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Summary
Dementia, particularly Alzheimer’s disease, is a defining characteristic of ageing today. Its 
confusion, disorientation and loss of memory provoke anxiety, dread and fear and its 
increasing incidence has led, in turn, to a growth in its representation across a variety of 
literary, cultural and other forms.
This thesis examines Alzheimer’s in contemporary cultural and theoretical terms 
through a reading of a diverse range of texts, arguing that such material can be best viewed 
through the prism of the Gothic, and that Alzheimer’s is informed by Gothicity, rendering 
Alzheimer subjects and their social world in a posthuman space. Several interrelated themes 
run throughout - body and mind; psychological and social loss; notions of fear, terror and 
horror -  all addressed by means o f theoretical paradigms drawn from psychoanalytic, 
postmodernist and poststructuralist thought.
Chapter 1 considers the contemporary cultural impact o f Alzheimer’s disease and, 
adopting an historical perspective, locates present-day anxieties in nineteenth- and twentieth- 
century cultural practice. Chapter 2 posits Alzheimer’s as a Gothic pathology, profiling 
Gothic fiction and its contemporary criticism. Chapter 3 contextualises Alzheimer’s in private 
and public spaces.
Chapter 4 sets out the use o f metaphor in cultural representations of disease and 
illness and is followed, in Chapter 5, by an exposition o f Gothic imagery and the language of 
Gothicity in Alzheimer’s. The thesis closes, in Chapter 6, with an analysis of imaginative 
writings about Alzheimer’s in contemporary fiction. Extensive reference is made throughout 
to biography, memoir, poetry, public papers and official reports.
The disintegrating personal and social realms of Alzheimer subjects scarcely feature 
in representations of dementia in the disciplines of medicine and science. This thesis is the 
first full-length attempt to fill such a gap and to demonstrate how the Gothic can advance and 
enrich the understanding Alzheimer’s in the contemporary world.
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Introduction
Dementia, with Alzheimer’s disease as its most common form, is on the increase within the 
United Kingdom. Whether written about or spoken, ‘Alzheimer’s disease’ evokes a sense of 
dread: horror, terror and fear are popular tropes associated with stories about Alzheimer’s 
and its effects and affects in contemporary fiction, popular media commentary, biography as 
‘pathography’ and the so-called ‘misery memoir’. Alzheimer’s disease is a condition which 
primarily affects the elderly and, by 2015, the number affected by this disease will have 
almost trebled in less than twenty years. Faced as they are with the possibility of an 
exponential increase in expense to the public purse in terms of health and social care, it is not 
surprising that Alzheimer’s disease is also a cause for concern to scientific researchers and 
public policy makers, whose work is itself not immune to infection by the popular tropes 
already mentioned. Caused by the gradual erosion of brain cells, Alzheimer’s disease leads to 
a loss of memory, understanding, judgement, language and thinking, and it is primarily with 
the cultural and literary representation of this loss that this thesis is concerned.
The master narratives o f biology and humanism determine the models of old age in 
their medical, social and economic paradigms, and these narratives have a long and 
influential history emphasising their powerful cultural effects. However, in their singular and 
joint dynamics, they cannot entirely resist or deny other narratives which propel different 
understandings about old age. Dissenting views bring to the surface some of the social 
contradictions in the master narratives, particularly in relation to our perceptions of disease in 
old age. For example, biology and humanism are foregrounded, only to be subverted, in Kelly 
Hurley’s The Gothic Body, where she describes her main theme as ‘the ruination of the 
human subject’1 in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This thesis is a further
1 Kelly Hurley, The Gothic Body: Sexuality, Materialism, and Degeneration at the Fin de Siecle (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 3.
2excursion into strangeness, and has a similar, if ultimately different, theme to Hurley’s text. It 
attends primarily to the ruination of the mind brought about by the neurological condition of 
Alzheimer’s disease, with the prism of the Gothic summoned into use to view the way this 
disease is represented in contemporary western society, particularly with regard to the 
psychological and social constructions inherent in these cultural representations.
Traditional constructions of human identity are undermined by Alzheimer’s disease as 
it insidiously enters the brain to destroy one of the brain’s primary attributes - memory. The 
aesthetic of the Gothic also subverts these constructions so as to delineate the limits of reason 
and the power of the body, both of which foreground vulnerability to the influence of others. 
The genre of the Gothic has traditionally shown a horrified fascination with madness as an 
example of the limits of reason, as also with the terrifying prospect of not having the power to 
choose reason above non-reason. Such concerns highlight the power o f the body and the 
difficulty of defining a clear boundary between sanity and insanity. Steven Bruhm argues that 
‘the Gothic graphically renders the body as violently attacked and in excessive pain’2 and this 
notion puts the body not in a sentimental humanistic position, but a posthuman one, without 
agency. It is precisely because Alzheimer’s disease construes its subject as both present and 
absent, leaving the body in a complex sphere somehow suspended between singularity and 
generality, that notions of the abject and the posthuman best articulate the private and the 
public filling o f that space with images of abandoned bodies released from anchoring minds.
This thesis argues that Alzheimer’s subjects become fear itself as their inner life 
disintegrates and a dislocation and a fracture o f their psychological self becomes apparent. 
Thus is a psychological structure presented which lends itself, wittingly or unwittingly, to
2 Steven Bruhm, ‘Gothic Body’, in The Handbook to Gothic Literature, ed. Marie Mulvey-Roberts (New York: 
New York University Press, 1998), pp. 267-268 (p. 267).
3Gothic language and imagery and, given that the Gothic acts as a repository for our social 
fears and ills, it is the contention of this thesis that the diverse variety of texts produced in 
contemporary society concerning old age and dementia possesses a family resemblance to 
that genre. Alzheimer’s disease has become the most representative phenomenon associated 
with old age, and the condition, probably due to its psychological effect of transforming the 
human into the posthuman, is open to a dark and metaphorical language reflecting social 
anxieties as well as personal fears. In this respect, the thesis argues that the subjects become 
in themselves a kind o f metaphor. In other words, materiality substitutes for the embodied 
self. The se lf s involuntary retreat, a voyage into the deep space o f the body, is a metaphoric 
understanding of the effects of this increasingly common condition. That this process and its 
consequences are terrifying and horrific is perhaps understandable given modernity’s 
emphasis on the integrity of the self and the supposed choices and freedoms o f action - 
physical and psychic -  that are available. Cultural historians such as Fred Botting and Neil 
Badmington argue that humanity was invented by modernity, and that to define this concept 
it had to be held up against a difference. For Badmington this difference can be viewed 
through the paradigm of posthumanism, and, for Botting, through the notion of monstrosity, 
both o f which might be construed as humanism’s darker shades.
It is the idea of difference and how it is represented which is important to this thesis. 
The term ‘Alzheimer subject’, or the person subject to Alzheimer’s, is used in its postmodern 
sense to suggest, as David Punter puts it, ‘a kind of unificatory power and powerlessness’.3 In 
other words, a subject in process from being one to becoming another as the condition 
decentres meaning, the notion being that the immediate identity is processed by the disease - 
is subjected to Alzheimer’s, as it were. The disease, it is argued, signifies the idea of
3 David Punter, Metaphor (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), p. 48.
4precedence - someone going on before, ahead, creating a gap - the mind going before the 
body and leaving a gap between the two that is filled with fears and apprehensions that 
mobilize the Gothic mode.
Andrew Balfour asks the question ‘how do we think about something we may rather 
not know about?’4 If  something is so terrifying that we find it problematic to face, the 
paradigms of psychoanalysis, within which Balfour’s question is often the opening gambit, 
suggest we might have to say we resort to the process o f projection and displacement to keep 
the terrifying at arm’s length. This thesis argues that we tend to use the dark language of the 
Gothic to contemplate a deconstructing disease - one that is always at work within - to 
balance out our personal fears and social anxieties. However, these forms of psychic defence 
or evasions are not always easy to achieve, as psychological haunting is a powerful emotion 
indicating that the dark flaws of whatever it is we call our nature are not to be complacently 
transcended. I f  art, as is traditionally argued, is, in its many guises, the human way to 
contemplate this projection and displacement, then it seems appropriate to explore the forms 
of fiction, biography and memoir to consider our paradoxical concerns about old age and the 
loss of capacity Alzheimer’s disease brings in its wake.
4 Andrew Balfour, ‘Facts, Phenomenology and Psychoanalytic Contributions to Dementia Care’ in Looking into 
Later Life, ed. Rachel Davenhill (London: Kamac Books, 2007), pp. 222-247 (p. 222).
5Chapter 1 
Alzheimer’s Disease and its Cultural Impact
The great dread of our age is the insidious onset o f Alzheimer’s 
disease. The inexorable loss of the very memories that constitute 
our individuality, our personhood.
Steven Rose
Descartes ... arrived at a new and remarkably influential account 
of what it means to be human .. .Rational thought, quite simply, 
makes humans human .. .Reason not only grants the subject the 
power of judgment; it also helps ‘us’ to tell the difference between 
the human and the non-human.
Neil Badmington
Gothic spaces are simultaneous spaces of being and of 
self-destruction, resulting in the creation and destruction 
of the social other.
Steven Bruhm
What particularly fascinated me, because of my interest in the 
biology of memory, was the possibility that psychotherapy, which 
presumably works in part by creating an environment in which 
people learn to change, produces structural changes in the brain 
and that one might now be in a position to evaluate those 
changes directly.
Eric R. Kandel1
1 Steven Rose, ‘Forgetfulness o f Things Past’, Guardian, 29 April 2004, pp.4-5; Neil Badmington, 
‘Introduction: Approaching PosthumanisnT, in Posthumanism, ed. by Neil Badmington 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000), pp. 1-10 (p. 3); Steven Bruhm, ‘Encrypted Identities’, Gothic 
Studies, 2 (2000), 1-7 (p. 4); Eric R. Kandel, In Search o f Memory (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Co., 2006), p. 367. Rose’s work concerns the biological processes of learning and remembering, 
and his research as a neuroscientist is focused on new treatments to counteract Alzheimer’s 
disease and the loss of the human. As such it relates to Badmington’s interest in the concept of 
posthumanism in Western culture, which, it is argued in this chapter, has an association with what 
Bruhm calls ‘Gothic spaces’. Kandel’s text relates to the interaction between biology and the 
environment and their influence in both the private and public arenas. Culture and its practices are 
encompassed by these epigraphs which broadly frame this first chapter in a reading of Alzheimer’s 
disease.
6Introduction
Alzheimer’s disease is a neurological condition understood primarily to be caused
by structural and chemical changes in the brain creating the loss of brain cells. It
is, therefore, considered to be a condition of the brain rather than the mind, a
neurological problem rather than a psychiatric one, although it can be
accompanied by forms of mental illness such as depression. It is usually indicated
to be present when the patient demonstrates several types o f symptoms: loss of
short-term, and, subsequently, long-term memory; confusion; mood swings; and
impairments in language and social functioning. These symptoms commonly
anticipate a slow deterioration of mental and physical abilities and tend, in the
main, to affect people in the post-sixties age group. Alzheimer’s disease is the
most common form of senile dementia, afflicting about 62% of the total number
of 700,000 subjects in the United Kingdom (a figure now revised, as referred to
further below), but its primary cause, as Sherwin Nuland points out, ‘has
continued to elude scientists since the problem was first brought to medical 
• • 0attention in 1907’. At the time of writing, there is no absolute test to signify the 
presence of the disease. It is usually diagnosed during a person’s lifetime solely in 
clinical terms, and even though brain scans are now a common diagnostic tool 
increasingly used by medical practitioners, they are not commonly used in the 
diagnosis of various forms of dementia, which diagnosis is confirmed only 
following autopsy, and even autopsy is not necessarily a regular practice.
Although Alzheimer’s disease as a syndrome has been known for more than a
2 Sherwin Nuland, How We Die (London: Chatto and Windus, 1994), p. 91.
7century and forms of dementia for very much longer, its symptoms and effects, 
including the fragmenting and transformation of identity, suggest a disease which 
can be tellingly comprehended by means of concepts drawn from a postmodern 
vocabulary or world view.
The diagnosis of the disease, as Rose’s epigraph above suggests, 
signifies the presence of a developing absence; the progression of a disease 
which establishes a regression, creating, as it were by appropriation, a fiction 
out of a fact. In other words, loss of memory, language and functional ability 
leaves a material fact, the body, without the self-conscious awareness that is 
assumed, conventionally, to drive it and give it meaning. The epigraph also 
characterizes the notion of dread in terms of an insidiousness of loss, a kind of 
erosion o f the fullness of being. This fullness relates to a quality o f memory 
which, from Rose’s point of view, establishes the idea of self because this 
quality shapes the history of our minds. The logic of such a view is that memory 
captures past and present while encompassing an idea of the future, thus 
establishing the self in time and space, with the loss o f such bearings leaving the 
subject in a kind of void. Configured in this way, the corporeal presence - the 
body - is a continuous remembrance of a human to whom there once was, and 
still is, an attachment: a hideous relic of what has been lost. This Gothic image 
of the hideous memento that is somehow out of time, encompasses a material 
and experiential reality affecting many thousands of elderly people and those 
who care for them, and suggestively echoes Badmington’s epigraph of a subject 
losing specificity as a human being once form separates from matter. It is a
8disease with an authentic sting, as banal as it is horrible in its theft of human 
dignity.
Rose’s epigraph also implies a divide between the body and the mind’s self- 
consciousness and a dread of the former by the latter. It further suggests that the 
disease is far more than a singular or personal event by declaring it to be ‘the great 
dread o f our age’ as the disease creates unguarded emotional responses and the 
mind shifts from structured to unstructured forms, thus evoking Charles Wright 
Mills’ maxim of private ills being transformed into public issues.3 If the continuity 
and linearity of memory is interrupted, it becomes a cause not only of personal, but 
also of public concern and, as the condition becomes widespread, a dynamic 
interaction between the personal and the public comes into play, a dynamic which 
will be explored in Chapter 3. The subtext of such an interaction is that the 
depredations of nature are perceived to be susceptible to public intervention and not 
simply to be endured in private. But this seemingly optimistic public intervention is 
often coloured by subversive fears represented in both public and private language 
as illustrated in Rose’s epigraph. Its dark images which reference something 
threatening and growing within that will eventually consume all before it offer no 
hope, lifting the veil on a further level of language exposed when faced by such 
fearful expectations. It is the exploration o f the private and public language 
representing this disease which inhabits the centre of this thesis.
The third epigraph suggests another form of interjection in the discourse 
of Alzheimer’s disease and its cultural impact in that it announces a point of view
3 For a fuller elaboration of these points, see Charles Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).
9about the condition as a kind of infection, thereby making use of one of the
popular motifs of the Gothic genre. The Gothic space, suggests Bruhm, is a space
within which such infections destroy selves and erode others’ identities. In other
words, private space is invaded by a disease which transforms identity.
Characteristically the Gothic genre also references terror, horror and notions of
monstrosity in both a singular and general sense, all this expressed in a language
dark in its sensibilities. The Gothic genre, therefore, is one in which these
characteristics relate to matters and events concerning loss, inscribing this loss in
what Steven Bruhm calls ‘a proliferation of language that borders on obsession -
compulsion’.4 Michel Foucault, cited by Botting, argues that the genre is
exemplified by an excess of language, a fulsomeness which tends to indicate that:
The language of terror is dedicated to an endless expense, 
even though it only seeks to achieve a single effect. It drives 
itself out of any possible resting place.5
It is not just an excess of language which defines the Gothic; the definition relies
heavily on what is stimulated by the Gothic. Terror and horror, which will be
considered in the following chapter, are an excess of remembered feeling
summarized in Botting’s idea that ‘Gothic atmospheres ... signal the disturbing
return of pasts upon presents’.6 Such ideas are also arrived at through a language
which alarms that present, a disturbance creating a sense of unrest or excitement,
the twin motifs of the genre. The language of loss, often used by Alzheimer
subjects and those who care for them, can also be perceived as the language of
terror and horror at the prospect of losing a sense of self. As the second epigraph
4 Bruhm, p. 1.
5 Fred Botting, Gothic (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 1.
6 Botting, p. 1.
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points out, reason enables us to distinguish between what is, and is not, human, 
and it is the prospect o f what is not human that suffuses the descriptive language 
surrounding those diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease.
The expressions of loss, horror and terror, aspects of the language of the 
Gothic, seem to emerge from images foretelling a slippage over the boundary of 
the rational to the chaotically irrational. If one of the ideas of the Gothic is that of 
excess, it is one which seems to contaminate the image o f dementia as expressed 
by Rose. The apocalyptic nature of ‘the great dread’ and its fearsome 
insidiousness, which has within it notions of something lying in wait and seeking 
to entrap or ensnare, cunning and deceitful, creates images o f something 
incipiently horrible. The disease is seen to menace the body as well as the mind, 
thus expressing the body’s limitations as well as its mutability through the nature 
of the progress of the disease. The body and the mind are haunted by this 
movement, turning the subject into the phantom of a once-known identity, a 
suggestive memento. It seems that within the fabric of the Gothic the fragility and 
the vulnerability of the body is returned to the horror of the primary position, a 
body of instinctual feelings and emotional outbursts; a sort of pre- and posthuman 
condition of the kind explored in Julia Kristeva’s Powers o f  Horror which also 
gives an emphasis to Botting’s notion of ‘Gothic atmospheres’, and her work will 
accordingly be discussed in later chapters. Framed by these epigraphs, this 
chapter will examine representations of the neurological condition named as 
Alzheimer’s disease within the cultural history that helped to construct both an 
understanding and a dread of the condition and the social concerns it has created.
Late Twentieth-Century Concerns
Late twentieth-century concerns with this ‘great dread’ relate predominantly to 
the growing volume of people living into old age and the attendant social and 
economic demands this creates on family structures, health and social care 
services and on the affordability of pensions. The elderly are seen as heavy 
consumers of such provision, and it was the twin pressures of a growing elderly 
population and the consequent demand on services which prompted the Audit 
Commission to carry out a review of public provision available to the elderly 
mentally ill, including those with dementia such as Alzheimer’s disease - a 
particularly dependant group. The Commission reported in 2000, publishing a 
document titled forget me not, 7 which elaborates a connection between private 
troubles and public issues by asking questions about what it considered to be 
society’s responsibilities to meet the needs of the elderly and, as the report’s title 
suggests, the desirability of recalling former selves destroyed by the condition of 
dementia.
The question which seems to emerge from this report is: is old age value for 
money? The question may seem to be heinous to those who belong to religious or 
humanist groups, as well as to many others of neither persuasion. But it is one that 
has been asked increasingly in a variety of texts at the latter end of the twentieth 
and early years of the twenty-first century; texts concerned with the social and 
health conditions of old age and the consequent socio-economic pressures on the 
working population, as well as imaginative texts of fiction, drama and poetry. If
1 forget me not (London: Audit Commission, 2000). A further report was published in 2007 by the 
National Audit Office, successor body to the Audit Commission, Improving services and support 
for people with dementia (London: National Audit Office, 2007).
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there is a value in old age, culturally or otherwise, it is one that appears to be 
mired in social contradictions. Although there is a sense of congratulation in the 
way that progress in a range of services has extended expectation of a longer life, 
dependent old age, in particular, seems to create considerable social and economic 
stress for western capitalist societies. On the one hand, there are the moral and 
social demands of compassion aligned with arguments about social justice and 
human rights, while, on the other, economic self-regard and a distaste for 
dependency create a tension that seems problematic for the ‘private’ and ‘public’ 
to bridge.
It is not unusual for government or other official reports on public services 
to be marked by a sense of how the self unravels in the face of conditions over 
which it has little or no power, and the Audit Commission’s report falls into this 
category, maintaining that ‘the prevalence of dementia rises sharply with age, 
with the proportion roughly doubling with every five years up to the age of 90’.8 
It goes on to state that ‘6% of the 75-79 year-olds, 13% o f the 80-84 year-olds and 
25% of those over 85 have dementia’.9 The statistics point toward a paradox and a 
stereotype: longevity is the successful outcome of better living and economic 
conditions as well as an improved medical science, yet it is often accompanied by 
the compromising risk of a diseased old age, which becomes transformed, in its 
turn, into the very stereotype of ageing. The Alzheimer’s Society, a voluntary 
organization, suggests that there are three-quarters of a million people in the 
United Kingdom who have dementia and has estimated that this will increase by
8 forget me not, p. 10.
9 forget me not, p. 11.
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another one hundred thousand before 2010.10 In a recent report, Dementia 2010, 
produced by the Health Economics Research Centre at the University of Oxford 
for the Alzheimer’s Research Trust, the estimates for those directly afflicted by 
the condition has risen to some 820,000 in the United Kingdom.11
The implication seems clear: as individuals live longer, so grows the risk of 
developing dementia as the population as a whole finds itself threatened by the 
burden o f caring for the demented. Andrea Gillies refers to this demographic, in 
apocalyptic terms, as both an epidemic and a time bomb. Indeed, history has 
described several periods of demographic pressure, underpinned by the notion of 
a ‘natural’ equilibrium of population, which has caused outbursts of moral panic 
resulting in the identification of groups who were thought to be problematic in 
causing such a situation. These groups became objects not only of fear but 
stereotypical constructions and forget me not may be construed as a late 
twentieth-century instance of such a panic and is indicative o f a tension which a 
developing public awareness has created about more people living into old age 
and its consequent conditions. Time, it seems, is inhabited by the pathological and 
the language of the Gothic. If three-score years and ten can be considered the 
measure of God’s time, an excess of it might be perceived as unjustified, indecent, 
unreal and even Satanic. And perhaps it is such possibilities that underscore the 
symptoms inhabiting this excessive time. Certainly, a return to a primary process
10 ‘Thanks to you \  Alzheimer’s Society Newsletter, 19 (2004), pp.1-6 (p. 1).
11 Dementia 2010, Health Economics Research Centre, University of Oxford, 2010.
12 Andrea Gillies, Living with Nancy, A Journey into Alzheimer’s (London: Short Books, 2009). 
Gillies’ text describes the emotional and practical aspects of the care of her mother-in-law, who 
has Alzheimer’s disease, against the background of an increase in the number o f people suffering 
from the condition.
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in bodies signaling their maturity may seem out of place and out of time, and, 
therefore, unnerving to others as well as frightening and disturbing to the sufferers 
themselves. The Audit Commission’s description of the process of the disease 
implies that this return to the body is a kind of unravelling of the mind and the 
beginning of chaos: intellectual abilities released from anchor seem to return the 
subject to the pre-human. The higher cortical functions are undone and 
personality and behavior are no longer controlled by an ego, but left defenceless 
to the lower cortical instincts. It is these instincts that suggest Freud’s model of 
primary process: a tendency toward an immediate discharge o f feeling or 
emotion.13
The Audit Commission’s report provides a descriptive account of the
process of the disease as presently understood:
Dementia refers to a cluster of signs and symptoms of intellectual 
and cognitive functioning being disrupted, usually in a progressive 
way that cannot be reversed. They are also called organic mental 
health problems, as they are linked to major physical changes in 
the brain. Four levels or stages have been described, although 
they merge into each other and individuals will vary in the way 
in which their condition progresses.
• Minimal: where the person has some difficulty in 
recalling recent events and may mislay or lose things
• Mild: where the person’s recent memory is very poor 
and they are sometimes confused or disoriented.
• Moderate: where the person is usually disoriented in 
time and place, and has difficulty in reasoning and 
or understanding. Sometimes they are incontinent 
and their emotional control deteriorates.
• Severe: where the person is totally disoriented, unable to 
communicate in normal speech, may fail to recognize 
close relatives, and is incontinent and completely 
dependent on others for personal care. Some people with
13 Sigmund Freud, On Sexuality: Three Essays on the Theory o f Sexuality, ed. by Angela Richards, 
trans. by James Strachey, Penguin Freud Library, Vol. 7 (London: Penguin, 1991), p. 21.
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severe dementia may be aggressive or violent to others.
As the dementia progresses, the person can become 
immobile and totally physically dependent.14
In this descriptive account of the process of Alzheimer’s disease, the flat
administrative prose reminds the reader that it is an Audit Commission (deriving
from the Latin audio ‘to hear’) that hears the slow, almost measured beats toward
the subject’s deterioration and dissolution of the mind, a kind of caressing affect
inside the idea of insidiousness, as it becomes transformed into its own shadow,
gliding ghost-like into a darkened future. What it hears and describes are the
pathological outcomes of a disease process, but what it does not hear is what
David Lodge calls ‘the density of those events as consciously experienced’.15
Administrative prose carefully hides, or more accurately, veils that psychological
experience and thereby avoids its cultural stress except through the arithmetic of
what it means economically for public services. It does not seek to ‘move’ or
‘transport’ the reader’s emotions, but to distance them, unlike works of literature,
which ‘describe in the guise of fiction the dense specificity of personal
experience’16 and in which the reader may feel the thrill of recognition. But the
text does precisely set out how the insidious and transformative nature of the
disease emerges over a period of time.
The process is one of the unravelling of the idea of selfhood, a kind of 
unwinding from the psychological to the biological, a reverse of the usual path 
taken in personal development, which prompts one subject of the disease to call
14 forget me not, p. 9.
15 David Lodge, Consciousness and the Novel (London: Seeker and Warburg, 2002), p. 14.
16 Lodge, p. 10.
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the process one of ‘joining a parade of horror’17 as he is cast off from the human. 
This idea is explored further in Chapters 2 and 3 through the work of Kristeva, 
which emphasizes the dark language of the Gothic through the abjection of the 
body into the symbolic. Personality, temperament and identity are harassed and 
attacked as the disease begins to bury history, leaving a body at the borders of 
past and future, existing in a kind of continuous present. The character formed by 
the disease is delineated through a process of becoming, arrived at through a 
process of unbecoming. The disease progresses as something secret, illicit in its 
growth, as the mind yields itself up to an incipient violence. Indeed, in its later 
stages, Alzheimer’s leaves no room for what might be called the clutter of 
psychology or motivation, those interior niceties that are at the centre of 
psychoanalytic discourse and literary art. The condition at this stage seems to 
separate talking and thinking from action and behaviour, indicating that the 
subject can have no more meaning because it can no longer explore or question its 
humanity or mortality. Thought, language, questioning or writing are left to die as 
they are stripped away by the disease leaving something less than human in its 
wake, a characteristically Gothic predicament. The disease process, as outlined 
above in the Audit Commission’s report, tellingly underlines the way the human 
is destroyed, its place usurped by the ‘not-quite-human subject ... continually in 
danger of becoming not-itself ,18 a movement that entails a threatening promise as 
it transforms the usual constructs of human identity to a condition of being 
fragmented and changeable.
17 Thomas DeBaggio, Losing my Mind (New York: The Free Press, 2002), p. 1.
18 Kelly Hurley, The Gothic Body: Sexuality, Materialism, and Degeneration at the Fin de Siecle 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p.6.
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The weight of the incipient violence entailed in Alzheimer’s alters the
shape o f the mind and the body. As cited earlier, Thomas DeBaggio likens the
process of being diagnosed with the disease to ‘the parade of horror created by
Alzheimer’s’. But if a return to a primary instinctual existence is perceived in
these terms, it is often accompanied with a parallel view about old age in general.
Simone de Beauvoir, for example, states that ‘society’s attitude towards the old is
deeply ambivalent’. She goes on to assert ‘economists and legislators ... deplore
the burden that the “non-active” [have] laid upon the shoulders of the active
population’.19 Similarly, Margaret Simey claims that ‘to be old is by definition to
be pitiable and poor, to suffer from irreversible decrepitude, to be doomed to go to
the workhouse - or to “a home’” .20 De Beauvoir argues that economists and
legislators fail to recognize their own future and the need to insure against its
depredations. It is a denial and a resistance - a failure to accept and understand
mutability and time:
Nowadays we know that it is pointless to study the physiological 
and the psychological aspects separately, for each governs the other ... 
this relationship is especially clear in old age ... yet what is termed 
the individual’s psychic or spiritual life can only be understood 
in the light of his existential situation: this situation therefore, also 
affects his physical organism. And the converse applies, for he 
experiences his relationship with time differently according to whether 
his body is more or less impaired 21
This Darwinian interplay between biology and environment is echoed in Tom
Kitwood’s study Dementia Reconsidered: The Person Comes First, when he
claims that:
19 Simone de Beauvoir, Old Age (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985), pp. 8-9.
20 Margaret Simey, ‘How, and where, I found my independence’, in Getting a Life: Older People 
Talking, ed. by Michael Simmons (London: Peter Owen Publishers, 2000), pp. 133-138 (p. 134).
21 De Beauvoir, p. 15.
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The brain is now recognized as an organ that is capable 
o f continuing structural adaptation, its circuitry is not static, 
as in a computer, but dynamic -  slowly changing according to 
environmental demands.22
The question that arises from these perceptions is how the contradictory social
attitudes expressed in western societies affect the elderly. What Kitwood’s
statement, in particular, begins to suggest is that a condition such as dementia,
once thought to be wholly explicable in biological terms of unremitting decay,
might now come to be questioned, and that from somewhere in their buried
history, subjects may yet be heroically rescued.
In the 1960s and 70s Ronald Laing, an existentialist psychiatrist,
propounded the view that some people were sent mad by being placed in what he
thought were untenable positions by a contradictory dialectical process. In other
words, the person being sent mad was a repository of what might be called
contradictory messages. Kitwood argues similarly:
I began to ask myself whether some, at least, of the symptoms 
[of dementia] that are commonly found might be due more 
to a failure of understanding and care than a structural failure 
of the brain. I discovered that a few people had indeed written 
along these lines, although their work was generally discounted 
or neglected 23
Considering whether Alzheimer’s is a disease of the brain or the mind, Jacques 
Maisondieu, a French psychiatrist, begins by examining the confusions which 
arise in the allocation of such cases between psychiatrist and neurologist. This 
leads him to the possibility that in some cases dementia may be more socially 
affected in its origins than medical science to date wishes to acknowledge. This is
22 Tom Kitwood, Dementia Reconsidered: The Person Comes First (Buckingham: Open 
University Press, 1997), p. 2.
23 Kitwood, p. 3.
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clearly not an argument that meets with much understanding or agreement in
medical scientific circles, which consider the condition in entirely biological
terms as opposed to environmental ones, even though its origins are still not
known. Up until the latter years of the twentieth century psychiatric illnesses were
classified into two major groups, organic illnesses and functional illnesses based
on presumed differences in their origin. Such a classification, which dated back to
the nineteenth century, emerged from postmortem examinations o f the brains of
those suffering from mental illness. But Maisondieu argues that:
Alzheimer’s disease has become the nightmare of the third 
and fourth ages. This disease whose origin is so obscure has 
now an amazing dominance ... as against a radically biological 
Alzheimer’s there is room for purely functional types which may 
in every respect look like the same thing. Between these two 
distinct poles the overwhelming number of cases of senility must 
be linked to mixed pathological types in which neurochemical lesions, 
psychic problems and social and linguistic difficulties are linked 
inextricably with the patient’s reactions to his own ailments and 
with the reactions towards him by those around him.24
On the surface this argument may seem no more than a plea for a more rigorous
diagnostic process, involving not only neurology and psychiatry but other kinds of
professional workers as well, but its primary message seems to rest with the idea
that some of the origins of demented behavior may be found in dysfunctional
social interactions, which gives emphasis to the importance of the environment.
But perhaps the clue to it being something more than this rests in the idea
that the condition of Alzheimer’s has ‘become the nightmare of the third and
fourth ages’, indicating the power of biological medicine to provoke images of
monstrous proportions. This telling ‘nightmare’, another motif of the Gothic,
24 Jacques Maisondieu, ‘Alzheimer’s Disease: Disease of the Brain, or Disease of the Mind?’ 
Encephalie, 5 (1999), 7-10 (p. 9), privately translated by R. H. Spencer.
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suggests that de Beauvoir’s arguments about the way old age is perceived as a 
kind o f decrepitude, something to be largely ignored or put to the margins as a 
way of becoming blind to the wretched fate reserved for old age in a society 
which is only interested in the young, is a very persuasive one. And, if we are 
persuaded to see old age as burdensome and a kind of mirror-image of the erasure 
and loss of identity, as implied in Maisondieu, why not express despair in losing 
your wits? Such despair, according to Kitwood, would have its effects on the 
brain. The subtext of Kitwood’s argument is that to reduce everything to matter is 
to ignore culture and its effects on that matter. Thus, it can be argued that the 
emerging message in the texts of de Beauvoir and Maisondieu concerns both the 
creation and destruction, in both medical and social cultures, o f old age and its 
ravages. Old age could be construed in terms of the benign, the sagacious and 
even the active and engaged, but its predominant construction is affected by the 
anguish of dying, decrepitude and death. This anguish seems, in turn, to fill a 
space to create images redolent of the Gothic with notions of transformation bred 
through processes of corruption.
If it is culture that persuades people how to be old, then old age is not 
necessarily determined by biology: hence, identity need not be buried by age. No 
doubt the ageing body does become the focus of a discursive project as it is 
transformed into a site for medical science and its application. Neurological 
science, in particular, will seek to anchor the ageing and diseased brain in flat, 
sombre facts. Indeed, as Stephen Katz points out, the National Institute on Ageing 
in the United States of America has ‘been instrumental in publicizing Alzheimer’s
21
disease as a nationwide crisis’ and continues by arguing that ‘what is the AD 
movement if not the biomedicalization of senile dementia stripped of its social 
and economic dimensions?’25 In the United Kingdom, however, as noted earlier, it 
was the economic consequences of Alzheimer’s disease that influenced the Audit 
Commission’s report. But Katz’s concern with the social aspects of the disease 
emphasizes how the mind constitutes an elaborate means of thought and language 
through which a more imaginative process of being can be conjured and acts of 
resistance created. What Kitwood, among others, has attempted to do is to focus 
on ‘the person, not the brain’.26 In a sense, he returns old age, and in particular the 
elderly demented, to a kind of private sphere, thereby undermining the master 
narrative established by public science. His argument is an anti-reductionist one in 
which the care and sole treatment of the Alzheimer subject is around physical 
attention ‘based on neurological determinism’.27 Attention only to the body 
reduces the person to matter, and, alongside care of the body, it is cognitive 
functioning which needs to be both maintained and improved.
From his experience of working with people with dementia, Kitwood 
argues that ‘the key criteria of personhood are ... subjectivity, relationship and 
agency’.28 These criteria, as he readily admits, are highly valued in western 
societies, but would seem to be lacking in people diagnosed with dementia, 
thereby taking them outside of the human. But he and his colleagues ‘place more
25 Stephen Katz, Disciplining Old Age (Charlottesville: The University Press o f Virginia, 1996), 
p.5. Katz takes the paradigms of categorization and classification from Foucault to argue against 
‘the disciplining’ of old age by medical and social institutions.
26 Kitwood, p. 3.
27 Kitwood, p. 8.
28 Kitwood, p. 8.
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emphasis on feeling than on reason, and interdependence than autonomy.29
However, such constructions do not necessarily remove the Alzheimer subject
entirely from the clutch of the body. Feelings arise from the somatic as well as
from the stimulation of the external world and the notion of interdependence may
well be a way of ascribing to the master narrative a desire to perceive old age as a
stage of dependency. Feelings and interdependency may well be seen as
something less than reason and autonomy, and more soft than hard in conceptual
terms. Nevertheless, in Kitwoocfs paradigm they arise out of the continuing
psychological needs of the Alzheimer subject underpinning his emphasis on the
notion of personhood and the need to maintain identity in the face of a
determining biology and the power of medical science. The paradigm invests in
the residues of capability, and in the fragments of expression which relate to
whole things. This point of view is subscribed to by Mike Hepworth:
Because the self is not a biological entity but a social construct, 
it is possible to explore the rich variety of ways in which 
biological changes can be accommodated in any personal 
life story. The master narrative of decline requires a single self 
going through a linear trajectory, whilst the portmanteau self 
is an active concept of ageing as self-narrated experience, 
the conscious, ongoing story of one’s age identity.30
This seems a paradigm which encapsulates Kitwoocfs philosophy and stands in
manifest opposition to the primary concerns of de Beauvoifs economists and
legislators in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. These points of
argument raise questions such as how much of the behaviour of the elderly can be
accounted for by biology, and how much by language, culture, and thought? But
29 Kitwood, p. 10.
30 Mike Hepworth, ‘In Defiance of an Ageing Culture’, Ageing and Society, 19 (1999), 139-146 
(p. 146).
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such biological and social concerns do not emerge fully-fledged from the 
constructs of medical and social scientists of this period; on the contrary, they 
were clearly signposted in the classificatory systems characteristic of thought in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth century designed to control and regulate a rebellious 
nature.
Nineteenth-Century Concerns
Social concerns about older people in the community as portrayed in late 
twentieth-century reports may represent contemporary cultural sensibilities, but 
such concern should not be seen as a new phenomenon. Anxieties about an excess 
of population and the nature of that population, and about a return to the body, 
also marked the social and cultural milieu of the nineteenth century. In particular, 
a fascination with the mind and a fear of the body was apparent in nineteenth- 
century psychiatry, which wove a narrative around constructions of mental illness 
plucked from an inner and private life and thrust into the public arena.
Legitimacy for this narrative was sought by appropriating ideas and 
analyses from the natural sciences. It has been argued that the eighteenth century 
foreshadowed ‘a dualism that has tended to denigrate the corporeal dimension of 
human life in favour of the intellectual and cognitive basis of human 
understanding’.31 This hierarchical structure presupposes both human and less 
than human aspects of our being that appear to arise out of a fear of the body: 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century fascination with the mind had to acknowledge 
the body, but only as a threat to the mind itself, which had to discipline that threat.
31 Philip Hancock, Bill Hughes, Elizabeth Jagger, Kevin Paterson, Rachel Russell, Emmanuelle 
Tulle-Watson, Melissa Tyler, The Body, Culture and Society: An Introduction (Buckingham:
Open University Press, 2000), p. 121.
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Indeed, the dominant lesson of the history of medicine is that it has sought to 
learn from the body only in order to dominate it and put it in its place in a quest to 
confront and shape it: ‘nature, including the body, has become something to be 
commanded and disciplined’.32 It is the embodied mind that is projected as 
commanding and disciplining each individual body, adopting both offensive and 
defensive strategies as it adapts to its surrounding mass. Later in the nineteenth 
century, such power was challenged by an evolutionary biology which suggested 
that the mind might never be entirely the master of its own survival unless it took 
steps to become the prevailing type which was generally understood as having the 
capacity to adapt to changing circumstances.
It was in these ways that nineteenth-century medicine constructed the 
body, working on the assumption that it was ‘obedient to the laws of anatomy and 
physiology’. This conception of the body as a biological and fixed entity, 
somehow outside of its cultural and historical context, inevitably defines the body 
as a passive instrument, but as the century progressed and theories of evolutionary 
biology became more contentious, a redefinition of this perception began to 
develop, culminating in the twentieth-century belief in the physicality of 
consciousness. This value structure, when applied to mental health, echoes both 
the rationalism of the Enlightenment and the discursive nature of the shaping of 
madness in nineteenth-century psychiatry.
Therefore, it may be argued that the construction of mental illness in this 
period arose out of opposed possibilities: did the condition result from a
32 Hancock et al., p. 2.
33 Bill Hughes, ‘Medicalized Bodies’ in Hancock et al., p. 13.
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psychological disturbance, or was it an expression of a material lesion? 
Evolutionary biology, with its implied notion of inheritance, pointed toward the 
latter explanation as a cause of mental illness. However, it could not entirely 
move away from the necessity of the mind to shape the needs of the body in 
meeting the social concerns of an increasingly industrialized population. A mind 
prone to irresolution in the face of bodily demands meant, in the long run, a 
diminution of the ‘quality’ of the population. And such irresolution also suggested 
that the mind could fragment and thus require services that local and national 
institutions, such as Poor Law workhouses, would find difficulty in providing. It 
was ideas such as these which developed throughout the twentieth century, 
influencing medical science and a variety of its clinical practices.
It was Herbert Spencer who first explicated the principle o f the survival of 
the fittest which emerged out of his concerns with evolutionary theories and his 
interest in their application.34 Evolution was not a new idea as it had been a matter 
of discussion amongst naturalists and biologists from the late eighteenth century. 
However, Spencer’s article in the Westminster Review in 1852 did anticipate some 
of the basic Darwinian principles of evolution such as the ideas that all organisms 
can produce more offspring than can survive to adulthood and that like breeds 
like; and that the best adapted variants are the most likely to survive. Writing in 
the tradition of Thomas Malthus and advocating moral restraint in the face of 
demographic pressures, Spencer initially extrapolated a principle of population 
control from the natural law of animal fertility. What Spencer attempted to
34 Herbert Spencer, ‘A Theory o f Population Deduced from the General Law of Animal Fertility’,
Westminster Review (April 1852), pp. 468-501.
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demonstrate from this law was the transformation of human life from a condition 
of uncontrolled instinctual impulse to one of self-regulation through the 
development of higher cortical arrangements arrived at via evolutionary 
processes.
This transformation from animal instinct to rationality, Spencer
maintained, is exemplified in the human species by qualities of swiftness, strength
and agility, together with instinct and intelligence. Spencer distinguished between
these qualities as displayed in some species of animals, by invoking the more
complex physiological and chemical make-up of the human nervous system and
the brain which is at its centre. Both human and animal species have an instinct to
survive, but human consciousness, arrived at through a highly developed nervous
system, enables the human species to cultivate this quality to a higher degree and,
in particular, to display a moral sense. Though framed within a scientific
discourse, Spencer’s paradigm could not veil its moral message:
In the nature of things, only those who advance ... eventually 
survive. For, necessarily, families and races whom this 
increasing difficulty of getting a living which excess of fertility 
entails, does not stimulate to improvements in production -  
that is, to greater mental activity -  are on the highroad to 
extinction; and must ultimately be supplanted by those whom 
the pressure does so stimulate.35
The structure of feeling evident here is predominantly one of fear, or at least
anxiety, in the face of an excess of population of a type, mainly seen in the notion
of the mob, whose behavior exemplifies lower mental activity suggestive of the
monstrous. At various times in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, moral
panics surfaced about demographic pressures. A growing urban industrial class
35 Spencer,‘Theory o f Population’, p. 499.
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brought into play the potential of the mob threatening the middle class with its 
unruly behavior. Spencer’s representation of evolution and population control 
expresses a fear of the body, and of bodies that were out of control and potentially 
violent. The representation suggests a body in excess of itself and open to error. 
Spencer construed the mind, however, as the controlling mechanism for a 
channelling process of stimulation, one that could ensure that the body was 
denied. Clearly, the physical ‘nature’ of the body had to be outwitted by a 
regulatory mind, a mind that was influenced by a culture turned toward progress. 
Spencer’s model, predating Freud, nevertheless resonates with the structure of the 
mind elaborated by the latter: ego and superego together smothering libido. Self- 
denial and self-help were characteristic of the nineteenth-century industrial and 
commercial middle class to whom Spencer primarily appealed.
It is Spencer’s emphasis on ‘the nature of things’ which calls to mind the 
idea of biological evolution and materialism - an alteration, indeed a 
transformation of hierarchy whereby primary processes are shaped and 
disciplined by secondary ones. The fear of excess was, of course, a fear of 
instinctual life: a potential animal that required suppression and control, perhaps 
even a Gothic evolutionary image of unmanageable instincts. In his commentary 
on demographics, Spencer perceived excess of fertility as subverting progress and 
undermining the individual because excess produced an inadequate species which 
was unable to advance progress and was hence a burden to both itself and to 
society.
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As noted earlier, Spencer’s ideas pre-dated Charles Darwin’s Origin o f
Species published in 1859, in which Darwin took a considered view of excess.36
His theory of evolution by natural selection rested upon three axioms. First, like
breeds like, with minor variations. Secondly, all organisms can produce more
offspring than can survive to adulthood, and, thirdly, the best adapted variants are
most likely to survive to reproduce in turn. Spencer’s anxieties related to the
notion of a demographic over-production and the idea that evolution could thus be
transformed into dissolution; an inevitable carrying forward of a weight from the
past to the future: some kind of possession determined in and by history from
which there could be no escape except in death. Hence, inheritance became a
primary factor in Spencer’s notion of self-preservation:
Whilst, on the one hand, it cannot be denied that the increase 
o f tissue constituting growth is self-preservation both in 
essence and in result; neither can it, on the other side, be denied 
that a diminution of tissue, either from injury, disease, or old age, 
is in essence and result the reverse.37
Spencer invariably cast his arguments within notions of the inverse, seeking
always a balance of forces in relation to progress which itself, he argued, rested
on a balanced population:
Regarded from an abstract point of view, increased ability 
to maintain life in this case, as in all others, necessarily involves
■JO
decreased ability to multiply.
Looking to the future, Spencer perceived a diminishing return in demographics 
with the ‘best’ prevailing, and the over-fertile dying away through ill-health,
36 Charles Darwin, Origin o f Species (London: John Murray, 1859).
37 Spencer, ‘Theory of Population’, p. 478. Spencer argued that self-preservation of the species 
was its primary motivating factor, and, therefore, the species had to resist forces that undermined 
motivation.
38 Spencer, ‘Theory of Population’, p. 478.
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starvation and decrepit old age. In fact, like Malthus before him, he was opposed
to state provision for such people, arguing that they should be left to charity and
their own devices:
Those left behind to continue the race are those in whom 
the power of self-preservation is the greatest - are the select 
o f their generation. So that, whether the dangers to existence 
be of fertility, or any other kind, it is clear that by the ceaseless 
exercise of the faculties needed to contend with them ... 
there is ensured a constant progress toward a higher degree 
o f skill, intelligence, and self-regulation - a better co-ordination 
o f actions - a more complete life.39
The qualities of self-preservation, intelligence and self-regulation required a
disciplined materiality and an active awareness of time. These qualities typify the
liberal bourgeois humanism of the nineteenth century most characteristically
illustrated in Self-Help, the work of Samuel Smiles, first published in 1859. In
other words, the species had to be conscious of the past and its possible effects on
the here and now so as to safeguard the future, lest dissolution threaten.
In material terms, Spencer’s work described a central nervous system
which featured integrative levels, the lower levels corresponding to more
primitive functions. Man, with his higher levels, was said to be able to cognize,
thereby demonstrating a more refined adjustment to his world than the usual
fight-flight behaviour of animals. But the concepts of dissolution and
degeneration became central tenets in nineteenth-century psychiatry. In particular,
it was Spencer’s model of the lower and higher levels of the nervous system
which influenced the work of John Hughlings Jackson, a physician and
neurologist, who gave considerable emphasis to theories of dissolution, arguing
39 Spencer, ‘Theory o f  Population’, p. 498.
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that the highest and most recently developed functions dissolve first in the disease 
process and begin the degenerative transformation toward the less than human. 
Jackson maintained that mental illness was primarily the result of some kind of 
brain lesion, and, in neurological terms, produces an effect that is the reverse of 
evolution: ‘dissolution is a term I take from Spencer as a name for the reverse of 
evolution’.40 In the sense that evolution was reversed if principles o f self- 
preservation were undermined or subverted by forces that damaged the nervous 
system, Jackson’s and Spencer’s ideas can be seen to express a mutual pre­
occupation with what Kelly Hurley calls a ‘prospect of the reversal of evolution’ 
with its possibilities of producing traits in the human species which would prove 
to be dangerous.41
However, in perceiving dementia (and epilepsy) as two forms of damage
to the nervous system, Jackson’s analysis could also be seen as portraying
evolutionary biology carrying within itself the seeds of its own destruction. But
Jackson distanced himself from Spencer’s tendency to apply Darwinian principles
universally, seeking instead to focus Darwinian biological propositions on an
examination of the nervous system alone:
Evolution is a passage from the most to the least organized; that is 
to say from the lowest, well organized, centres up to the highest, 
least organized centres; putting this otherwise, the progress [in the 
development of the nervous system] is from centres, comparatively 
well organized at birth up to those, the highest centres, which are 
continually organizing through life 42
40 John Hughlings Jackson, Selected Writings of John Hughlings Jackson: Croonian Lectures 
1884: Evolution and Dissolution o f the Nervous System, ed. James Taylor (London: Hodder 
and Stoughton, 1931), Vol. 1, pp. 45-75 (p. 45).
41 Hurley, p. 10.
42 Jackson, p. 45.
31
Jackson goes on to suggest that in the evolutionary process a kind of abnegation
takes place materially:
The highest centres, which are the climax of nervous evolution 
and which make up the “organ of mind” (or physical basis of 
consciousness) are the least organized, the most complex, and 
the most voluntary.43
The process of moving to something higher from something lower can be seen as
a form of becoming through renouncing the latter for the former. For Jackson, this
evolutionary biological becoming was a positive putting together of the nervous
system: its negative opposite was the process of dissolution, what Jackson
somewhat balefully called a ‘taking to pieces’.44 For him, dissolution was:
A taking to pieces in the order from the most complex 
and most voluntary, toward the most organized, most simple, 
most automatic 45
In other words, the higher cortical arrangements of the brain, those functions that
control movement, speech, memory and judgement unravel, leaving the lower
arrangements of the nervous system, our instinctual feelings and emotions, open
to little or no regulating influence. There is a loss of intellectual functioning in
voluntary language, and in logical and reasoned thinking, but there is retention of
emotional, automatic language - that is, a language of the body expressing
emotion. Jackson concludes his commentary on the evolution and dissolution of
the nervous system by asserting:
The doctrine of evolution implies the passage from the most 
organized to the least organized, or, in other terms, from the 
most general to most special, ... there is a gradual “adding on” 
of the more and more special, a continual adding on of new
43 Jackson, p. 46.
44 Jackson, p. 46.
45 Jackson, p. 46.
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organizations. But this “adding on” is, at the same time, 
a “keeping down”. The higher nervous arrangements evolved 
out of the lower keeping down those lower, just as the nation 
controls as well as directs that nation. If this be the process 
o f evolution, then the reverse process of dissolution is not only 
“a taking o ff’ of the higher, but is at the same time “a letting go” 
of the lower.46
The metaphor of the body politic is one that Jackson shares with Spencer and 
which echoes the relationship of mind and body. Jackson may concentrate on 
physiological features, but he makes clear the function or role of mind and body. 
The mind, fleshed somehow into the brain, is both subject and object to its 
surrounding mass. It is a consciousness aware of the potential invasion o f the 
mass with all its attendant pleasures and dangers. Within the tradition of 
humanism, the inclusive compass of ‘normality’ constructs the ‘other’ with its 
horrific undertones. Spencer’s construction of a duality of mind and body, and 
Jackson’s primarily physiological model of the nervous system established the 
mind as a shield against the body, and in evolutionary terms the survival of the 
best as opposed to the worst of the human species. In psychoanalytic terms, the 
self s fear of the body encourages the ego to establish protective forms, and one 
such defence, observed and noted by Freud, is that of sublimation, a 
psychological activity in which instinctual tension can be displaced on to objects 
which appear less threatening. When sublimation occurs, compulsive behaviour - 
repetitive behaviour - is evidenced against threats and fears.47
Within the context of evolutionary biology, Spencer’s anxiety about 
repetitive behaviour, and the likelihood of its material transmission (‘genetic
46 Jackson, p. 46.
47 Freud, ‘On Narcissism: an Introduction’ (1991), p. 69.
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inheritance’ in today’s parlance), indicates a fear of man’s passage through time 
being determined by nature, rather than nature being controlled and shaped by 
man’s history. Spencer and Darwin were central figures in the nineteenth-century 
conceptualization of history as a relation between parental and filial disposition. 
As the notion of inherited characteristics began to take shape, so the idea o f the 
dependence of the mental faculty on the body’s constitution or physical 
organization began to infuse medical science and the work of physicians such as 
Jackson. Instances of mental illness provided the most well-known examples to 
support such beliefs, especially when juxtaposed against cases o f ‘normal’ or 
positive moral traits evident in families. In his mapping of the body and its 
responses to the outer world, Spencer’s commentary on moral traits argued ‘that 
an impure blood is ... a possible, and indeed, a probable cause o f mental illness’, 
and in considering that the blood could be contaminated by the smoking of opium 
and hashish, Spencer declared that such activities ‘exalt the rate of molecular 
change in the nervous centres, [and] so intensify the feelings and ideas as to cause 
illusions’.48
Good reason, therefore, comes to be smothered by illusions, and, by 
means of the infusion of consciousness-changing drugs, a poisoned blood-stream 
permeates into future generations. Furthermore, Spencer argued, repetitive 
behaviour coalesced into moral traits creating a material memory; and because it 
is the process of repetition which structures memory, itself embedded within the 
physical makeup of the brain, its quality diminishes over time:
48 Herbert Spencer, Principles of Psychology (London: Williams and Norgate, 1881), Vol. 1, 
pp. 609-610.
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If we trace out the successive stages of failing memory ... the 
earliest among the related impressions which no longer so cohere 
that one recalls another, are those made by the daily trivialities -  
those represented in the nervous system by lines through which 
feeble discharges have but once passed. Interesting statements 
that are read, and passing events of considerable importance, 
presently cease: though like statements and events which date 
back to early life are still recallable: the reason being that the 
channels of nervous communication long ago made by the strong 
gushes answering to the vivid feelings of youth, remain more 
permeable than those lately made by the feebler gushes answering 
to the fainter feelings of age. Passing over many gradations, we 
come to the incoherence of thought in which the place now inhabited 
is confounded with places inhabited long ago, and the business 
of middle life is referred to as though translated yesterday -  
incoherences implying that comparatively permeable channels are 
now so far deserted that the discharges along them do not arouse 
the elements of these familiar ideas in their proper relations. And 
eventually we reach the extreme state, similarly explicable, in 
which even members of the family, who have been companions 
through life, cease to be recognized.49
The nervous system as portrayed here seems a somewhat passive carrier of
feelings stimulated from the outside, and because it is constructed in terms of
strength and weakness, it is infused with a sense of inevitability through the life
span.
Nevertheless, Spencer’s description of the process of memory loss from 
the early to the later stages of the life cycle resonates across time with that 
described by the Audit Commission in 2000: a remarkable similarity of 
conceptual thought given the passage of some 120 years. Suggestively, this seems 
to be a sort of intellectual genetic inheritance. Along with Jackson, Spencer 
believed that this degeneration involved the loss of the most recently learned and 
understood functions occurring first, with this followed by the progressive 
obliteration of longer-term memory and, finally, a failure to recognize others who
49 Spencer, Principles, pp. 588-589.
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have been important in one’s life. Jackson’s model of the physical evolution and
dissolution of the nervous system coincides with Spencer’s views in terms both of
process and time: the longer one lives, the more likely the loss of a sense of self
through a process of mental degeneration. Jackson took the view that:
We develop as we must, that is, according to what we are 
by inheritance, and also as we can, that is, according 
to external circumstances.50
Jackson’s sub-clauses on development seem full of common sense, but beg the
question of a mediating form between what we inherit genetically and the
environment and culture in which we live our lives. Put differently, what he
articulates is a nineteenth-century version of the nature-nurture debate. But
Jackson’s placement of inheritance over environment and culture suggests that
what we are delivered by nature is likely to be the determining factor. For Spencer
and Jackson, the body is an integrated system, a harmonious whole containing
complex interactions with lower nervous centres receiving and sending messages
and images to higher centres, and while these may provide opportunities to adapt
to circumstances as they arise, they may also be subverted by the force o f
inheritance. Nature, it seems, gets in the way of itself through the degenerative
process.
Evolutionary Biology and Heredity
Spencer used evolutionary biology to construct a social theory of population, 
particularly through notions of inheritance and degeneration. These ideas became 
inserted into the domain of medicine and culture and from the mid-nineteenth 
century onwards the emergence of heredity in mental pathology became a focal
50 Jackson, p. 71.
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point of interest. Heredity is essentially a law of succession, of filial disposition to 
parental traits and as such governs the relations between genealogy and 
legitimacy of transfer from one generation to the next. In mental pathology, it 
supposes a possible cumulative effect, damaging generations which follow in 
such a way as to determine their lives. Spencer’s suggestive notion o f heredity 
transmission of acquired characteristics relates to theories of degeneration in the 
nineteenth century, particularly in the interaction between ideas in medical 
science and those concerned with social responsibilities. In medical science and 
pathology, for example, various mental maladies were seen as being inherited and 
therefore incurable. Time, in such circumstances, had to be left to fend for itself 
as any intervention seemed worthless to a fledgling profession which could ill- 
afford to look unsuccessful. Inherited diseases were widely believed to be less 
amenable to possible cure than those that were acquired, and the locus of 
hereditary conditions was seen to be the inborn, individual constitution. In fact, 
the term ‘heredity’ in clinical medicine and medical pathology was reserved for 
those conditions largely immune to medical intervention and doctors tended to 
agree that especially intractable conditions such as consumption, gout and 
madness were the most likely to have been inherited. The implication is that 
individual constitutions were relatively unchanging, and faulty constitutions could 
hardly be expected to be responsive to intervention.
There is, of course, a sense of fatalism in the concepts of heredity and 
degeneracy, both of which are central to evolutionary biology, as well as in the 
cultural conceptualization of the Gothic. Such ideas found their way into wider
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society, threatening, it seems, the very notion of civilization. Interpretations of
these ideas found discursive space in literature and the arts more generally, spaces
in which these notions could be culturally represented, struggled with and even
contested. Valdine Clemens notes that:
England’s late Victorian period was a time of old things passing 
and new things coming into being. The fin de siecle marked the 
beginning of the end of British imperial power, but it was also 
a time of remarkable social and technological newness.51
Newness such as this threatened traditional ways of understanding the self and the
problems and issues facing individuals and society at large. In medicine, for
example, as Germaine Berrios and Hugh Freeman argue, ‘clinicians mostly accept
the textbook definitions of their time, which are seen as reflecting some “given”
entity -  a disease concept which seems immutable’.52 As fresh thinking came to
be brought to bear on the subject, so a paradigmatic shift in the consensus of
medical understanding began to occur: something different from the ‘given’
became the focus of evaluation, and, at the turn of the nineteenth century, it was
new technology that enabled advances to be made in psychiatry and neurology.
In particular, developments in the efficacy of the microscope and new techniques
in the staining of brain tissue when carrying out autopsies, gave pathologists and
neurologists access to possible causes of mental disease. From the eighteenth
century until the early twentieth, dementia had been broadly defined as:
A loss of intellectual function and memory, and divided into 
congenital, senile, and acquired forms: the causes of the latter
51 Valdine Clemens, The Return o f the Repressed (New York: State University of New York 
Press: 1999), p. 153.
52 Alzheimer and the Dementias, eds. G. E. Berrios and H. L. Freeman (London and New York: 
Royal Society o f Medicine Services Ltd., 1991), p. 1.
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included infections, vascular disorders, sexual excesses, 
poisons and trauma.53
Within this very inclusive definition, therefore, one could be born with the
condition, acquire it through longevity or as a result of accident, or by the
consequences of nature or behavioral excess - sex, alcohol, tobacco, narcotics.
Such definitional inclusiveness incorporates forms of what would now be defined
as psychosis, which also interferes with intellectual function and memory.
Anticipated in this definition, with its emphasis on the impairment of intellect, are
the nineteenth-century notions of degeneration and degeneracy. Given such
inclusiveness, no specific form of brain pathology could be singled out as a cause
of the disease. This remained the position until the latter half of the nineteenth
century when, according to Berrios and Freeman’s history of dementia:
Senile dementia... was a disease that specifically affected old age ... 
rarely occurring spontaneously before sixty-five. [Richard Krafft-Ebing] 
believed that heredity and other external causes were far less important 
to the development of senile dementia than the natural changes 
accompanying ageing, including poor cerebral nutrition, anaemia 
and degeneration of the cortical cells. Clinically, demented patients 
were distractable, vacant, repetitious, disoriented, showed loss 
of memory, and could no longer recognize family members or 
places that were once familiar to them .54
This argument clearly sees dementia as a condition of old age, one of ‘natural’
degeneration unconnected to heredity and it also confidently lists a series of
associated physical symptoms which, presumably, might argue a singular disease
entity. The argument appears to bring together earlier schools of thought on senile
dementia: Jackson’s emphasis on ‘natural’ dissolution which he links to a process
53 Berrios and Freeman, p. 12.
54.Berrios and Freeman, p. 19.
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of ageing, and Spencer’s notion of blood flow to which is added symptoms of 
anaemia and loss of brain cells.
This theoretical argument, clearly establishing a relationship between 
behavioral symptom and physical condition, was based on the classical anatomo- 
clinical correlation paradigm of nineteenth-century medicine, which entailed close 
observation of the patient to see if behaviour fitted certain kinds of clinical facts. 
In physical medicine, the clinician could also call upon the patient to express a 
subjective account of their symptoms, but this became more problematic for the 
psychiatrist or neurologist when facing a dementia patient as very little could be 
expected from any attempt to elicit subjective experiences of dementia.
The Krafft-Ebing position, which emphasizes cognitive failure as the primary 
signal for senility, was shared by many because intellect, as evolutionary biology 
had argued, was the defining characteristic of the human species. In the latter half 
of the nineteenth century, psychosocial incompetence was perceived to be the 
result of a failure of mind, and this general belief was, of course, related to 
theories of degeneration and degeneracy. Therefore, the model of cognitive 
impairment tended to be promoted in both the clinical and ideological 
orthodoxies.
Alois Alzheimer and Alzheimer’s Disease
As the art and science of medicine developed, signs and symptoms were taken to 
be representative of some hidden ‘truth’ or ‘truths’, and the inner world of the 
body came to be regarded as a phenomenon which required further exploration, 
over and above its basic anatomy. But while changes in the tissue and organs of
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the body could be expressed in signs and symptoms, an improved detection was 
necessary to unearth such changes and what may stimulate them. In the nineteenth 
century, such improvements came to hand in the development of histology: a 
branch of biology concerned with the minute structure of tissues and, in 
particular, the study and exploration of diseased tissue. In this way, improvements 
in both microscopic technology and staining techniques came to be crucial in 
enabling advances to be made in the understanding of brain disease.
Ernest Jones, in his biography of Freud, offers some detailed commentary 
on Freud’s early interest in histology prior to his stay in Paris and his work with 
Charcot.55 Freud, according to Jones, ‘produced some first-class original work’56 
on this topic and, he goes on to say, ‘like all workers in science [Freud] was well
c n
aware of the importance of technique’. Part of what Jones refers to as Freud’s 
‘first-class work’ relates to the development of a technique ‘to stain nervous tissue
• c owith some solution of gold chloride’, which enabled Freud to obtain what he 
called ‘a wonderfully clear and precise picture’59 of the cells and fibres of the 
spinal column.
Developments in the techniques of staining were crucial to the work of 
Alois Alzheimer. Bom in Bavaria in 1864 and qualifying in medicine in Berlin in 
1888, he had shown an initial enthusiasm for anatomy and histology, but for some 
years had worked as a clinician - an assistant medical officer in the asylum at
55 Ernest Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, ed. by Lionel Trilling and Steven Marcus 
(Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, 1964).
56 Jones, p. 187.
57 Jones, p. 187.
58 Jones, p. 188.
59 Jones, p. 188.
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Frankfurt. Under the influence of Emil Kraepelin, Alzheimer eventually returned 
to his former interest, and, in particular, to the study of the anatomy and structure 
of the brain. Many psychiatrists at this time considered that the dementias of 
middle age were primarily disorders of the mind as opposed to the pathological or 
biochemical organic. In 1902-03, Alzheimer moved to Munich to work with 
Kraepelin, and then, in 1912, three years before his death, was appointed 
Professor and Director of the psychiatric hospital in Breslau. During his work in 
the Frankfurt asylum he primarily ‘concentrated on mental disorders with clear 
organic causes’.60
In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, this type of work was known
as forensic psychiatry and was not considered as a separate or specialized aspect
of psychiatry:
The fact that forensic issues were felt then to be of 
great importance was not only for practical reasons: it was also 
related to the politically and scientifically influential concept 
o f ‘degeneration’. These ideas were prompted by Cesare 
Lombroso’s Italian school of criminology ... Alzheimer’s 
position on this matter was a differentiated one: on the one hand, 
he rejected the crude and purely speculative statement that 
the existence of a mental disorder as such proved the 
degenerate state of the patient. On the other, he defended the 
concept of inherited degenerative mental disorders.61
Alzheimer’s ‘differentiated’ position is important in understanding later
twentieth-century developments in conceptualizing dementia. He did not hold that
someone suffering mental illness was necessarily degenerate because it could be
that the illness was inherited from a diseased organ present in an earlier
generation. (In fact contemporary medical thinking on the subject of early onset
60 P. Hoff, Alzheimer and his Time, in Berrios and Freeman, pp. 29-55.
61 Hoff, p. 41.
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dementia is that such patients may carry an inherited cell or cells that may indeed 
be the cause of the condition). But Alzheimer’s differentiation did give emphasis 
to his quest to reorientate psychiatry away from simply naming symptoms and to 
move toward the underlying anatomical origins, as he and others saw them, of 
mental illness.
From this point of view, the post-mortem and autopsy became important
methods of investigative research to discover such origins: as Edward Shorter
puts it, this type of analysis centred upon ‘reasoning back and forth from findings
at autopsy to the signs and symptoms displayed before death’. This
methodology gave credence to the notion of scientific evidence in psychiatry and
pioneered, to a degree, modem understandings of genetics and biology in the
neurosciences. Indeed the approach acted as a counterpoint to nineteenth-century
assertions of psychiatry and biology that major mental diseases, although having a
biological and genetic make-up, also get worse as they are passed down through
the generations. So it came to be that the significance of progressive degeneration
as a central concept in the clinical practice of psychiatric medicine began to be
challenged by anatomical research.
Although Alzheimer believed mental illness was very likely to be a
material disease, he deemed it necessary, in seeking its origins, to base the
research on contemporary psychiatric clinical practice. As P. Hoff puts it:
The most urgent task of any medical science is the collection 
of single cases in the form of diseases, which within certain 
boundaries are defined by the aetiology of their relevant features 
concerning clinical phenomenology and outcome.63
62 Edward Shorter, A History ofPsychiatiy (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1997), p. 70.
63 Hoff, p. 38.
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For Alzheimer, a prerequisite of the conceptualization of psychiatric illness was 
that it be merged with the understanding of neurological pathology and the 
validations of clinical practice: out of this embrace could the collation and 
categorization of diseases be built. Such an approach emphasized that the signs 
and signals of clinical practice could be no more than indicators for, and not proof 
of, the existence of a particular disease. Something else is required in the search 
for the origins of ‘odd’ behaviour and this was, and is, at the centre o f medical 
materialism.
Psychiatric practice in the nineteenth century was part of a discourse 
concerned with the question: does nature change by itself and, if  so, what are the 
laws that govern such change? This question begged another - where did the 
agency for change lie? Alzheimer, like other medical practitioners o f his time, 
was puzzled by mental diseases that were either in excess of, or an inherent part 
of nature, and by the manifestations of the signs, images and symbols of that 
puzzle. Nature’s paradox, be it internal or external to the body, is that it is 
imagined as balanced and harmonious when it can be disturbing and terrifying. 
Medical practice and medical science are seen as mediating agencies between 
humankind and nature, and in this mediation both science and practice make use 
of the notions of ‘normality’ and ‘abnormality’ in the materiality of mind and 
body.
Alzheimer viewed medical research as a kind of superstructure with 
medical science reliant upon clinical practice. However, clinical work is built 
upon existing knowledge and practice, both of which are necessarily shaped by
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the social constraints and fashions of the period. Medical science and medical
practice do not stand outside of society or culture, somehow transcendent of both.
On the contrary, there is an
Interaction between descriptive language on the one hand, and 
a biological process, bodily changes which emit signals, in the 
shape of signs and symptoms, on the other. The language of 
description reflects the beliefs of its users, and so the creation of 
disease is also a social phenomenon.64
The language of description is the diagnostician’s primary tool. It is the means of 
their interpretation of visual data and the patient’s explanation of their symptoms, 
and it is indicative, therefore, of a certain point of view: it is necessarily 
influenced by existing knowledge, beliefs and attitudes. But what Alzheimer 
sought, over and above this empiricism, was something else to give substance and 
credence to the data. This inevitably meant exploring the dead: invading the 
cadaver to conduct an anatomical investigation of the brain. Developments in 
microscopic and staining techniques gave Alzheimer’s kind of science the means 
to confirm (or not confirm) empirical diagnosis.
During 1901, whilst at work in the Frankfurt asylum, Alzheimer examined 
a fifty-one-year-old woman upon her admission to hospital. He closely observed 
and questioned this patient over a period of four days. She repeatedly said to 
Alzheimer: ‘I have lost myself.65 The patient’s behaviour displayed a 
transformation from an ordered life to one of increasing chaos. Her responses to 
questions, and her inability to identify objects shown to her, indicated a loss of
64 Berrios and Freeman, p. 2.
65 Konrad Maurer, Stephan Volk, Hector Gerbaldo, ‘Augusta D. and Alzheimer’s Disease’,
The Lancet, 347 (1997), 1546-49 (p. 1548).
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short-term memory which compounded her agitation. Her speech suggested 
confusion and disorientation in time and place. She repeated herself and 
sometimes became mute in the middle of a sentence. When reading, she would 
omit many lines of text and substituted words in naming objects - a form of 
aphasia. She also exhibited some forms of delusion and paranoia. Alzheimer 
carried out a physical examination of the patient, but could find no particular or 
obvious problem. The patient’s behaviour suggested some kind of dementia or 
psychosis, but a diagnosis of dementia seemed unwarranted in one so relatively 
young. She remained in hospital, deteriorating gradually both physically and 
mentally, until she died in 1906.
Following her death, Alzheimer carried out an autopsy on the patient’s 
brain, and, with the assistance of a silver staining technique and technologically 
advanced microscopic equipment, recorded a pattern of past activity that later 
came to be named as the disease which bears his name. Alzheimer observed the 
autopsy to reveal a number of major cell alterations, in particular, the formation of 
a number of plaques: a kind of chemical protein that had grown and multiplied to 
the extent that it had stifled living cells. He also observed a number of tangles in 
the neuro-fibrils: a cell that acts as a kind of communicator of ‘messages’ between 
different parts of the brain. Alzheimer hypothesized that these brain lesions might 
well be the cause or the effect of the disease yet to be named ‘Alzheimer’s 
Disease’, or possibly a combination of cause and effect.
Current thinking suggests an organic basis for the disease, and notes that 
the presence of plaques and tangles indicates its onset and severity. It is thought
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that genetics may play a part, particularly in those patients where the onset of the 
disease occurs in middle age. Alzheimer’s discovery of the senile plaque and 
nerve tangles not previously recorded in people of middle age began the process 
of defining a new disease-structure encompassing both pre-senile and senile 
stages o f the condition. In 1906 Alzheimer gave a report of his findings to a 
conference of psychiatrists, and in the following year published the contents of his 
paper. In 1910 Kraepelin proposed that Alzheimer’s name be attached to the 
condition. By naming the disease for Alzheimer, Kraepelin followed a long 
tradition of medical eponymy which creates the disease as a possession: the 
giving of a name denoting foundation and conferring a kind of symbolic power. 
The symbolism of Alzheimer’s disease relates to an absence, a lack, a deficiency 
in being, but conceptually it can also be argued to be an excess or an addition by 
‘nature’ to being. In fact it is these notions of deficiency and excess which emerge 
as the primary drivers in the argument around degeneration and degeneracy. 
Modernism, Humanism and Posthumanism
Although Alzheimer’s work demonstrated a shift in medical science, brought 
about, in part, by advances in technology - from a description of mental states to 
an analysis of neurological disorders and their origins - the disciplines of 
psychology and pathology were still used to embrace the idea of evolutionary 
perfection and imperfection. As Spencer argued, the highest ideal was the struggle 
for life.
This meant that society as a whole needed to engage with the maintenance 
of evolutionary health: those who did not participate in a collective social advance
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became objects of fear, derision and criticism. Consequently, the basis for the 
definition of the abnormal or the degenerate was established within the central 
notion of an evolutionary ideal where ‘normal’ equalled good, and ‘abnormal’ 
equalled bad, constructing a binary which privileged one over the other. The 
abnormal, of course, fell into the practices of medicine, which helped to create the 
concept, and with it the incorporation of the idea of monstrosity. Institutional 
medicine studied illness and the study of illness meant the study of life. It 
contemplated and pondered the tangible and visible body of man, adopting the 
role of social interpreter which mediated aspects of the wider culture. Medicine 
became a site for questions of social value and morality, themes consistently 
followed in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818) which demonised a kind of over­
reaching medicine 66 and a code of attitudes and dispositions to be considered and 
resolved through the conduct of a social policy which yielded outcomes of the 
desired good, thus giving substance to Foucault’s argument that empiricism and 
scientific enquiry constitute an exercise in social power.67
Such stereotyping of the marginalised in medical science and practice, 
when set within its symbiotic and diverse relationship with society more 
generally, also calls to mind Foucault’s paradigm of natural and unnatural space. 
Up until the classical age, the mad circulated within society’s physical and moral 
frameworks. This was because the mad were primarily considered to be 
custodians of hidden truths about human nature and the human condition. But,
66 Mary Shelley, Frankenstein (London: Penguin Books, 1994).
67 Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilisation, trans. by Richard Howard (London: Routledge, 
1997). Foucault maintains that in the Enlightenment those considered to suffer from unreason 
were prohibited entry into the category o f the human and, therefore, put away.
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being part of a shared ‘natural’ space did not mean that the mad were not viewed 
as different -  they were so considered, but neither caught up in nor incorporated 
into any restraining system of medicine or law. However, the cultural shift from 
medievalism through to the Renaissance and then to the modernity of the 
Enlightenment, saw such freedoms constrained by the development of a system of 
asylums which, although originating as benevolent, protective safe havens for the 
mad in the late eighteenth century, took on a quite different aspect in the 
nineteenth. Then, as evolutionary biology came to be the dominant cultural 
measure, bringing in its wake constructions of the mad as degenerate and 
dangerous creatures, (think of the many texts of the period featuring vampires and 
devils from whom rational society required protection),68 the asylum became a 
place for well-considered neglect, if not ill-considered punishment.
Two of the founding fathers of degenerationism in the nineteenth century, 
Benedict Augustin Morel and Cesare Lombroso, adopted evolutionary biology to 
provide evidence for what they considered to be various forms of mental disorder, 
criminality and degeneration. As professor of psychiatry and forensic medicine at 
the Royal University of Turin in the late nineteenth century, specialising in 
criminology and anthropology, Lombroso developed the idea that degenerates 
could be identified by certain physical features: a notion which came to be widely 
used in his specialist area. In the middle part of the century, Morel too pursued the 
idea of degeneration but particularly as a product o f heredity.
68 For example, see Hurley, whose The Gothic Body illustrates through a number of late 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century texts, how cultural anxieties concerning the mind 
and body were portrayed.
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Extending the conceptual analysis, Max Nordau, a physician and social
critic of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, and another who studied
with Charcot, appropriated these ideas and translated them into cultural and
political criticism. Clemens’ argument cited earlier about the fin  de siecle marking
the end of the known and the certain with the ‘beginning of the end of British
imperial power’, can also be seen in Hurley’s critical account of Gothic writing in
that period, which echoes Clemens and portrays it as a time o f considerable
upheaval and uncertainty. Hurley argues that the writing of H. G. Wells, Arthur
Machen and Bram Stoker, among others, metaphorically reflected this uncertainty
by characterising the loss of the human. Hurley claims that Nordau’s text
Degeneration 69 of the same period:
was the book of the 1890’s, phenomenally popular throughout 
Europe. It was perhaps the most successful example of that late 
Victorian sub-genre, the sociomedical text, incorporating biology, 
evolutionism, psychopathology, moral philosophy, and sociocultural 
analysis into one sweeping critique of modernity.70
What is to be made of such a diverse range offin de siecle subject matter?
Primarily, perhaps, that it reflected the dominant concern of the period: a debate
about science and culture’s anxieties about the future of civilization and of the
human race itself. Nordau characterises this end-of-the-century period as one of
decadence and refers to it, in apocalyptic terms, as a
Dusk of nations, in which all suns and all stars are gradually 
waning, and mankind with all its institutions and creations
71is persisting in the midst of a dying world.
69 Max Nordau, Degeneration (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1993).
70 Hurley, p. 76.
71 Nordau, p. 2.
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Degeneration theory was very much a product of nineteenth-century thought,
foreshadowed in the work of Spencer and Jackson, and Nordau’s text reflected its
concerns about the loss of the human, particularly in relation to a range of
aesthetic movements in the late part of the century. Certainly Degeneration
echoes in its language of biology, evolution and psychopathology the work of
Darwin, Spencer, Lombroso and Morel; and in moral philosophy and
sociocultural analysis the work of Jeremy Bentham, Samuel Smiles as well as
Spencer again. It can be argued that all of these figures were concerned with the
establishment and maintenance of the liberal, bourgeois humanism of the
nineteenth century which Nordau’s text sets out to defend and promote. George L.
Mosse, in his introduction to the text, states that:
Lombroso hailed Nordau as the ‘true representative of a new 
humanity’. He might more accurately have said that Nordau was 
the representative of a century which at that very moment was 
being freely challenged by men and women who glorified 
precisely what the two friends castigated as criminal and 
degenerate.72
And because Lombroso, Nordau and others thought degenerate behaviour ‘caused 
culture to slide back into more primitive behaviours [it became] the particular 
plague of modernity’.73 Nordau argues that the aesthetic movements of the period 
emphasised form over substance and from his perspective this menaced the 
traditional notions of art and literature. Modernity, of course, was characterised by 
industrialisation, urbanisation, mobility and communication, and in Nordau’s 
view these things were associated with mental disturbances and other illnesses 
(syphilis, tuberculosis) and vices (drinking and drug-taking); issues of excess in
72 ‘Introduction’ by George L. Mosse to Nordau, pp. xiii-xxxvi (p. xx).
73 Hurley, p. 73.
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individual and social behaviour often represented in these movements through
visual art as well as literature and drama:
Degenerates are not always criminals, prostitutes, anarchists 
and pronounced lunatics. They are often authors and artists.
These, however, manifest the same mental characteristics, and 
for the most part, the same somatic features, as the members 
of the above mentioned anthropological family, who satisfy 
their unhealthy impulses with the knife of the assassin or the 
bomb of the dynamiter, instead of with pen and pencil.74
Nordau claims that artists and writers of what might be called a modernist
persuasion, share not only the same physical features of those he calls
‘degenerate’, but also some of their ‘mental characteristics’. From his point of
view, the influence of Tolstoy, Ibsen, Zola and Wilde tended to corrupt rather
than enhance ‘morality and beauty’. The art produced by such artists, and others,
was, according to Nordau, an expression of animal-like instincts, terrorising and
exciting readers at the same time, which has also been the intention of Gothic
fiction since its development in the eighteenth century. In fact, Nordau argues that
the texts of modernist authors perverted reality, reducing it to chaotic features in
their manifestations o f ‘moral insanity, imbecility and dementia’, points often
made in criticism of the Gothic genre.
If the Gothic genre sets out to awaken a thrilling fear, as will be explored
in the next chapter, the aesthetic movements of the second half of the nineteenth
century, so Nordau believed, set out to undermine the ‘traditional views of custom
and morality’.75 He believed these movements gave prominence to a ‘forgotten,
far-away past’, one which had demonstrated ‘inarticulateness, childishness, and
74 Nordau, p. 5.
75 Nordau, p. 5.
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savagery’ .76 Nordau, therefore, seems to charge this past with what might be
called Gothic characteristics: loss of some kind of approved language, immature
behaviours and violence. It seems, suggestively, that the Gothic can be seen as a
form o f degeneration as it brings about a loss, or a gap, in our constructions of the
human and, as Hurley points out, ‘Degenerationists emphasise the ominous
mutability of the human body, [and] its liability to abhuman becomings’.77 It may
be interpreted that Nordau traced Lombroso and Morel’s theories on criminality
and degeneration into cultural issues in order to defend and promote the kind of
liberal humanism he approved of against an aesthetic which modem cultural
critics might term as posthuman; one that acknowledges what Neil Badmington
calls ‘a crisis’ in our conception of the human. Badmington argues that the idea of
posthumanism arrives out of the work of Marx and Freud which opened ‘up a
space’.78 If humanism is constructed around the idea of a ‘core humanity or
common essential feature in terms of which human beings can be defined’,79 the
notion that our world is one of man making meaning now we are emancipated
from God, then posthumanism, in the Marxist sense, argues that our
‘consciousness ... does not determine a person’s social life; it is, rather, social life
that determines consciousness’.80 Badmington puts it this way:
Subjectivity, in the Marxist account, is not the cause but the effect 
of an individual’s material conditions of existence. The subject 
is not a given. Eternal man is no more; he now has a history 
and a contingency denied by humanism.81
76 Hurley, p. 76.
77 Hurley, p. 77.
78 Badmington, p. 5.
79 Badmington, p. 2.
80 Badmington, p. 5.
81 Badmington, p. 5.
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Freud took this idea of subjectivity to a more personal level by suggesting that 
human activity is, to a degree, regulated by the unconscious, thereby throwing our 
motives into doubt. Such an idea undermines ‘the Cartesian model, in which the 
critical determinant of being is rational, fully-conscious thought’.82 Hence, if 
consciousness is only a part of our mental processes, it must mean we act as de­
centred beings, no longer in absolute control of events or experience. Nordau’s 
polemic in defence of a traditional and bourgeois humanism menaced by an 
aesthetic which might be described, in these contemporary critical senses as 
posthuman, reflects the uncertainties regarding the future in the fin  de siecle 
period.
Hurley argues that ‘the last decades of the nineteenth century witnessed 
the re-emergence of the Gothic as a significant literary form’, whose purpose, she 
goes on to say, functioned ‘maximally to enact the defamiliarization and violent 
reconstitution of the human subject’. Nordau’s tracing of degeneration theory 
into culture, which he saw as threatening the traditional perception of the human, 
can therefore be positioned within Hurley’s notion of the Gothic. Certainly 
Nordau believed that the aesthetic movements of these decades set out to 
reconstitute the human subject and he argued his point of view in what Glennis 
Byron called ‘one of the most notorious and, in its way, most Gothic texts of the 
Victorian fin  de siecle \ The following extract from Degeneration underlines
82 Badmington, p. 5.
83 Hurley, p. 4.
84 Glennis Byron, ‘Gothic in the 1890s’, in A Companion to the Gothic, ed. by David Punter 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2001), pp. 132-142 (p. 132).
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Byron’s point, reflecting, as it does, a crisis of confidence through the language of
the apocalyptic, of tragic endings and uncertain beginnings:
One epoch of history is unmistakably in its decline, and another 
is announcing its approach. There is a sound of rending in every 
tradition, and it is as though the morrow would not link itself 
with today ... Over the earth the shadows creep with deepening 
gloom, wrapping all objects in a mysterious dimness, in which 
all certainty is destroyed and any guess seems plausible. Forms 
lose their outlines, and are dissolved in floating mist.85
If Nordau sets out to write a socially conservative defence of liberal humanism,
his language is graphic and threatening in seeking what Hurley calls ‘a more
visceral readerly response’86 and conjuring up a fear of the new and different.
However, Nordau’s use of what might be called gothicity - a use of language to
construct dark images - seems, unlike that of authors of Gothic fiction itself, to
boil away the excitement and the thrill, leaving merely a residue of existential
dread. Appropriating the language of medical science, with an emphasis on its
darker Gothic shades, Nordau’s polemical text appears haunted by pathology as it
seeks to revive a sense of self by invoking tradition to contest the new and the
unfamiliar. The concept of pathology, of course, transmutes the familiar into the
unfamiliar and this transformation is central to Nordau’s argument, reflecting, as
it does, the Gothic theme of the loss of the human.87
85 Nordau, p. 5.
86 Hurley, p. 4.
87 As Hurley carefully illustrates, Nordau was not alone in appropriating the language of pathology 
and psychopathology to expose the anxieties of the ‘fin de siecle’. The images created by such an 
appropriation sink into cultural mythologies, and within these DeBaggio’s contemporary fears of 
what Alzheimer’s disease will do to his sense of being, have clear Gothic psychological meaning. 
His presence comes to be re-constituted by the disease as a kind of absence and he expresses his 
fear of this transmutation in the dark language of the Gothic. Alzheimer’s subjects, rather like 
Gothic subjects, are inserted as unstructured /structured beings into a social order which seeks to 
deny them. As the disease subverts the rational, what is hidden — our dreams, desires and
Conclusion
While the master narratives of biology and humanism determine the models of old 
age in their medical, social and economic paradigms, their singular and joint 
dynamics cannot entirely deny the possibilities of other stories which produce 
different understandings of this period of life. Some of these dissenting narratives 
give emphasis to the social and contradictory aspects of old age, particularly in 
our perceptions of disease in this stage of the life cycle. Alzheimer’s disease is 
one such example as it construes its subjects as both absent and present, leaving 
the body suspended in a complex sphere somewhere between singularity and 
generality, the private and the public, filling that in-between space with images of 
an abandoned body released from an anchoring mind. The images conjure up 
Gothic forms of transformations of identity ‘and the alienation of self from both 
itself and the social bearings in which a sense of reality is secured’.88 This 
defining characteristic of the Alzheimer’s subject, a body in which the self has 
been lost, exercises a public policy to meet the costs of diagnosis and care within 
an ethos of dignity and compassion. Such discourse, typically conducted in a 
private and public language of fear, creates a moral crisis of considerable 
proportion in our idea of humanism as it confronts a kind of Gothic 
posthumanism. How this neurological pathological condition establishes dark 
images of the loss of human specificity is the main focus of the following chapter.
nightmares -  is released in the kind of imagery referred to by DeBaggio, and carried into that most . 
telling of Gothic conditions -  a living death.
88 Botting, p. 157.
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Chapter 2 
Alzheimer’s Disease: A Gothic Pathology
Perhaps we may put it this way: the Gothic and the sublime best 
encounter each other on the terrain of memory and forgetting.
David Punter
Gothic. This term is ... employed to refer to a cultural discourse 
that utilizes images of disorder, obsession, psychological disarray 
and physical distortion [and] the tropes of mental, bodily, and 
ethical disintegration fostered by the Gothic are inextricably linked 
to ... ideological, historical and political circumstances.
Dani Cavallaro
‘Knowing’ is implicitly defined as the setting of limits, and the
‘Sublime’ as the impossibility of knowledge. So certain kinds of
absence, what Burke calls privation, are Sublime -  vacuity, darkness, solitude,
silence -  all of which contain, so to speak, the unpredictable,
the possibility of losing one’s way, which is tantamount, Burke implies,
to losing one’s coherence.
Adam Phillips
What remains consistent [in Gothic literature] according to Angela Carter, is the 
retention of ’a singular moral function - that of provoking unease’. This inflection 
of Gothic as un-ease or dis-ease invites comparisons with the pathological.
Having taken up residence in its host, the Gothic replicates itself throughout our 
culture like a virus. While resistant to the antidote of realism, it persistently 
conjugates with the dark side of contemporaneity, at the same time, making a 
textual negotiation with history.
Marie Mulvey-Roberts
Gothic ... has been theorized as an instrumental genre, reemerging cyclically, at 
periods of cultural stress, to negotiate the anxieties that accompany social and 
epistemological trans-formations and crises.
Kelly Hurley 1
David Punter, Gothic Pathologies: The Text, the Body and the Law (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 
1998), p. 10; Dani Cavallaro, The Gothic Vision: Three Centuries of Horror, Terror and Fear (London: 
Continuum, 2002), p.vii; Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of ourldeas of the 
Sublime and Beautiful (Oxford: OUP, 1998), ed. with an introduction and notes by Adam Phillips, p. xxii. 
The Handbook to Gothic Literature, ed. by Marie Mulvey-Roberts (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd., 
1998), p. xvii; Kelly Hurley, The Gothic Body: Sexuality, Materialism, and Degeneration at the Fin de 
Siecle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 5. These epigraphs refer, in one way or another, 
to the Gothic invocation of a feeling of unease. Mulvey-Roberts’s suggestion that this feeling invites 
comparisons with the pathological conveys a perception of the Gothic as some kind of virus, an epidemic 
which is somehow resistant to the idea of cure. It is a virus which rests disturbingly inside until ready to
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Introduction: The Idea of the Gothic
What is pathology and how can the idea of the Gothic, described severally in 
the epigraphs above, relate to it? This will be the question addressed in this chapter and it 
is also one which lies at the heart of this thesis. Medical science needs to define its terms 
carefully in relation to its investigations and practices, arising, as it does, out of biology 
and chemistry; and modem medicine, having evolved out of the ‘spirit of Augustan 
taxonomy’ and the eighteenth century’s need to classify and catalogue, requires these 
forms of social control. In his Dictionary o f Human Biology, Robert M. Youngson 
defines pathology as ‘dealing with bodily disease processes, their causes, and their effects 
on body structure and function’.3 Pathology, as a result, and paradoxically, is a way of 
normalizing a disease, imposing upon it a pattern and a particular determination. 
Concerned with departures from normality and grappling with abnormalities, pathology 
in relation to Alzheimer’s disease occupies the gap established between remembering and 
forgetting: it is concerned with memory, losing it and never getting it back. In a way, 
Alzheimer’s disease can be described as an elegiac condition, haunted, as it were, by loss. 
Literature, by contrast, and in this instance the genre of the Gothic, has to shape and 
control language to give it meaning and effect. Literary works, a term recognized as 
begging any number of questions, are not, as Terry Eagleton puts it:
break out when circumstances encourage its next arrival at a point of history. As such, this metaphorical 
disease finds a place, suggests Punter, between memory and forgetting, invoking forms and images of 
psychological and physical disintegration. It seems impossible to refuse these images cloaked in what 
Cavallaro describes as dark language. Our embedded anxieties, it seems, are only too ready to be awakened 
at moments o f history that appear to require a discourse which shapes these feelings o f awe and fear. In 
some senses, therefore, it seems unremarkable that contemporary anxieties about dependent old age and 
loss o f self can, or should be, perceived within the paradigm of the Gothic. It is clear, however, from these 
epigraphs and the texts from which they derive, that the Gothic genre performs a useful and meaningful 
repository for our fears about mutability and death.
2 Mulvey-Roberts, p. xv.
3 Robert Youngson, Dictionary of Human Biology (Glasgow: Harper Collins, 2006), p. 370.
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mysteriously inspired, or explicable simply in terms of their author’s 
psychology. They are forms of perception, particular ways of seeing 
the world, and as such they have a relation to that dominant way of 
seeing the world which is the ‘social mentality’ or ‘ideology of an age’.4
Eagleton’s point of view, expressed in his book Marxism and Literary Criticism, chimes,
unremarkably, with the Marxist thesis that products, in this instance texts, and their
meaning arise out of a particular historical epoch, and are embedded and reflective of
points of history. The base of Marxist ideology is that ‘consciousness does not determine
life: life determines consciousness’.5 This wholly revolutionary understanding of the
socialization of man points to a dialectic between authors and the language and culture
they inhabit. Eagleton’s commentary on language, bodies and culture resonates with the
observations noted in the epigraphs cited above by Cavallaro, Mulvey-Roberts and
Hurley, all of whom comment on history, ideology and cultural stress within the idea of
the Gothic, thus exemplifying with a particular metaphor something more universal.
These epigraphs posit the language of the Gothic as a perspective estranging and
defamiliarizing in its effects, perhaps similar to that of disease. They introduce the reader
to a vision dark in character and content, subverting a taken-for-granted normality so as
to ‘speak to the mysterious fears of our nature and awaken thrilling horror’ as well as ‘to
curdle the blood’ as if to decompose the body of the reader. Mary Shelley, whose
intention this was in writing Frankenstein,6 saw this fear as something deeply embedded
in our being, ready to be awakened by something so horrible that it would capture the
reader in a double mix of thrill and fear: this is the Burkean idea of the sublime response,
4 Terry Eagleton, Marxism and Literary Criticism (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1976), p. 6.
5 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, ed. and introduced by C. J. Arthur (London: 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1999), p. 47.
6 Mary Shelley, Frankenstein (London: Penguin Books, 1994); the phrases cited above are taken from 
Shelley’s introduction to the novel (p. 7).
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and one which echoes the first of the epigraphs. In other words, the gap between memory 
and forgetting is filled by this mix of emotions which underlies and provokes a sense of 
an insecure identity. Howard Phillips Lovecraft, in Supernatural Horror in Literature, 
underlines Shelley’s argument, declaring that ‘The oldest and strongest emotion of 
mankind is fear, and the oldest and strongest kind of fear is fear of the unknown’; and 
what he calls ‘the literature of cosmic fear’ evokes and resonates with a deep, instinctual 
awe of the unknown accompanied by a profound sense of dread, emphasizing the power 
of the body to outwit its rationalizing mind.7 Awakening, of course, indicates something 
forgotten or repressed when confronted by fear. If Gothic literature has an intention it 
must surely be the one announced by Shelley and Lovecraft, but its appeal, through its 
variety of hallmarks, particularly the uneasy and ambivalent conversation between 
anxiety and desire, can also alert the reader to other psychological themes and contexts, 
such as Alzheimer’s, that can evoke terror, horror and other aspects given birth by ‘the 
mysterious fears of our nature’. Overall, fear, it seems, is evolution’s way o f ensuring our 
survival.
It is the plasticity of the hallmarks listed in the epigraphs from Cavallaro and 
Mulvey-Roberts which can be read in both the history of the Gothic and in the 
contemporary cultural discourses on dementia and dependent old age that is of central 
concern in this chapter. The contention is that Alzheimer’s disease and the Gothic awake
7 Howard Phillips Lovecraft, Supernatural Horror in Literature (New York: Dover Publications, 1973), p. 
12. H. P. Lovecraft (1890 -  1937) first published his long essay, an historical review and critique o f what 
his publisher called ‘weird fiction’, in 1927. He carried out further revisions and the work, in its final 
version, was published in 1939, two years after his death. He was a prolific writer of ‘weird fiction’ which, 
he argued, was based on something he referred to as cosmic fear. He referenced this fear to things 
unknown, something mysterious and transcendent of self, a kind o f thing-ness which touches the emotion 
of fear. It is a fear of things transmuted, monstrous and un-human. Lovecraft writes in his introduction 
‘the one test of the really weird is simply this - whether or not there be excited in the reader a profound 
sense of dread, and of contact with unknown spheres and powers’ (p. 16).
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dis-ease and un-ease, gathering together, as it were, those dark intimations which
challenge the sensibilities of liberal humanism as each seeks to contaminate and
interrogate the other. The language in texts which seek to represent Alzheimer’s and
decrepit old age in terms of personal pain and the response the community makes to that
pain, is an indication of a Gothic space. It may be argued therefore that the disease and
the idea of the Gothic interrogate and contaminate each other. As Punter puts it:
By the body we may be all too easily contaminated ... we need to find 
a form of being which carries all the terrifying weight of infection while 
eschewing the bodily; thus the haunting, thus the nature of the ghost.
The ghost comes to menace the bodily with its limitations; but it also 
comes to celebrate the loss of the body.8
Punter’s discussion concerns not only the genre of the Gothic through what it represents
and its effects, but by the way it plays with our fears, seeping into our lives as a kind of
cultural psychology or pathology of physical and/or mental abuse. Punter argues that it is
these forms of abuse which come to haunt us. We recognize ‘in Gothic and its traces
glimpses o f the hidden narrative of abuse’.9 But if the Gothic, as suggested in Shelley and
Lovecraft, is based in fear, it surely makes the concept timeless. It outgrows, as it were,
its history, so as to be ready to be deployed in the present and the future and ready to
respond to the anxieties of the moment.
If the idea of the Gothic is timeless, it clearly creates a difficulty for scholars to
find an appropriate definition. Fred Botting argues that seeking a rigorous definition for
the genre of the Gothic is problematic and that, to compensate, writers resort to categories
such as ‘early Gothic’, ‘Victorian Gothic’ and even ‘modem Gothic’, accompanied by
8 Punter, 1998, p. 2.
9 Punter, 1998, p. 15.
sub-genres which have such titles as ‘female Gothic, ‘queer Gothic’ and so on.10 David 
Punter conducts a similar argument in his introductory essay to A Companion to the 
Gothic, examining critical approaches to the genre. He argues that the Gothic has 
fragmented to such a degree that it is no longer possible, if it ever was before, to construct 
a fixed definition or meaning for it.11 Gothic horror and fantasy were popular in the late 
eighteenth century, originating out of a new interest in medieval architecture and what 
has become known as romance literature. Its classic textual motifs were castles and 
dungeons, ghosts, secrets, hidden documents, inheritance, madness, torture and death, and 
much more.
By the use of the term ‘modem Gothic’, and other sub-categories, o f which the 
sub-title of this chapter - ‘Gothic Pathology’ - is another, there is a clear suggestion that it 
is a genre that manages to weather time and subject-matter with a suppleness not 
necessarily given by scholars to other kinds of texts. It can be argued that ‘modem 
Gothic’ concerns itself more with psychological forces that are problematic to 
comprehend and seem overwhelming, rather than the generally accepted and traditional 
hallmarks of the genre, and it is these forces which primarily colour contemporary 
accounts of Alzheimer’s disease, establishing what might be called a metaphoric Gothic 
space as a repository for our fears. The Gothic has, as Hurley argues, an ‘instrumental’ 
plasticity which enables it to re-emerge in different periods of history as a way of 
negotiating cultural stress; enabling it to speak to contemporary culture’s fears and 
problems through its particular language and motifs, and it is these which facilitate access
10 Fred Botting, ‘Preface: The Gothic’, in Essays and Studies 2001: The Gothic, ed. by Fred Botting 
(Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 2001), pp. 1-6 (p. 1).
11 David Punter, ‘The Ghost of History’ inv4 Companion to the Gothic (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 
2001), pp. viii-xiv.
to what Terry Castle calls the ‘hag-ridden realm of [the] unconscious’.12 Hag-ridden, in
Castle’s sense, indicates that we are tormented and even harassed by our unconscious.
Cavallaro and Hurley’s epigraphs suggest working definitions of the Gothic, emphasizing
that its expressive dark language and history are two of its essential hallmarks which can
be used to interrogate any particular historical period. Hurley’s The Gothic Body is an
example of exploring cultural anxieties at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries through an analysis of fiction and other texts of the period, particularly those
representing the degeneration of the body and the disintegration of the mind, two further
hallmarks and primary themes in Gothic literature. Hurley’s thesis is that the themes of
the texts she uses, and their popularity, often shaded by Darwinian evolutionary ideas of
dissolution, reflected the concerns of the age, and, in doing so, must have been
interrogating those concerns.
In much the same way, Thomas DeBaggio’s memoir Losing My Mind
interrogates, through reflecting upon his life after being diagnosed with Alzheimer’s
disease, the anxieties of late twentieth-century America about the disease:
It was the day I was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s. What time had 
hidden was now revealed. Genetic secrets, locked inside before my 
birth, were now in the open. I became a new member in the parade 
of horror created by Alzheimer’s.13
The shock and the horror expressed here underline an unbroken distinction between the
public and the private, suggesting both a personal and societal sense of disgust and
shame. This is a horror that comes from within, recognizing, as it does, the personal and
public fear of this disease as the condition becomes the substitute or the metaphor for his
12 Terry Castle, The Female Thermometer: Eighteenth-Century Culture and the Invention o f the Uncanny 
(Oxford: OUP, 1995), p. 5.
13 Thomas DeBaggio, Losing my Mind (New York: The Free Press, 2002), p. 1.
abjected self as it establishes ‘a sense of dissolving a definite identity’.14 DeBaggio has 
what is called early onset Alzheimer’s, a disease caused, it seems, by a single defective 
gene thought to be inherited from previous generations, an ironic and paradoxical kind of 
immortal gene, the outcome of which is similar to that destined for those who develop the 
disease in old age. The sense of his reaction, as perceived in the language he uses, is that 
he views his future self as some kind of public horror. He will become estranged from his 
usual and familiar self and turn into a figure viewed with fear in which the perspective of 
the Gothic interrogates him as much as he begins to interrogate the idea of the Gothic. 
That such a condition will ‘speak to the mysterious fears of our nature’ seems unarguable.
DeBaggio also uses the ideas of secrets and revelations to express his horror, 
which gives further ballast to the notion of seeing the condition within a Gothic 
perspective. As indicated earlier, these are often motifs in eighteenth-century Gothic 
literature which tend to emphasize the breakdown in the distinction between the private 
and the public (as outlined in Chapter 1 and expanded later in Chapter 3) expressed in 
concerns about a burgeoning older and dependent population. It can also be argued that 
this seemingly Gothic disease is, as DeBaggio’s memoir illustrates, an attack on the 
enlightened mind, reducing it to an activity unrelated to a conscious sense of self. He 
perceives the disease as stripping him of his human qualities, a process of dissolution 
comparable to that suffered by the Gothic body. And part of his emotional pain is related 
to the idea of how he will be perceived, anticipating that his disease will spread and, as it 
were, infect others not only psychologically but materially through his son. This sense of 
infection wrought by inheritance is, of course, a further motif of the Gothic genre,
14 Fred Botting, ‘Horror’, in The Handbook to Gothic Literature, ed. by Marie Mulvey-Roberts 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998), pp. 123-131 (p. 124).
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particularly in relation to madness and infectious disease. DeBaggio’s text indicates that 
writing and reading about Alzheimer’s creates an appalled recognition of hopelessness in 
the face of unfolding events and experiences, as well as providing understanding of a 
determination to translate our apparent incompetence into a language that somehow 
distances and encloses us at the same time.
If Alzheimer’s disease does suggest dissolution into something akin to the 
opposite of being human, then it may be seen as somewhat ambiguous. Pain is not 
peculiar to the human species, but its qualities are obviously expressed and received in a 
language that can evoke feelings of horror, terror, guilt, remorse, anger and shame, 
amongst many others. Its physical and emotional torments can outweigh anything else 
when one is confronted with disease. But being on the wrong side of health may provoke 
sympathy or empathy on the part of others even when it comes to the notion of 
monstrosity. Botting makes this point, which perhaps prevents the argument made above 
in relation to DeBaggio becoming too much of a conceit, when he argues that 
Frankenstein
presents a humane and suffering monster, less a figure of vice and 
transgression and more a figure of monstrous social exclusions. Indeed, 
blurring the boundaries between good and bad, human and monster, 
the novel interrogates prevailing value systems to the extent that 
monstrosity becomes uncannily pervasive, an effect of and intrinsic 
to the sphere of the human.15
Frankenstein’s stitched-together monstrous creation of bits and pieces may constitute an
image of unspeakable horror, but its humane suffering is due to its ambiguous closeness
to humanity. The monster becomes a kind of apostle to the idea of self-help, a later
Victorian virtue, by learning to read and speak, to become as close to being human as
15 Botting, ‘Monstrosity’, in Mulvey-Roberts (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998), p. 163.
possible, with language as his doorway to acceptance (but the Alzheimer’s subject will 
eventually lose language). And it is this kind of blurring of boundaries which is 
eventually rejected as unacceptable to humanity. With or without language, his monstrous 
image means his social exclusion. Shelley’s novel certainly interrogates cultural tensions 
concerning education and the way certain groups, such as women and the working 
classes, were excluded from it. Her text also reflected nineteenth-century’s medicine’s 
development into different disciplines to indicate its concerns with discrete aspects of the 
body. Victor Frankenstein’s creation, therefore, establishes the idea of the monster and 
monstrosity as a metaphor which has become a kind of cultural category, as Botting’s 
argument indicates. It is a metaphor for the failure of society to find a space for those 
who appear less than human and in that sense underlines one of the derivations of 
monster as a warning.
The word monster derives from the Latin monstrum, which in turn comes from 
the root monere which means to warn, and that notion seems to emphasize how 
metaphors shape our thinking and experiences. But if monsters are threatening they are 
also disgusting and we seem to be particularly averse to notions of impurity, although not 
enough, it would seem, not to be still lured towards the horror genre. DeBaggio’s memoir 
also interrogates contemporary value systems and suspects them of falling short of full 
acceptance of his future self by concluding that he will join a ‘parade of horror created by 
Alzheimer’s’. The horrific image he conceives of himself seems to become the point 
around which his subjectivity unravels, and this is the central theme of his memoir. And 
his suspicions about the effect his disease has on others can be witnessed by the need to 
have organizations such as the Alzheimer’s Society constantly campaigning both to assist
those with the condition and to underline the continuing ‘humanity’ of the victims of the 
disease. But Botting’s argument suggests an ambiguity of response: compassion shaded, 
or shadowed, by both a sense of disgust and shame emanating from a dread of the effects 
of the disease.
‘Monstrous social exclusions’
Botting’s ironic phrase gives rise to the idea of the Gothic being a paradigm for
transgression which leads to social exclusion: an idea with an infectious nature which
appears troublesome and creates unease. If we have an ambivalent response to chronic
disease and its capacity to undermine our notions of the human, such ambivalences can
raise concerns about the nature of cause. Is disease caused by unwitting accident or is it
brought on by subversive forms of social behavior (as argued by Max Nordau)? Fear,
which seems to give birth to horror and terror, was often used in early Gothic literature as
a way of cautioning the reader into what might be called virtuous and proper conduct and
therefore underlines their appropriate humanness when indicating disgust at anything
which appears to be less than human in conduct and thought. Shelley’s intention, on the
other hand, has a more contemporary, psychological and political feel to it. However, it
might also be that a mingling of fear and disgust at something which seems less than
human may provoke violent reaction, as demonstrated by Alice Sebold in her novel The
Almost Moon}6 At the beginning of the story, Helen Knightly, the first-person narrator,
murders her mother, who is in the latter stages of Alzheimer’s disease. To the reader, the
act may seem inhuman, but Anna Shapiro in reviewing the novel, writes:
The painful ambivalences of mother-daughter relationships are 
so familiar -  and the problems mentally disabled elderly parents 
can pose for their adult children so well-attested -  that I suspect
16 Alice Sebold, The Almost Moon (London: Picador, 2007).
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it is a rare person who will not feel a thrill of sympathy for the 
murdering daughter.17
Helen’s complex relationship in the past with her mother does not disguise her fear and
disgust at a mother whose disease tends to magnify the personality she once was: a
demanding and quarrelsome parent not attuned to Helen’s liberal sensibilities. But
Shapiro’s review shows a sympathetic understanding of a violent act toward a person
who has become less than human. Is this an act of ‘monstrous social exclusions’? Does
Shapiro’s point of view show an intrinsic humanity when she argues that by ridding
herself of her mother Helen shows a humane attitude and one with which to empathise?
Shapiro takes the novel’s sensibilities and indicates that in the real world it interrogates
and tests our values concerning ‘mentally disabled elderly parents’. She suggests that the
familiar and the well recognized are sufficient grounds upon which a sensibility can turn
to an act of murder, and notes the thrilling awareness displayed by those who may be in a
similar situation. Another way of reading this event, and understanding Shapiro’s point of
view and Helen’s act, is to consider Helen’s mother no more than an ambiguous living
ghost, possessed, as it were, by a ghostly disease that has transformed her into an
uncanny familiar self. She is an abject subject who appears to exist between two worlds
and is, therefore, difficult to cope with for an individual like Helen or the wider society
implied in Shapiro’s review. Has Helen’s mother become so like an awkward ghost as to
be seen as a kind of interstitial figure, somehow between normal categories of being?
Perhaps it is within the familiar ‘ambivalences o f mother-daughter relationships’,
as well as other relationships, that there can be read the psychoanalytic paradigm of the
17 Ann Shapiro’s review article ‘Not all there . . . ’ appeared in the Guardian Review, 13 October 2007, p. 6.
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other. Julia Kristeva’s argument concerning abjection puts this paradigm in the following 
terms:
I experience abjection only if an Other has settled in place and stead of 
what will be ‘me’. Not at all an other with whom I identify and incorporate, 
but an Other which precedes and possesses me, and through such possession 
causes me to be.18
This paradigm suggests a kind of becoming, Kristeva’s thesis being that subjecthood 
arrives out of the primary repression of being abjected from what she calls the chora, a 
state of undifferentiation. However, even as the subject may be abjected and separated 
from the mother, it lives with an anxious residue that it might slip back into that chora 
and thus lose its sense of individuality. This state of anxiety emanates from the Other, the 
unconscious, the split within. The paradigm might also be seen as a version of the 
psychoanalytic model of the death-wish, a powerful psychological drive which runs 
counter to Freud’s ‘pleasure principle’, which concerns itself with the desire to live and 
survive.19 The death-wish rests upon the continuing attraction, or fear, of a return to the 
darkness and security of the womb.
The unconscious, that ‘hag-ridden realm’ with its Gothic undertones, can be read 
into Helen’s situation with her mother: the notion of abjection parallels the process of 
Alzheimer’s disease, but in a reverse way. The mother has a presence, but it is one that 
coexists with an increasing absence, a presence that is on the edge of nonexistence. 
Alzheimer’s disease abjects her self and where her felt borders once were she is now
18 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. by Leon S. Roudiez (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1982), p. 10.
19 See Suzanne Raitt’s essay, ‘Freud’s Theory of Metaphor: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Nineteenth- 
Century Science and Figurative Language’ in Literature, Science, Psychoanalysis, 1830-1970: Essays in 
Honour of Gillian Beer, ed. by Helen Small and Trudi Tate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp.
118-130. This essay discusses how Freud sought to develop his notion of the death drive predicated on the 
research work of August Weismann and others in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century which 
posited the possible ‘immortality’ of certain kinds o f cell culture.
threatened by dissolution: a kind of return to the chora of undifferentiation. Helen’s 
mother, therefore, becomes a foreigner, a stranger, albeit one with a sense of familiarity. 
And this feeling, almost an uncanny one, can cause, in Kristeva’s theoretical paradigm, a 
reawakening of the sense associated with the loss of the chora: a state of anxiety 
provoked by the lessening of the repressed sense of loss in the face of the abyss suggested 
by the mother as being a living ghost. To lose that fear of her own potential dissolution 
Helen destroys the object which causes it.
The Origins of Fear
Kristeva’s Powers o f  Horror: An Essay on Abjection examines horror and 
marginalization, amongst other concepts. Her book, which uses the master narratives of 
becoming and identity associated with Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan, signals one of 
the major psychoanalytic contributions to the ‘mysterious fears of our nature’. She argues 
that the process of abjection is the psyche’s primary repression, with Lacan’s mirror stage 
a secondary process. Repression, of course, acts as a defence against loss. Given that 
psychoanalytic theory is very much concerned with psychical defences, its theories do not 
say a great deal about the origins of fear other than that it is a primary emotion dealing 
with issues of fight and flight, emphasizing the above point about it being evolution’s 
way of ensuring our survival, but Kristeva’s dark language concerning the notion of 
becoming suggests that metaphor is both generated and sustained by fear. Her essay also 
indicates something more nuanced, resting on the idea of a sublime mix of bodily 
instincts and psyche in which the body remembers an abjection the psyche has 
forgotten/repressed. Noelle McAfee puts it this way:
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Loss inaugurates being-a-subject, and thereafter abjection marks 
this loss. Uncanniness is the recollection of that inaugural loss,
onthe reminder of the chora that one has forgotten/repressed.
The fear of a return to the chora, undifferentiation, may be seen in terms of a flight from 
that overwhelming sense of losing oneself. Fear, therefore, is not, as Cavallaro puts it ‘a 
sporadic event but an ongoing condition with eminently ambivalent powers’.21 The idea 
that this emotion is accompanied by ‘ambivalent powers’ seems to mitigate the 
possibility that the emotion of fear is one that can transcend modes of representation: if it 
could, then, presumably, Gothic fiction would never have achieved the popularity it 
apparently has. In other words, fear is a kind of subliminal feeling of terror and horror. So 
what psychoanalytic theory has established as a primary emotion confirms Shelley’s view 
of it being part of our nature, ready to be awakened by events or circumstances. Helen 
Knightly’s murder of her mother might also be seen as both fight and flight in the sense 
that by destroying what she fears most she also takes flight from it, even as Helen’s dark 
act also seems to demonstrate a connection between the visible and the invisible. Put 
differently, the physical act of murder is prompted by the unseen and repressed fear of 
nothingness. However, whatever her desires concerning ridding herself of this fear by 
murdering her mother and the disease, she is unhappily undone by her inability to control 
the ghostly feel of her mother within as it haunts her for the remainder of the text. 
Similarly, DeBaggio’s fear of his disease haunts him in its increasing manifestations of 
forgetfulness. Perhaps it is these hauntings that underlie Shapiro’s comments above, 
indicating that the imagination, through invention, can disclose that which exists,
20 Noelle McAfee, ‘Abject Strangers: Towards an Ethics o f Respect’ in Ethics, Politics and Difference 
in Julia Kristeva’s Writings, ed. by Kelly Oliver (New York and London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 116-134
(p. 122).
21 Cavallaro, p. vii.
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suggesting that pain may be shared within the Gothic space. DeBaggio’s ‘parade of 
horror’, at one level, interprets his disease as one which is shared, but is likely to provoke 
fear in those who observe the ‘parade’, suggesting a kind of community of horror which 
extinguishes the distinction between the public and the private, the visible and invisible 
and the acceptable and the unacceptable, as the disease and the reactions to it become 
manifest.
If chronic diseases of the mind, such as Alzheimer’s, provoke a cultural discourse 
which ‘utilizes images of disorder ... psychological disarray ... and disintegration’ then 
such a discourse is presumably one which seeks to hide its fear about the prospect of 
nothingness, except through its occasional outbursts of moral indignation concerning the 
treatment of the vulnerable elderly. Where the discussion interrogates this hidden fear 
through various texts concerning this group, it is ‘to negotiate the anxieties that 
accompany social and epistemological trans-formations and crises’ of contemporary 
society. Fear, as Kristeva has argued, is part of our very being, embedded within us to a 
degree which requires the self and the wider society to be defended from its manifold 
effects, but defences can be difficult to erect. Certainly DeBaggio finds this problematic, 
being, as he is, on the cusp between memory and forgetting: his Gothic horror and fear at 
a point where he is haunted by the prospect of losing his memory as his inner life 
disintegrates. He believes his true self is to become encrypted by the disease, becoming, 
paradoxically, a ghostly presence, a form of otherness, a kind of memento of a former 
self. As Botting puts it, ‘the future only presents a dark, unknown space from which 
horrors are visited’.22
22 Fred Botting, Gothic (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 163.
Fear, Horror and Terror
It may well be argued that the space inhabited by those who have chronic mental 
conditions, such as Alzheimer’s, provides an index of otherness in that Gothic gap which 
awaits the ‘horrors’ indicated by Botting’s remark above; and what can seem to fill this 
space is what Hurley calls ‘the not-quite-human subject, characterized by its morphic 
variability, continually in danger of becoming not-itself, becoming other’. What fills the 
gap between the so-called normal and the abnormal is often occupied first with fear, 
followed by horror or terror or both. Cavallaro argues that the Gothic genre is ‘the textual 
constellation of the phenomenon of fear’ and that terror and horror ‘are not antithetical ... 
but complementary’.24 This suggests that Gothic texts, as with Shelley’s intentions, 
generate fear and do not simply represent them. Ann Radcliffe, one of the early Gothic 
writers from the eighteenth century, published in 1826 a magazine article ‘On the 
Supernatural in Poetry’ in which she argues for a distinction between terror and horror: 
‘terror and horror are so far opposite, that the first expands the soul, and awakens the 
faculties to a high degree of life; the other contracts, freezes, and nearly annihilates 
them’.25 Cavallaro, however, insists that ‘these do not constitute fixed and self-contained 
categories for they incessantly collude [with] and metamorphose into each other as fear’s 
interdependent affects’ 26 But, if Radcliffe is correct, it would seem that Shelley seeks to 
awaken terror rather than horror in the readers of Frankenstein, and DeBaggio might be 
said to freeze at the prospect of annihilation as he writes about the manifestation of 
Alzheimer’s created by his forebears.
23 Hurley, pp. 3-4.
24 Cavallaro, p. vii.
25 Ann Radcliffe, ‘On the Supernatural in Poetry’, New Monthly Magazine, 16 (1826), 145-152 (p. 150).
26 Cavallaro, p. vii.
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However, what DeBaggio anticipates is what Botting claims is a ‘sense of 
dissipation of [his] faculties and physical power, the vampiric draining of energy [which] 
explains why horror remains ... difficult to dispel’.27 Certainly DeBaggio recognizes the 
‘vampiric’ metaphor when he writes that ‘Alzheimer’s is the closest thing to being eaten
9  Qalive’ as the disease sucks and eats away at his very being. The metaphor is also used in 
Saul Bellow’s The Actual when Amy refers to her father’s condition - ‘Alzheimer’s
•  OQdisease has pretty well swallowed up his mmd’. The idea of being eaten alive, therefore,
seems a meaningful one in both fact and fiction. But fear, according to Cavallaro, is
‘endowed with ambivalent powers’ and the intentions of Shelley and the reactions of
DeBaggio may not be as straightforward as suggested.30 Fear can be blinding and
numbing in its effects, so the construction of defences, as indicated above, seems to be
necessary. Psychoanalytic theory, as Adam Phillips argues, points to
The way we construct our defences [which] tends to suggest that 
we unconsciously invite, or sustain contact with, whatever we fear ...
By constructing fear as a form of desire, by redescribing it as 
a particular kind of excitement, psychoanalysis has made the object 
of fear -  the place where fear is located -  a paradox: both elusive 
and irresistible ... we can’t find it and we can’t get away from it.31
If the unconscious both lures and repulses, it clearly brought Helen Knightly to an act of
what can be called monstrosity, and if fear is somehow embedded within us, then the
psyche, it seems, has to find a defence against the body, constructing, as Phillips argues, a
kind of psychical shield against a bodily reflex. And this reflex arrives out o f a sense of
the helplessness of abjection, underpinning, as Phillips writes, ‘our fantasies of autonomy
27 Botting, ‘Horror’, p. 124.
28 DeBaggio, p. 41.
29 Saul Bellow, The Actual (London: Viking, 1977), p. 82. Bellow’s novel deals with old age, regrets and 
issues of redemption.
30 Cavallaro, p. vii.
31 Adam Phillips, ‘Fears’ in Terrors and Experts (London: Faber and Faber, 1995), pp. 46-63 (p. 48).
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[which] are circumscribed by [a] fear’32 that also ‘becomes the perception of a truth that 
inspires tenacious denial’ - a psychical defence not uncommon as a reaction to the 
diagnosis of Alzheimer’s.33 If denial disguises the ‘truth’ of desire, the lessening of the 
strength of the ego presumably allows that ‘truth’ to become apparent and this is, after all, 
the aim of psychoanalytic treatment.
An example of this failing of the ego, as far as the neurological condition of 
Alzheimer’s is concerned, is the reaction of Fiona, the central character in Sarah Polley’s 
film Away from Her?A a dramatization of Alice Munro’s short story, ‘The Bear Came 
Over the Mountain’. Fiona begins to lose her memory and eventually goes into a 
nursing home, but before doing so she tells her husband, Grant, who has had a number of 
affairs throughout their married life, that there is ‘something delicious in oblivion’ - not 
being troubled by the past or worrying about the future but living in the claustrophobic 
nothingness of the present, unhaunted by memories. DeBaggio understands this as one of 
the effects of the condition and calls it ‘the inevitable self-absorption typical of such a 
disease’. This is the central unease of the film and the story, which uses the idea of 
Alzheimer’s as a metaphor for handling Grant’s infidelities. It may be, of course, that the 
desire for oblivion is the wish the husband projects onto his wife because his disease of 
unease throughout the drama emanates from shame and guilt. They do not share the 
secrets of these infidelities, leaving a considerable sense of darkness between them,
32 Phillips, p. 51.
33 Phillips, p. 52.
34 Away from Her, dir. Sarah Polley (Metrodome Distribution, 2007).
35 Alice Munro, ‘The Bear Came Over the Mountain’, in Hateship, Friendship, Courtship, Loveship, 
Marriage (London: Vintage, 2007). Munro’s story is an example o f an ambivalence o f moral function 
underlying the deep sense of guilt and unease at the heart of this portrayal of Alzheimer’s disease.
36 DeBaggio, p. 7.
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emphasized by Fiona’s developing loss of memory. Their prospects are an example of a 
future which will be ‘a dark, unknown space from which horrors are visited’.
Radcliffe, as a writer of Gothic texts, thought to stimulate the reader’s mind 
through terror: horror would do nothing for the imaginative engagement which mystery 
encourages. As Cavallaro argues ‘the difference is between awful apprehension and 
sickening realization: between the smell of death and stumbling against a corpse’.37 
The distinction Cavallaro makes here seems to be between the invisible and the visible, 
with, for readers of Gothic fiction, the reality of the latter having less charm than the 
potential for imagination in the former. However, she insists that ‘terror and horror are 
closely interconnected and that each is capable of metamorphosing into the other’.38 She 
argues that:
The interaction of terror and horror is most explicitly conveyed 
by stories that articulate the experience of fear as an ongoing 
condition. Such narratives intimate that fear is not triggered by 
a single disturbing moment or occurrence but is actually a permanent, 
albeit multi-faceted, aspect of being-in-the-world.39
Clearly Shelley and Radcliffe sense this in seeking to awaken the thrill of terror through
their stories, but the horror of something ghostly or monstrous is just as apparent in their
work, creating a feeling of unease. Although not using the terms terror and horror, Martin
Heidegger, in his text Being and Time, suggests a distinction between fear and anxiety:
fear is a response to an identifiable threat, and anxiety a response to an unidentifiable one,
the danger being nowhere in particular and yet somehow everywhere.40 This last notion
Cavallaro, p. 3.
j8 Cavallaro, p. 5.
39 Cavallaro, p. 6.
40 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by John MacQuarrie and Edward Robinson (London: 
Blackwell, 1978), Part 1, Chapter 6, ‘Care as the Being of Dasein’, articulates the distinction between fear 
and anxiety.
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seems to echo Lovecraft’s idea of cosmic fear. However, these various responses seem to 
collide, as may be seen in the two following examples.
The first begins to explore the start of the beginning of the end between memory 
and forgetting and is from Giorgio Pressburger’s short story ‘The Law of White 
Spaces’.41 Doctor Abraham Fleischmann, the primary character, becomes concerned by 
losing track of words and attempts to carry out a series of exercises to retain a hold on 
language:
He repeated over to himself a hundred times the word ‘injection’, 
each time scrutinizing every thought and mental association that 
passed through his head. In this way he alighted on the thought of 
death, and beyond it, of nothing. For an instant he felt like dying.
‘It’s obviously a case of an irreversible deterioration of the brain cells’, 
he thought on the subject of his unexpected amnesia, something that 
had never occurred to him before then. He began to sweat, and felt 
an emptiness in his stomach 42
Fleischmann’s compulsion to repeat is an attempt to retain a hold on things which are
familiar and is a common behavioral trope in the various representations of Alzheimer’s
disease discussed in future chapters.
The second example is drawn from J. Bemlef s novel Out o f  M ind43 where the
first-person narrator, Maarten, an elderly Dutch emigrant to America, describes a
puzzling state of mind:
Walk, I must get up for a moment and walk about. Then it will ebb 
away again, this feeling of being absent while being fully conscious, 
of being lost, of losing your way, I don’t know what to call this feeling, 
which can apparently be aroused by the simplest objects.44
41 Giorgio Pressburger, ‘The Law of White Spaces’ in The Law o f White Spaces, trans. by Piers 
Spence (London: Granta Books, 1993), pp. 13-38. This story, throujgh first-person narration, outlines the 
narrator’s developing terror and horror at his loss of memory.
42 Pressburger, p. 18.
43 J. Bemlef, Out o f Mind, trans. by Adrienne Dixon (London: Faber and Faber, 1998). This novel through 
first-person narration, details the slow dissolution of the narrator’s mind. His total loss of language is 
demonstrated by the final blank pages.
44 J. Bemlef, p. 9.
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Things which may have appeared meaningful to the characters begin to be seen as having 
no meaning at all, and what was once familiar starts to look very strange. In Bem lef s 
novel the psychoanalytic theory of the uncanny seems to be at work as Maarten is 
suggestively caught between an inner and an outer state, a realm of the in-between as he 
engages hidden fears that both recognize and not recognize this mysterious process of 
‘being lost’.
These two stories do not ordinarily fall into the Gothic genre, but the use of a 
language o f forgetting and the depiction of a vulnerable hold on personal identity, reveal 
motifs which can claim, as Mulvey-Roberts puts it, ‘a family resemblance’ to the Gothic 
as they create senses of terror and horror in confronting the invisible force that will take 
over the characters’ lives.45 In both these works, the principal characters describe 
something invisible, which begins to manifest itself through loss of words and a sense of 
loss of self: something else takes over the character of Maarten. Bemlef s novel has a 
kind of dreamlike quality to it as Maarten slips between reality and the indistinctiveness 
of his life as Alzheimer’s begins to take possession of him, and as he seems to observe 
himself from afar. Fleischmann also begins to recognize his rationality seeping away as it 
defies and defines his struggle. In effect, these two characters represent and interrogate 
some kind o f lived experience as well as the imaginative capacity of the reader, as they 
begin to be something other than themselves and the body and the mind mingle in their 
affects. Both characters might be described as being at the mercy of overwhelming 
psychological forces that are difficult to comprehend; both are caught within a haunting 
abjection as the characters begin to realize that their worlds lack the commonly assumed
45 Mulvey-Roberts, p. xvi.
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secure structure and meaning. In short, both characters may be said to be at the centre of
what might be called ‘modem Gothic’ where ‘horror appears when fears come a little too
close to home’.46 As Cavallaro argues:
If, at the level of everyday lived experience, terror and horror merge 
in the domain of fear as a persuasive condition, at the level of representation 
they are drawn together by Gothicity as a cultural discourse that provides 
the underpinning of disparate narratives of darkness of which terror and 
horror are the recurring affects 47
For Fleischmann and Maarten, as Alzheimer’s subjects and objects, abjection moves
them from so-called unified beings to an un-restful place of borderline, interstitial figures.
It is the phenomenon of Alzheimer’s disease which establishes this form o f abjection
which Kristeva argues ‘disturbs identity, system, order’ and ‘does not respect borders,
positions, rules’. Abjection, it seems, creates ‘the in-between, the ambiguous the
composite’48 that Fleischmann and Maarten perceive through their terror and horror that
they will become.
So if there is a gap, or distinction, between terror and horror, it is one eradicated 
by gothicity, which any number of narratives may reflect through their use of language. 
DeBaggio’s reaction to his diagnosis suggests a future mental decline to overlay his 
physical degeneration. The images he conjures of corruption in his mind and body 
establish his own Gothic version of his situation, lending a telling personal authenticity to 
Cavallaro’s argument.
46 Botting, ‘Horror’, p. 124.
47 Cavallaro, p. 7.
48 Kristeva, p. 4.
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Gothicity as Infection
But can language horrify and terrorise? Clearly Shelley and Lovecraft thought so and the
popularity of the Gothic genre from the eighteenth century onwards indicates the desire to
be thrilled and awed at the same time by images either deliberately created or suggested
by the author. Punter’s Gothic Pathologies makes this point and also argues that the
Gothic is concerned with ‘creating, or recreating, other books’.49 In other words, it is an
approach which contaminates and infects the language of different texts and can,
therefore, horrify or terrorize the readers of such works. In a sense his book appears to
interrogate Castle’s ‘hag-ridden world of [the] unconscious’. His theme seems to suggest
that if the Gothic is a kind of literary conceit, its excesses interrogate culture’s dark
visions, its subversive Other, in much the same way as psychoanalytic practices
interrogate the language of the unconscious, hinting at its Gothic nature. The subtitle of
Gothic Pathologies is The Text, The Body and the Law, indicating that the idea of the
Gothic runs through all three. This is made clear in the following points:
haunted by a world which comes prior to text yet which we can know 
only in and through text, a world of oral tradition, of more primal 
hauntings by word of mouth.50
Gothic, then, provides an image language for bodies and their terrors, 
inhabits a point of undecidability in the area of the growth of 
self-awareness.51
Gothic persists in eluding this notion of ‘rule’ - it consistently 
subverts rules, the law of things - because it is concerned with the 
the disorder of things.52
49 Punter, p. 2.
50 Punter, p. 14.
51 Punter, p. 14.
52 Punter, p. 14.
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All three notions of the Gothic in text, body and ‘the law of things’ can perhaps be seen
in DeBaggio’s both angry and elegiac memoir and the statement he makes after he claims
that Alzheimer’s was the inspiration for writing his book. The book, he states:
was to be a word picture of the outside and inside, present and past, 
of a man’s naked struggle with the unknown on his way to trembling 
silence and unexplainable torment without the torturer. It was a story of 
unleashed anger and beauty brought forth by an unseen illness, incurable 
and relatively long-term in duration. I knew I was unable to write about 
all stages of Alzheimer’s because the disease causes cognitive decline 
and I will lapse into a world without language and memory.53
Language, the language of bodies and the disorder of things is suggestively incorporated
in DeBaggio’s need to explain himself and his disease, and as it horrifies him so it will
the reader. Body and mind are clearly under stress in terms of the invisibility of a
condition which will torment him, in the end, to silence, but in the meantime anger and
struggle provide the impetus to explain and explore his reaction to his daily dissolution.
The notion of the struggle also suggests something heroic, but a struggle that fate will
destroy, and the intensity and the drama of the language create a Gothic picture. But if the
signature of a memoir suggests intimacy, DeBaggio’s vivid language of anger and
frustration suggests a desire to put the disease outside of himself: to be rid of it. In this
excess of anger and frustration, he echoes the language of the Gothic as an internal desire,
a desire to return to his former self and escape his oncoming ghostly shadow. Punter
explores further how language and the body, through text, might terrorize:
We might take a broad line on this and assert that all texts are 
instruments of terror. The justification for such a claim would be 
derived from such thinkers as Heidegger, Blanchot and Derrida, 
and their arguments about the ways in which text, or ‘literature’ 
in their various formulations, represents absence and negativity.
In other words, although language may appear to ‘represent’,
53 DeBaggio, p. 7.
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in fact its major effect is to ‘stand in for’ its absent other; so that 
when we confront a text we are inevitably confronted in turn 
by absence, by a sense of loss with which the words we read have a 
complex relation. Literature, on these readings, would be that which 
pre-eminently exposes us to the terrors of loss and absence, which 
threatens our illusions of a fullness of being.54
Language, in Punter’s view, stands in the gap created by abjection, by underlining that
loss of fullness and its representation, and, paradoxically, indicating a fear of its return.
As Punter goes on to say, ‘Gothic fiction would, on this paradigm, be a model for all
literature; precisely because its very subject matter is haunting, which is in the end the
station of all writing’.55 Absence, it seems, creates the possibility of Gothic speculations
especially when rational consciousness is absent during dreams and nightmares.
The process of Alzheimer’s disease depicted by the Audit Commission and
outlined in Chapter 1, bears out this kind of haunting, albeit in the language of
administrative prose. It also illustrates a further point about terror and horror made by
Punter: ‘Horror, we might say, is a stark transfixed staring; terror has more to do with
trembling, the liminal, the sense of waiting’.56 The sense of waiting invoked by the
insidious progress of the disease is present at each stage as it withholds itself from the
next in terms of time and so the reverse abjecting process takes hold, being haunted not
only by the bits of the self lost, but also by what is to come. And as language and the
sense of self are gradually destroyed by the stranger within, it may be argued that the
Alzheimer subject faces what Punter calls ‘the terror of incarnation, the fear that bits and
pieces of our own ... body ... will receive the gift of “organization” and be returned to us
54 Punter, ‘Terror’ in The Handbook to Gothic Literature, pp. 235-240 (p. 235).
55 Punter, ‘Terror’, p. 236.
56 Punter, ‘Terror’, p. 236.
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as a fantasized organic whole’.57 Such a process appears to be the triumph of the material 
body over the symbolism provided by language and echoes Kristeva’s paradigm of 
abjection.
But Punter’s use of the word iim inal’ in connection with ‘waiting’ also suggests
that waiting has a relationship to the notion of the Sublime and Burke’s understanding of
it to indicate awe, surprise and terror. Phillips’s epigraph conjoins the idea of knowing as
implicitly suggesting limits and the Sublime ‘as the impossibility of knowledge’ and links
these to absence and eventually ‘to losing one’s coherence’. If terror is a kind of waiting,
perhaps more accurately described as anticipation, at its heart is what Phillips calls
‘vacuity, darkness, solitude, silence’, all part of the process of Alzheimer’s which is the
hidden haunting couched in the administrative language of the Audit Commission’s
report outlined in Chapter l.58 What this kind of language may wish to hide can be
imagined in its description of the unravelling of the mind as it sets out the stages of
dissolution. In this sense the Commission’s report seems to incorporate gothicity, which
may trigger the fear, terror and horror of its readers as they too face the representation of
absence underlying the invasive, transpersonal potency of language and disease. This
point is marked by Punter when he states of the representation of absence that it:
returns us again to the condition of all textuality, where the free will 
of the characters is an illusion but one in which we are more than happy 
to share until the point where we sense that our own freedom as readers 
is being demonstrably assailed and that we are being led to conclusions 
which involve death and destruction.59
Death and destruction are the end results of Frankenstein’s experiments in Shelley’s
novel. Sir Walter Scott declares something different in the pleasure and thrill of reading
57 Punter, ‘Terror’, p. 237.
58 See Chapter 1, pp. 6-10.
59 Punter, ‘Terror’, p. 240.
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what Lee E. Heller terms ‘philosophical Gothic’.60 Heller refers to early reviews of 
Shelley’s text ‘as assessing it in terms of cultural concerns about... character’.61 
However, he also refers to a review of the text which has been attributed to Sir Walter 
Scott who argued that Shelley’s novel is ‘more philosophical and refined [in its] use of 
the supernatural’ in which ‘the pleasure ordinarily derived from the marvelous incidents 
is secondary to that we extract from observing how mortals like ourselves would be 
affected’.62 Heller argues that ‘the development of Gothic fiction ... takes its meaning 
from the tensions informing ... cultural concerns about human nature, its potentials and 
limits, and the forces that go into its making’.63 It seems, therefore, that hidden behind 
Gothic intentions to thrill and excite is something of the terror and horror concerning 
‘human nature’, the dread of insidious loss and the struggles of identity, all of which 
speak to Punter’s arguments with some resonance and confirm Cavallaro’s points about 
how terror and horror metamorphose into each other. If the intention of ‘early Gothic’ 
was to excite, thrill and create a sense of terror, it presumably did so with the idea of 
resolving such responses by showing that evil designs in the end are happily outwitted by 
the good in ‘human nature’, perhaps attempting thereby to shape readers’ morality.
Contemporary gothicity may suggest something different. In Hurley’s The Gothic 
Body, Gothic literature of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century is examined as 
interrogating and being interrogated by ‘a range of scientific discourses ... rhetoric, 
modes of imaging, and narrative structures which reveal the surprising compatibility of
60 Lee E. Heller, ‘Frankenstein and the Cultural Uses o f Gothic’ in Mary Shelley: Frankenstein, 
ed. by Johanna M. Smith, Case Studies in Contemporary Criticism (New York and Boston:
Macmillan Press Ltd., 1992), pp. 325-341 (p. 328).
61 Heller, p. 329
62 Heller, p. 329.
63 Heller, p. 326.
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empiricism and supematuralism’ at that time in history. This approach is, as she states,
‘more than the formulation of genre-as-symptom’.64 Her intention is to show how these
various discourses became metamorphosed into Gothic stories and how the language of
these other writings were suffused by the idea of gothicity and the Gothic vision.
Cavallaro’s text, The Gothic Vision: Three Centuries o f  Horror, Terror and Fear
published two years before Hurley’s /defines this vision as ‘investigating narratives of
darkness’.65 Cavallaro describes this darkness as being
invested with negative connotations by many mythologies and 
religions. Frequently, it is associated with the baser instincts, lack of 
clarity and order, a pervasive sense of fear and a fate of unrelieved sorrow.66
She writes later that ‘Darkness does not necessarily mask an alluring mystery. It may
also, in fact, conceal the absence of anything’ .67 However, she views the discourse of
gothicity as primarily referring ‘to tales of obsession and haunting which employ images
of disorder, alienation and monstrosity for the purposes of both entertainment and
ideological reflection’.68 Her views bear many similarities to Hurley’s analysis of Gothic
tales in the period of history she covers, and which, she asserts, can also be read in other
discourses of that period. So if gothicity images what Hurley calls ‘the ruination of the
human subject’,69 it encompasses, both in the darkness of its language and the terror of its
vision, the notions of personal dissolution and struggles with identity that can be
recognized in many contemporary accounts of Alzheimer’s disease. These fearful sights
and sounds come to be incorporated into the ‘great dread of our age’, where the ‘parade
64 Hurley, p. 5.
65 Cavallaro, p.vii.
66 Cavallaro, p. 21.
67 Cavallaro, p. 23.
68 Cavallaro, p. 8.
69 Hurley, p. 3.
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of horror’ is viewed with considerable unease and terrified impotence. In so far as the 
Gothic is ‘a site of difference’, it is only so ‘within a panoply of family resemblances’.70 
Conclusion
If consciousness of self, an awareness of being aware, is considered to be the primary 
aspect of a civilized and enlightened existence, presumably its lack is seen as something 
uncivilized, unenlightened and, therefore, abnormal, pathological and probably 
posthuman. Compacted into the pathological are the dark images of the Gothic seen not 
only within the literary genre which deliberately accounts for such images, but also in the 
reactions of those diagnosed with Alzheimer’s and in the imaginative narrative 
descriptions offered by those concerned and interested to create and explore the inner life 
of the disease.
Furthermore, as Punter has persuasively argued, it seems clear that other kinds of 
texts dealing with the condition, such as those from the social sciences, medical science 
and a variety of social policy and administration organizations, cannot entirely escape 
from these dark visions. The ‘ruination of the human subject’ comes within the categories 
and classifications on which all these knowledge repositories rely, and although their 
respective languages may not be able to indicate the density of lived experience, they find 
it difficult to avoid the Gothic images and visions ordinarily supposed to be separate from 
the wider culture. While these areas of knowledge may seek to objectify Alzheimer’s 
disease and its effects and turn them into areas of public concern, they rarely, excepting 
the products of interest and campaigning groups, are able to get inside the disease. Even 
memoirs of people who have the condition are written, as it were, somehow outside 
themselves and in some cases, such as DeBaggio’s, very vividly. But the accounts of
70 Mulvey-Roberts, p. xvi.
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those who write through the creative imagination enable the reader to feel the full sense 
of fear, terror and horror which the language of other knowledge areas tends somewhat to 
veil, though not always successfully as the veil often slips, allowing the darker Gothic 
images to seep through the gaps.
Punter’s argument about the Gothic and the sublime meeting on some battlefield 
between memory and forgetting summons up the notion that within our dreamlike and 
nightmarish states of mind our fears are, ironically, awakened. It is Alzheimer’s disease 
which creates the terrain between memory and forgetting and establishes the space for the 
Gothic and the sublime to meet. The Gothic appears out of the language of fear, terror 
and horror, and if horror seeks to annihilate, it does so through the sublime in the sense 
that DeBaggio, for example, stands in awesome and stunned fear of being possessed by a 
disease which will reduce him to silence, eventually rendering him lost for words. This 
possessive power turns him from one kind of reality to another, in which he will become 
unrecognizable and a ghostly projection of himself. Punter, and no doubt other scholars 
recognize this as the psychological embodiment of the Gothic awaiting its release through 
a language fit for its purposes.
Gothicity, then, enables this language of the ‘hag-ridden realm of the 
unconscious’ to contaminate and infect a range of texts concerned with Alzheimer’s, but 
it is the imaginative works of fiction, poetry and drama that manage the cultural stress the 
condition creates so as to interrogate our fears concerning the disease, and in this sense 
they fall into the category of works that bear ‘family resemblances’ to the Gothic genre. 
The brutality of the fact of the disease provides a basis for the use of imaginative 
language to explore its subversive reality, and here it seems clear that the tragic drama of
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Alzheimer’s disease produces a collision of fact and the imagination to a point where the 
condition might be described as a Gothic pathology ‘relevant to a very tangible social 
reality’.71 Various aspects of the private and the public within this social reality are 
considered in the following chapter.
71 Cavallaro, p. 9.
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Chapter 3
Aspects of the Private and the Public
The world seems to be in the grip of a dementia epidemic. There are, 
as I write, about 24 million dementia sufferers across the globe, with 
80 million forecast for 2040 ... That’s why the phrase Dementia Time 
Bomb is beginning to be used.
Andrea Gillies
For the past 2,500 years our understanding of disease has evolved 
with the state of knowledge about how we are affected by nature, 
and it has borne a changing burden of anxiety about bodies, souls 
and the way we live in the world we have made. Prominently, 
ancient suspicions of contamination, divine punishment, and moral 
correction have permeated humanity’s awareness of disease and 
continue to influence our grasp of the epidemic.
Philip Alcabes
We humans dread death. It is only natural that the mass mortality 
brought by a great plague makes us afraid. And besides our dread of 
death, we are frightened by the prospect of social disruption. To live in 
a civilised society is to bear a dread that goes beyond the fear of death.
Philip Alcabes
Because there is a silence, a taboo. No one knows how to feel, or what 
to think because the meteor of dementia that strikes families and wipes 
out so much is supposed to be part of the realm of privacy.
Linda Grant
The sociological imagination enables its possessor to understand the 
larger historical scene in terms of its meaning for the inner life and the 
external career of a variety of individuals ... By such means the personal 
uneasiness of individuals is focussed upon explicit troubles and the 
indifference of publics is transformed into involvement with public issues.
Charles Wright Mills1
1 Andrea Gillies, Keeper: Living with Nancy. A Journey into Alzheimer’s (London: Short Books, 
2009), pp. 10-11; Philip Alcabes, Dread (New York: Public Affairs, 2009), p. 10 and p. 4.
Linda Grant, Remind Me Who I am Again (London: Granta Books, 1998). Linda Grant is cited by 
Christopher A. Vassilas, ‘Dementia and Literature’ in Advances in Psychiatric Treatment, 9 
(2003), 439-445 (p. 444). Charles Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (New York:
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Epidemics and Pandemics
Earlier chapters have shown how periodic cultural concerns regarding population 
balance resonate with contemporary anxieties about the social, economic and 
political effects of increasing numbers of elderly and dependent people, and how 
cultural commentators have relied upon the Gothic trope and the language of 
gothicity to respond to and represent these anxieties, taking them beyond the 
personal ambit into the public scope in a variety of media - official documents, 
campaigning reports, and works of fiction, drama and poetry. The number of 
people affected by forms of dementia within the United Kingdom is now 
estimated to be some 820,000, of which Alzheimer’s is considered to be the most 
common form. Whether or not this can be regarded as an epidemic in strict public 
health terms, it is clearly seen as such by those intimately involved with the 
condition such as Gillies. Her stark imaging of an epidemic gripping the world 
with a potential explosive effect creating disorder and alienation, has its own 
menacing Gothic undertones, so that, as Linda Grant asserts, the demographic of 
dementia no longer permits the subject of the disease to remain a taboo. It now 
spills over into the space of the communal realm, exposing the private troubles of 
families and friends to a public gaze. Epidemics, of course, have been fellow
Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 5. The several stages of Alzheimer’s disease, as outlined in 
Chapter 1, which will be considered further in this chapter, are marked by loss of aspects of 
personality and behaviour. These aspects originate within the privacy of individual and family life 
but the emotional pressure of such a disease, as in epidemics, creates an eruption of fear as the 
condition socially mutates from the intimate into the public. Private troubles become public issues. 
These epigraphs, like the texts from which they derive, act as a frame of reference for this chapter 
as it seeks to illustrate how a disease, such as Alzheimer’s, because it is problematic and difficult 
to understand, becomes, in a sense, a carrier of something we fear - like a spreading dark shadow.
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travellers of human civilization for thousands of years, and the realities of 
infection and contagion have exercised imaginations throughout these times.
If the increasing numbers of the demented reference a kind of epidemic, at 
least in Gillies’ view, then it is an epidemic which seems to create a sense not 
only of impotent fear, but the possibility of violence, as hinted at by Alcabes in 
the first of his epigraphs above. Prefacing one of the themes in this chapter 
concerned with aspects of the private and the public relating to Alzheimer’s 
disease, Alcabes argues that the event of an epidemic is often accompanied by 
feelings that ‘divine punishment’ and ‘contamination’ are at work and requires a 
response of ‘moral correction’ to eliminate a suggestive excess.2 These responses 
indicate a need on the part of communities to seek out the agent responsible for 
such horrific randomness. The gothicity of this language seems to indicate 
something like a sublime reverence in the face of the disease, and the idea of 
‘moral correction’ echoes the argument used in the late nineteenth century in Max 
Nordau’s Degeneration.
However, Gillies’ use of the term epidemic to denote the number of 
people with dementia across the globe is, strictly speaking, misleading. Alcabes, a 
public health specialist, would insist it is more appropriately called a pandemic, 
one that crosses borders rather than one isolated in one area or space. William 
Bynum in The History o f Medicine argues that because ‘public health is about the 
state and the individual’ it is concerned therefore with isolating epidemics to
2 Alcabes, p. 10.
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prevent pandemics. But dementia, again in strict terms, is not an infectious
disease, other than in a social sense when its effects on others are socially,
psychologically and economically profound. In logic, too, it might be argued that
people who contract early onset Alzheimer’s (that is, those who demonstrate the
symptoms of the disease at a relatively early age), are infected by the condition
because it appears to have been inherited. Hence, it is in these interstitial ways
that the felt experience of Alzheimer’s disease and dementia more generally,
crosses the gap between one individual and another and thus moves into the
public realm. Wright Mills’s argument concerning history and its effect on the
inner life of individuals resonates significantly here. An epidemic is one way of
reading the Wright Mills’ paradigm, being an event which can be perceived as
crossing the cultural divide of private and public, not only as a cause in biological
biography (as argued later in this chapter from the work of David Shenk), but as
an experience that creates social crises. Illness, of course, is a universal as well as
an intensely private experience, one where the science and practice of medicine is
supposed to act to relieve the tension between the two.
Clearly epidemics generate individual and social fears about what is
unknown, undesirable, or misunderstood. In Dread, Alcabes writes that:
The way we have responded to epidemics like polio, AIDS ... 
and the way we are currently responding to obesity [etc] ... 
reveal that we bring fears to the prospect of any sort of epidemic, 
deadly or not.4
3 William Bynum, The History of Medicine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 68.
4 Alcabes, p. 5.
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According to Alcabes, our fears and anxieties appear to be manifold, going
beyond what is usually seen as normal fear of death:
To judge by our response to epidemics that are less sudden or 
catastrophic than the black death, we fear much more besides: 
strangers, flying things, modem technology, female sexual 
desire, racial differences ... and so on.5
One might add to this the fear of a decrepit old age. Of course, the number of
people growing into old age has been a matter of knowledge for some time and
therefore cannot be as sudden or as catastrophic as some epidemics have been in
history, but nevertheless it seems to have taken western culture by surprise with a
mix of relief, pleasure and fear at its own success that life now routinely goes
beyond God’s allotted time of the proverbial three score years and ten. Alcabes
underlines this point when he argues that ‘besides our dread of death, we are
frightened by the prospect of social disruption. To live in a civilized society is to
bear a dread that goes beyond the fear of death’. In the land of the living, fear, it is
implicitly suggested, is part of our makeup, waiting, as it were, to be wakened. In
this sense Alcabes echoes Mary Shelley and Julia Kristeva, indicating that without
order, the terrible and the extravagant can be admitted, particularly if the cause is
unknown.
Imaginative Dread
But even if the cause is known, it appears our fears and apprehensions can still be 
stirred into imaginative forms of dread and desire to capture and, to a degree, 
distance ourselves from these social fears and ills. This might be argued to be the 
function of the Gothic, a kind of repository and a metaphor for such fears.
5 Alcabes, p. 5. These points of fear are implied to be part o f ‘human nature’.
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Illustrative of Alcabes’ argument that epidemics have three aspects,6 Edgar Allan 
Poe’s story, ‘The Masque of the Red Death’, registers an event which causes 
disease and illness, thereby establishing a social crisis. Such crisis disrupts private 
lives and public institutions and, in turn, becomes transformed into a kind of 
narrative which knits these several aspects together.7 It seems likely that this story 
may have been prompted by tuberculosis, from which Poe’s wife suffered and 
from which his mother died. Poe is also likely to have witnessed an epidemic of 
cholera in Baltimore, Maryland in 1831 which could also have helped inspire the 
story.
There are two protagonists in Poe’s atmospheric tale. The first protagonist 
is the disease which has developed into an epidemic and is mainly illustrated 
through its symptoms and the death of those who are infected. The second 
protagonist is a class of people, personified through the Prince Prospero, who 
attempt to escape the disease by taking refuge in one of the Prince’s ‘castellated 
abbeys’. The Prince and ‘the knights and dames of his court’ believe this self- 
imposed exile will protect them from the ‘Red Death’ disease which has caused 
the demise of half his population.8 Place and time suggest something medieval in 
Poe’s story, but what is also discernible is the fabric of William Shakespeare’s 
The Tempest, which relates the story of Prospero, the Duke of Milan, who, taking 
flight to a seemingly deserted island, finds himself troubled by the monstrous
6 Alcabes, p. 5.
7 Edgar Allan Poe, ‘The Masque of the Red Death’ in Selected Tales (London: Penguin Books, 
1994), pp. 192-198.
8 Poe, p. 192.
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Caliban. Poe’s ‘Prince Prospero’ is also referred to as the ‘Duke’, and it is he who
vividly describes the symptoms of the ‘Red Death’ at the beginning of the tale:
Blood was its Avatar and its seal -  the redness and the horror 
of blood. There were sharp pains, and sudden dizziness, and 
then profuse bleeding at the pores, with dissolution. The scarlet 
stains upon the body and especially upon the face of the victim, 
were the pest ban which shut him out from the aid and from the 
sympathy of his fellow-men. And the whole seizure, progress and 
termination of the disease, were the incidents of half an hour.9
This description of the ‘Red Death’ portrays the victims in a condition of
posthuman dissolution with an outpouring of blood creating an image of horrific
proportions. Thankfully, the suffering is over in a short time. The Prince and his
followers can have no dialogue with this kind of death, it is too horrible and too
quick, and they can only take flight from its terrifying manifestations, but
epidemics, Poe seems to be saying, are dreadfully democratic.
Poe’s narrative language suggests a medieval period which is illustrated
by many of the familiar Gothic motifs, particularly of dread, incorporated as an
apprehension of an uncertain future with an unknown disease as the object of fear.
There is no indication of when the disease will strike, but it is implicit that it will,
and escape is not really possible. Fate, therefore, is central to the narrative, as it is
to the idea of falling victim to an epidemic. This establishes a sense of both fear
and awe. Certainly the pleasures sought by the Prince and his followers at his
masked ball in his abbey, as a means of avoiding thinking about the disease, seem
to be a kind of fearful indulgence in the face of a terrible death, symbolically
masqued to bring the story to a close.
9 Poe, p. 192.
If apprehensive dread is endemic in the experience of epidemics, it 
suggests an uncertain waiting for the disease to strike: a kind of anticipation of an 
adversary to take on in battle. It can also incorporate the notion of fate. This is 
something that determines the feelings of the narrator in Michael Ignatieff s novel 
Scar Tissue, whose mother and maternal grandmother have become subjects of 
the Alzheimer’s disease he begins to believe he will inherit - indicating a kind of 
immortal gene: ‘It was as if I discovered in my innocence, that there was such a 
thing as fate and that it could take a life and dismember it’.10 The narrator portrays 
himself as a helpless victim of past generations, fated to be driven asunder into 
bits and pieces by this immortal gene which will determine the relinquishment of 
his thinking self. The privacy of his family life is exploded by this understanding 
and his psyche begins to unravel both in the face of his mother’s deteriorating 
psychological sense of self and his knowledge of maternal family history. He 
becomes obsessed by the ghosts of his past as they begin to create the sense of 
chaos that overtakes him, suggesting that he is beginning to feel the effects of this 
inherited condition by the novel’s end. This text will be discussed in a later 
chapter, but here it illustrates, together with Poe’s story, the chilling effect of 
gothicity on the idea of fate destroying people by a masqued disease revealed 
through symptoms which permeate private and public spheres through its effects 
on mind and body.
10 Michael Ignatieff, Scar Tissue (London: Chatto and Windus, 1993), p. 64.
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Biology and Old Age
As explicated above, it may be argued that disease creates a space in which the 
private and the public cross over one into the other and collide with some physical 
and emotional force. Wright Mills uses these terms to suggest both a demarcation 
and a relationship, and his notion of private troubles being transformed into public 
issues is illustrated in the Audit Commission’s report referred to in Chapter 1.
This is a text which foregrounds a segment of the population as an infectious 
social problem requiring regulation through statutory and voluntary welfare and 
medical provision. In doing so, it problematises, and socially constructs, an 
ageing population as an actuarial one and, in consequence, echoes Spencer’s 
alarmist demographics at the same time as emphasising Darwinian biology as the 
master of the ageing body. Although the Audit Commission’s report gives a due 
recognition to the social, it establishes a hierarchy of explanation and by giving 
pride of place to the biological, medicine comes to be offered as the starting point 
for intervention. Therefore, with old age construed in its terminal stages as a 
biological process and thus outside the social, the ageing body becomes 
medicalised as a malfunctioning entity seemingly without emotional and social 
content. Because precedence has been given to the organic, arguably this puts the 
aged body into a kind of posthuman condition, given that it is no longer seen as a 
maker of meaning. Construed thus, terminal old age divides the body from the 
mind. If memory is crucial to self-reliance, its disappearance signals a journey 
into the paradox of adult infancy.
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In focusing upon loss of function and how this may best be managed, the 
report, solicitous in tone throughout, advances medical specialities originating in 
the nineteenth century: geriatrics and psycho-geriatrics. Such specialities have 
appropriated the ageing body as their particular focus, and have centrally cast that 
body as pathological and terminal. Much commentary on these considerations is 
closely associated with loss, and indeed loss is often the dominant empirical 
experience. And the otherness of the biological aged body is not just a 
construction of medicine; other discourses - psychology, sociology, public and 
social administration - have also contributed much of theoretical salience. 
Managing the otherness of the ageing body has been underpinned by what may be 
described as welfare narratives, and the explanation afforded by the Audit 
Commission report is exemplary in this regard in that it evidences the three stages 
by which the otherness in question is constructed: first, the fact of an ageing 
population is offered as a problem to be resolved; secondly, the problem is 
classified and categorised into a body of knowledge; finally, ways and means are 
outlined of dealing with individuals and their families who present with these 
problems. The otherness which is to be exposed to the attentions of welfare is 
construed by the de-anchoring of the social from the biological, and it is to this 
de-anchoring that this chapter now turns.
The Public ‘Life’ of Alzheimer’s Disease
Within the discursive nature of the paradigm presented by the Audit Commission 
remains a structural issue. It may be argued that the problematizing of old age, 
with its emphasis on loss to the point of death, produces welfare capitalism: that is
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to say, the ‘problem’ of old age supports a welfare industry of providers to tend to 
a malfunctioning, biomedical, aged body set apart from its anchoring social, 
cultural and intimate self. The Audit Commission report certainly characterizes an 
elderly population at risk of losing such anchorage through the process of 
dementia, and in textualising such a characterization, the report argues the 
necessity for partnerships between public and voluntary bodies and the families 
and carers of those diagnosed with the condition.
Thus the Audit Commission creates a space in which both private and 
public are able to meet, but at the expense of a body already marked by the 
constructions that the report endorses. For those diagnosed with dementia there 
can be, the report implies, no Cartesian dualism, nor the construction, let alone the 
maintenance of a sense of self outside the body. Bodily decay parallels mental 
decay, and, as such, constitutes old age and otherness. Biologically, the body 
betrays the idea of self. The report’s endorsement of the stereotypical medicalised 
and aged body is an illustration of textualising, of writing on that body. It also 
indicates that the spaces of the private and the public circulate around this body, 
considering, examining and often reviling it in its entirety as well as its 
fragmentation. The body, in this state of disarray, invites further textualisation as 
illustrated below.
David Shenk’s the forgetting: Understanding Alzheimer's: A Biography o f 
a Disease, reflects upon and explores the exchange between culture and power.11 
Many theoretical constructs explore this tension, but Shenk attempts to consider
11 David Shenk, the forgetting: Understanding Alzheimer’s: A Biography of a Disease (London: 
HarperCollins, 2002).
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the factual effects of Alzheimer’s disease and how it has affected the public 
domain as demonstrated by comprehensive responses from voluntary bodies, 
funding organizations, medical and scientific research, the pharmaceutical 
industry and government as a whole. The text illustrates how a contemporary 
perception has come about, given the increasing number of people living into old 
age, the effects of ageing on individuals, families, public and voluntary services, 
and the need to develop social policies as tensions oscillate between and within 
these groups. His analysis makes it appear that a single organic condition has 
spread its effects to a considerable degree as private troubles penetrate and 
punctuate the domain of the public and vice versa. Shenk foregrounds 
Alzheimer’s disease and its history from its naming in 1910 to the present day. He 
entitles his text a ‘biography’ of the disease, suggesting to his readers that not 
only does he wish them to understand this subject as a disease, a scientific as well 
as a social one, but as a character that has a life of its own, and a singular one 
encompassing many other bodies. It is a ‘life’ that emerges as a kind of serial 
killer: a ‘life’ that is decadent and promiscuous in its ‘purpose’, indicating a text 
which may be read as a kind of Gothic thriller. By giving due weight to the most 
extreme effects of Alzheimer’s disease, Shenk’s text evokes a double response of 
horror and compassion: fear of the condition, and sympathy for those who suffer 
from its ‘purpose’.
Its ‘purpose’ may be described as driving out the inner life, derived from 
internalizing ‘civilization’, and creating another form of self-presentation: that of 
someone living in space rather than time. The conventions of restraint taken more
100
or less for granted in most social interaction are lost, and, as regression sets in, a 
private self becomes a public problem due to the body’s capacity and ability to 
disturb the order of time. Perhaps it is the notion of the regression of the adult body 
and mind that provokes fear, bringing in its wake a transforming counteraction: in 
this instance it is the forces of modem medical science which bring the 
transformation into focus. Medical science, in particular, based on the principle of 
law and certainty and the absence of doubt, comes to be centrally challenged by the 
discovery of a condition such as Alzheimer’s, which confounds the law as manifest 
in known diagnostic labels. Shenk’s text shows how ‘objective’ science and 
‘subjective’ experience are brought together within the space of a tension between 
mind and body. What really troubles the laws of medical science is the idea of 
randomness: people suffering from Alzheimer’s disease reveal no established 
pattern of the invasion of the disease other than the symptoms of the condition 
themselves. Therefore, such ‘accidents’ suggest those diagnosed with the disease 
are victims, and this seems to make it both unfair and unreal. Such randomness also 
elicits a fear of the disease as uncontrollable, and in this sense it haunts a wider 
public domain in much the same way as any kind of epidemic will, which is vividly 
illustrated and gothically represented in Poe’s story.
This invasive ‘life’ has a haunting effect in its very insidiousness; a 
growing blight from which, apparently, it is impossible to escape until it devours 
the very thing which keeps it alive: memory. Shenk quotes Ralph Waldo 
Emerson’s argument that memory brings us into being, shapes our consciousness,
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and that ‘without it all life and thought [is] an unrelated succession’,12 and he
accentuates the biological process of memory:
New memory traces are laid down on top of a foundation of 
old memories, and old memories can only be recalled in context 
of recent experiences ... because of this, no recorded experience 
can ever be fully distinct from anything else. Whether one likes it 
or not, the past is always informed by the present, and vice versa.13
Shenk’s definitive statement of how biology affects the processing of memory fits
comfortably within the assurances of neurological science, and can be traced back
to Spencer and Jackson’s nineteenth-century views that the latest memories will
be the first to be contaminated by earlier ones, and would be the first to be lost in
the process of dementia. Shenk’s description of a biological process uses a
language which explains its complexity in simple images. His description
constructs a metaphor imaging memory as architecture that changes with time as
repairs and new materials are added to build upon the original structure. Shenk
declares that biology determines the processing of our memories. Old memories
mixed with fresh ones are clearly malleable, and if our identities are so reliant on
this mix (as his citation from Emerson seems to suggest) it follows that memories
can never really be fixed and permanent. Here, it appears, biology meets
poststructuralism with its notions of identity also being something which shifts
and is reshaped with passing experience.
These notions of shifting and re-shaping clearly complicate the idea of
laws and the culture of medical science, but, at the same time, such notions have
to be quelled so as to quieten the apprehensions and costs that disturb the private
12 Shenk, p. 6.
13 Shenk, p. 55.
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and the public. In this sense, medical science finds it problematic to ignore the
social, and maybe Shenk’s metaphor underlines the necessity to reshape science’s
laws which, in most cases, offer rewards (in medical, social and economic terms)
if such reshaping takes place. The medicine of old age is not a ‘glamorous’ aspect
of medical science, but, as Shenk points out, the discovery of a mitigating drug or
a cure for Alzheimer’s disease will make those involved very rich indeed.
Neurological science is particularly well placed to prosper from reshaping the
paradigm. Consequently, research on the mind and the brain faces many tensions.
Memories are an aspect of our consciousness and hence of our mind. Paul
Broks’s belief is that:
Minds emerge from process and interaction, not substance.
In a sense, we inhabit the spaces between things. We subsist 
in emptiness.14
Broks seems to be arguing that minds are primarily the result of culture although 
clearly we need to have the basic physical machinery with which to interact. It 
seems to Broks that the mind fits a space somehow between the body and the 
space within which it moves or operates. But once the mind, however formulated, 
begins to be taken over by bodily processes, it stops interacting, and the body 
appears to become an empty space. When Alois Alzheimer carried out an autopsy 
on the brain of Auguste D. in 1906 and discovered the condition which thereafter 
carried his name, was he considering a piece of machinery devoid of self, mind 
and soul? Auguste D. had stopped interacting with the world in any 
comprehensible way several years before her death, which would indicate that her
14 Paul Broks, Into the Silent Land (London: Atlantic Books, 2003), p. 56.
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mind was beginning to disappear, or regress, at a stage earlier than her death. As 
Broks argues:
The self is not an intrinsic feature of the brain and it is possible 
to become derailed -  through psychosis ... and as a result of 
brain damage.15
Hence, our consciousness of things and ourselves can be ‘derailed’ by any 
number of unpredictable, random ‘accidents’. As Shenk points out, such 
‘accidents’ demonstrate both that ‘the disease [Alzheimer’s] was emerging as one 
of the largest causes of death in the United States’16 and, that, prior to death, the 
number of bodies outliving their minds was creating a level of dependency that 
society felt it could not contain: ‘the unique curse of Alzheimer’s is that it ravages 
several victims for every brain it infects’.17 Here, Shenk’s language conflates 
demographics and classifications to create, perhaps unwittingly, a transformative 
Gothic image of unrestrained, cursed and infected bodies, such as the victims in
1 RPoe’s story, which are forms with no content: the ‘parade of horror’ or zombie­
like monstrous images so feared by Thomas DeBaggio. Alzheimer’s disease is 
turned into a curse and an infection that ravages a decrepit old age as it sits at the 
edge of the formlessness of old age, and confers another identity and a 
representation of monstrosity.
Certainly it is others, who are forced to confront this process of regression, 
who need somehow to compensate for the witness with which they are 
challenged. Shenk’s language, however, suggests some transcendental malign
15 Broks, p. 42.
16 Shenk, p. 62.
17 Shenk, p. 62.
18 Thomas DeBaggio, Losing my Mind (New York: The Free Press, 2002), p. 1.
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force concerning the disease, which seems to be incisive in its ‘purpose’, for to be
cursed, infected and ravaged is to be taken over by the other within and typical, as
such, of subliminal fears demonstrated in Poe’s story. And the number of bodies
outliving their minds drives the condition into the public arena as individual
stories add up to such significance that they become public concerns underlined
by these Gothic images:
The disease name is public recognition of a shared affliction.
The name says, this is what you are suffering from. You are not 
alone. Others are suffering from the same thing ... once accepted, 
specific names quickly come to dominate social reality.19
Shenk maintains that names become emblematic of a process, not a thing, and
it is this transformative process which is, paradoxically, fixed by one name -
Alzheimer’s. The reality of the disease to those so diagnosed, and their families
and carers is inevitably shifted into the social and public arena through the
intervention of diagnosis and the subsequent prognosis which seeks to identify a
range of services in an attempt to combat the disease: public recognition and
social reality are indeed defining aspects of the public and the private. For all
engaged with the ‘victim’ there may be opportunities to share common
experiences of loss or care; but as the disease progresses the patient, as ‘victim’,
moves beyond any notion of shared interaction, moving into a state of isolation
from others and themselves. Many simply become lost, to themselves and to
others, behind the symbol of the name, and although medical science is
underpinned by an optimism that believes that in the end ‘nature’ will give way to
19 Shenk, p. 80.
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man’s intervention, it seems that there is a chasm between that optimism and the
mournful world of sufferers of the disease. Broks, however, argues that:
We must try to understand what mechanisms might be 
operating at the intersection of the biological (the brain) 
and the social (the self).20
Such Cartesian dualism perceives the biological in terms of mechanisms and the
self as something quite different and distinct from it. This is akin to the idea of the
ghost within the machine, but it is also suggestive of a descending mist. Certainly
many who suffer from Alzheimer’s disease describe their state of being in these
terms as the disease makes its insidious progress with the protein plaques and
tangles smothering and hiding the mechanisms associated with storing memories.
But in the initial stages of the disease process another psychological aspect tends
to come into play. Shenk records how some patients resist the changes which they
are undergoing:
Denial is an important part of the Alzheimer’s experience, 
very commonly employed as symptoms first appear, or at any 
juncture where a truth is so horrifying that the most emotionally 
healthy choice is to pretend that it does not exist. The poisonous 
reality is pushed back into the recesses of the mind and only slowly, 
in small drips, is it allowed to seep back into consciousness 21
Shenk’s interpretation, following interviews with patients and staff, suggests a
continuing but steadily reduced consciousness of self, which eventually goes
beyond reach. He suggests that this consciousness is still psychologically aware
enough to deny the condition and its effects, and he expresses, in some dramatic
terms, the way patients demonstrate such attitudes. Logically, it would appear that
20 Broks, p. 52.
21 Shenk, p. 115.
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a remaining self-consciousness uses the space between the mutability of the
disease and the residual sense of self to express a kind of illusionary dream as a
form of defence. It is as if the subject is stranded in time between the past and the
future, an unbecoming in prospect, uncertain of place or status and unanchored.
The subject is both touched and untouched within the denial.
The Freudian psychological model of the mind argues that the ego is
driven by ego-reality, a consciousness of the objective world. In this sense, the
ego is primarily concerned with self-preservation and part of that instinctual drive
is to deny the objective world. Freud argued that it was necessary for the
organism to seek a state of constancy, a state of equilibrium by discharging
tensions, maintaining that:
The nervous system is an apparatus which has the function of 
getting rid of the stimuli which reach it, or of reducing them 
to the lowest possible level; or which, if it were feasible, would 
maintain itself in an altogether unstimulated condition.
Denial seems to be a defence which seeks to prevent an estrangement from
oneself. If the defence process proves insufficient it means the subject becomes
separated from himself and a split occurs. The subject’s hold on their linear
narrative becomes dream-like as their edges and boundaries grow blurred and
indistinct as represented in the characters of Maarten and Jake in, respectively,
Out o f  Mind (see Chapter 2) and The Wilderness (see below). The apparent
trauma of the condition, with all its emotional consequences, seems to establish a
kind of internal silence. Alzheimer subjects who use denial as a defence,
22 Sigmund Freud, ‘Instincts and their Vicissitudes’, in On Metapsychology: The Theory of 
Psychoanalysis, ed. by Angela Richards and trans. by James Strachey, Penguin Freud Library,
Vol. 11 (London: Penguin Books, 1991), pp. 107-138 (p. 116).
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something that might be called a protective shield, suggest a psychic splitting 
whereby two ‘people’ are created: one of these seeks to be part of the world, and 
the other acts as if they have no contact with it at all. What Shenk refers to as the 
‘truth’ seems to be accompanied through the process of diagnosis, with the 
subjects coming to realise that they will disappear into their own futures which 
will bring a first death - loss of self, before the second physical death. Moreover, 
Shenk regards such denial as an ‘emotionally healthy choice’, echoing Freudian 
notions of defence as a developmental and evolutionary idea, with sublimation, in 
this sense, viewed by Freudian analysts as ‘normal’.
However, the basis of defence is in the instinctual drives, and the ego, 
seeking equilibrium, has to displace such instinctual energy elsewhere, and Shenk 
is clearly committed to the view that the ego energises the defence mechanism of 
denial, suggesting a circular or repetitious process. The desire for equilibrium is 
driven by a search for security, for peace, for not wanting to be troubled; but such 
a desire is, in itself, akin to the surreal, unworldly, somehow out there and, in a 
Lacanian sense, Real. But the fear of disappearance hangs uncomfortably within 
the notion of denial. Such feeling creates something of the sense of the uncanny, 
Freud’s psychological notion which has its own Gothic fabric as Nicholas Royle 
claims:
The uncanny entails another thinking of beginning: the beginning 
is already haunted. The uncanny is ghostly. It is concerned 
with the strange, weird and mysterious, with a flickering sense 
(but not conviction) of something supernatural. The uncanny 
involves feelings of uncertainty, in particular regarding the reality 
of who one is and what is being experienced.23
23 Nicholas Royle, The Uncanny (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2003),
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Samantha Harvey in her novel The Wilderness describes some of these uncanny
uncertainties through Jake, an architect, who is beginning to become exposed to
the symptoms of Alzheimer’s:
He stares at the drawing; it is not his, it was done by one of the 
junior architects and he has been asked to check i t ... A simple 
two-storey building whose only design hurdle is, as ever, the 
budget; but even so he has been gazing at it all afternoon, his 
pencil in hand, a stream of coffees getting cold as he tries to 
remember what it is one is supposed to do. Should he change 
the lines somehow (but how)? Should he put a tick in the 
comer? 24
Jake refuses to acknowledge his symptoms until events and experience overtake 
him and Shenk describes this point in the process of the disease as a kind of 
middle stage:
The middle stages bring the end of ambiguity. The subtle clues 
that something was not quite right - so easy to miss a few years 
ago - are now bright, self-reflecting signposts of decline, impossible 
to avoid. Conversation is now pockmarked with lost names and 
empty recollections. Times and dates have become fungible.
Concentration wanes. The mind is clearly ebbing.25
It is paradoxical of course that the manifestation of decline should be both ‘bright’
and ‘pockmarked’ and full o f ‘empty recollections’ so that it cannot be misjudged
in any way, illustrated, curiously, using the language of contamination and
epidemic. However, this odd oscillation between knowing and not knowing who
one is emphasizes Royle’s conception of the uncanny in its ‘strange, weird and
mysterious’ formulation.
p. 1.
24 Samantha Harvey, The Wilderness (London: Jonathan Cape, 2009), p. 35.
25 Shenk, p. 117.
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For the Alzheimer’s disease patient it is a process of exile, being separate 
from oneself as if the patient is doubled, inside and outside of the self as 
something akin to emptiness begins to occur. Denial of this estrangement can be 
construed as a form of silence: it speaks only in its symbolism as it meets, in 
secret encounter, with ego-reality. Shenk indicates that denial is passed once the 
second stage of the disease arrives. It is, he declares, an end to any ambiguity of 
the condition. As the process of the disappearing self gains ground, it may be 
viewed as some sort of return, albeit an unwelcome one, to innocence, represented 
in an unprotected vulnerability: no defences, no boundaries, no edges, just a blur 
as the disease announces the end of psychology and the beginning of neurology. 
The paradox, sublimely, is both beautiful and horrifying as this unprotected 
vulnerability makes a claim on whatever it is we call humanity. Shenk comments 
that Barry Reisberg, neurologist at New York University and a ‘pioneer in
' y / r  •
defining stages and substances of Alzheimer’s’, once noticed:
That there were precise inverse relationships between stages 
of Alzheimer’s disease and phases of child development in 
the areas of cognition, coordination, language, feeding 
and behaviour.27
Such an inversion echoes Jackson’s nineteenth-century view that dementia, once 
on its journeying trajectory, was noticeable by its dissolution of the human 
personality. All the skills, knowledge, feelings and facts that a person has learned 
are steadily eroded as the process of becoming inches towards unbecoming.
26 Shenk, p. 122.
27 Shenk, p. 122.
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The Private ‘Life’ of Alzheimer’s Disease
Not all ‘victims’ of Alzheimer’s disease await its insidious coming in a passive
way. Some struggle to hold on to whatever it is they consider themselves to be, in
attempting to stem the coming of the other within. The Alzheimer Disease Society
has brought together some personal accounts of those taken up with such
endeavour, and one such account states:
Every morning when I wake up, I’m unsure where I am and 
feel anxious. But when I see familiar things, I know I’m at home.
At night I try to take all my important things into the bedroom 
with me. It’s reassuring to know everything is in place when I get 
up in the morning. It helps me feel calm if I know what time it is 
and what day it is, so I have the TV guide and clock next to my bed.
Some mornings I forget to look and consequently get up very early.28
The organisation of space and materials to anchor time and self is clearly very
necessary for this person, in the struggle against forgetting and being a ‘victim’
about to be swept up into a void. There is no apparent denial here, only an
admission of the disease and its effects which provokes both a defensive and
proactive response.
Such a struggle, moreover, exemplifies the notion of the uncanny in its
exposition of the compulsion to repeat. To stem his anxiety about forgetting,
‘John’, whose account this is, devises a set of repetitive behaviours to reassure
him of being himself. The essence of repetition rests not only upon the idea of
familiarity but, in psychoanalytic theory, the need to resolve a problem. But what
does it hide? As Freud puts it, if an emotional impulse is repressed:
into anxiety, then among instances of frightening things 
there must be one class in which the frightening element can be
28 In Memory of Memories, Alzheimer Disease Society (London, 2003).
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shown to be something repressed which recurs. This class of 
frightening things would then constitute the uncanny.29
A number of selves appear to be operating in ‘John’s’ account. There is the
conscious self, seeking to handle the anxiety of another self which is so
threatening. The anxiety seems to be related to a form of living death. In this void,
the private and the public necessarily meld into each other. There are no more
nuances or ambiguities (essentially forms of privacy), just an emptiness which is,
paradoxically, the enclosed space of the material organism. According to Freud
such doubling of self originates in the development of the ego and acts ‘against
the destruction of the ego, an energetic denial of the power of death’.30 The ego
seems to hold this doubling in some kind of balance through the process of
repetition which, moreover, symbolically brings to light what Freud calls ‘the
uncanny harbinger of death’31 in the form of the representation of the double
within the repetitive behaviour.
Royle’s construction of a transcendent uncanny as ‘strange, weird and
mysterious’ may be thought to be akin to magic by Freud - a product of the
enlightenment project in medicine. However, Freud’s work in the First World
War on the process of the uncanny and primary instincts draws attention to the
internal pessimism of the enlightenment project as he emphasises a further
collapse of the private and the public within the paradigm of biology and culture
with meditations on the death instinct. Freud published his essay on ‘The
29 Sigmund Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’ in Art and Literature, ed. by Albert Dickson and trans. by 
James Strachey, Penguin Freud Library, Vol. 14 (London: Penguin Books, 1990), pp. 335-376 (p. 
363).
30 Freud, (1990), p. 356.
31 Freud, (1990), p. 357.
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“Uncanny”’ in 1919, but while working on these ideas was also developing his
thoughts on the subject of primary instincts which were eventually published in
1920 under the title ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’. Both works meditate on how
the mind protects itself from reality, particularly the matter of death. But within
the biological paradigm of the primary instincts, a parallel exists between the
sexual instincts, which, Freud argued, are concerned with the preservation of life,
and other instincts which apparently lead to a form of regression and eventually
death - an inorganic state. In his account of keeping anxiety at bay, ‘John’s’
conscious self depends on repetitive, habitual behaviour as an expression of
mastering the anxiety created by what Freud calls a ‘truth’:
If we are to take it as a truth that knows no exception that 
everything living dies for internal reasons - becomes inorganic 
once again - then we shall be compelled to say that ‘the aim o f  
all life is death' and, looking backwards, that ‘inanimate things 
existed before living ones \ 3
This evocation of Darwinian biology underscores an uncanny concealed desire to
cease living; that nothing can gainsay the desire to return to this inorganic state.
Simultaneously, however, an equally powerful instinct for self-preservation has to
be accommodated. ‘John’s’ account of his desire for self-preservation conceals, in
Freudian terms, the symbol of the death instinct, that internal desire to die
seemingly created in the form of an organic disease which is ‘determined’ to kill
off itself as well as the body which incorporates it. However, ‘John’s’ remaining
conscious self demonstrates an equal determination to stave off his anxiety and
maintain his independence:
32 Freud, ‘Civilisation and its Discontents’ (1991), pp. 310-311.
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My independence is hugely important to me. I might seem 
a prisoner of my routines. I can’t just pop out. I can’t do 
my job or go for a drive. But I still manage to live on my own.33
This paradoxical independence caught within the structured routines of a prisoner,
is suspended within the interstices of the private and the public, giving a greater
significance to the private against the encroaching public as biology and culture
begin insidiously to merge.
The importance of personal privacy finds an emphasis in Jonathan
Franzen’s book about his father:
My father was an intensely private person, and privacy for him 
had the connotation of keeping the shameful content of one’s 
interior life out of public sight. Could there have been a worse 
disease for him than Alzheimer’s? In its early stages, it worked 
to dissolve the personal connections that had saved him from the 
worst of his depressive isolation. In its later stages it robbed 
him of the sheathing of adulthood, the means to hide the child 
inside him.34
Franzen renders his father’s privacy public, presumably to make the point that
Alzheimer’s disease destroys such distinctions in much the same way as it
destroys the distinction between what ‘John’ sees as independence and
dependence. The psychological attributes of privacy and independence seem
conjoined and are probably perceived as central aspects of the notion of self,
which is seemingly buried beneath them. However, in Julian Barnes’s short story
‘Appetite’, the first-person narrator, discussing her husband’s dementia, says:
When it began, I thought, well it’s better than some things 
he could have got. Worse than others, better than some, 
and though he’ll forget things, he’ll always be himself, there,
33 In Memory of Memories, p. 19.
34 Jonathan Franzen, ‘My Father’s Brain’, in How to be Alone (London: Harper Perennial, 2004), 
pp. 7-38 (p. 24).
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underneath, through and through. It may be like second childhood,
but it will be his childhood, won’t it?35
The narrator perceives her husband’s dementia in relative terms, but argues that 
his essential self is still ‘buried’, ghost-like, within and remains somehow in his 
ownership, notwithstanding that this self is locked in by the disease. Indeed the 
‘selves’ o f ‘John’, Franzen’s father, and the narrator’s husband in Barnes’s story 
share the common experience of this locked-in privacy.
Privacy is at the compelling heart of psychoanalytic theory: so private that 
it is unknown to itself except in occasional acts of unwitting revelation, either in 
deeds or in words, asides at the edges of things. But Alzheimer’s disease seems 
promiscuously to conflate the private and the public and in so doing reduces the 
human to its basic elemental being. Franzen and Barnes elaborating from their 
personal and imaginative spheres conjure this humanity and posthumanity into 
our presence and render the conflation into a recognisable private and public 
persona. Barnes’s narrator, with regard to her husband, and Franzen with regard 
to his father, perceive the self as owner of their experience and narrative: aged 
bodies carrying on through the agency of much younger ones, ones which return 
their owners to a childhood stage through the passage of the disease. For the 
narrator, her husband’s past is another country. Between her and that place is an 
almost impenetrable hurdle, which she can rarely cross to be able to get a glimpse, 
through his confusions, of what that place may have been like for him. Demands 
are made upon the imagination if the demonstrable confusions of the veil are to be 
seen through, and the occasional rushes of memory which visit the demented
35 Julian Bames, ‘Appetite’, in The Lemon Tree (London: Picador, 2005), pp. 159-173 (p. 164).
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patient may well seem phantasmagorical to the carer or observer. Body and mind
are written upon by Alzheimer’s disease as memories are insidiously written off.
Exploring the ‘mystery’ of this writing, Tobias Wolff notes:
Below the mind’s business and noise, in deep unlit shafts 
where phantom messengers struggle towards us, [they] kill 
one another along the way.36
What is left resembles a rush of phantoms, breaking the surface of a dying
consciousness. Wolffs interest is in another form of what might be called the
creative instinct which, he suggests, arises from the depths of consciousness,
arriving unannounced and in unexpected or unpredictable forms. The anticipatory
fascination of this has its own kind of rhythm but is, no doubt, again as Wolff
hints, tinged with anxiety because of something concealed being revealed.
Franzen, in discussing the importance of privacy to his father, draws
attention to the notion of concealment as some sort of condition of civilization.
The term is a broad one, which covers not only secrecy and deception, but also, as
in Franzen’s father’s case, reticence. Social conventions precede legal rules, and,
as a social convention, an attitude of reticence clearly fights shy of the excessive
revelation. But the subject of Alzheimer’s disease displays no such consideration
and the boundaries of mind and body break under the strains of the excessive. The
disease may well be thought of as an act of material violence by the body on its
seemingly separate mind - a mind vulnerable to material violence - and the weight
of that violence alters the shape of mind and body alike. The disease may also be
seen as a space occupied with dead time, memory and anticipation having no grip
j6 Tobias Wolff, Old School (London: Bloomsbury, 2004), p. 156.
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on ‘reality’ and no anchorage. The subject becomes the other and falls into 
another narrative discourse. The mind, no longer able to edit or censor, cannot 
muster the defences of social convention, and, if Franzen’s father had any right to 
concealment, it was thoroughly abused by Alzheimer’s disease.
Furthermore, the condition is one which does not allow for a relationship 
between an inner world and the public domain, a domain that regulates social 
relationships and unspoken contracts. Indeed the condition veils the capacity to 
imagine the self, looking, as it were, inside from the outside. The abuse of the 
disease robbed Franzen’s father, as it will inevitably ‘John’, of an interior life, that 
concealment of experiences owned by him. Inexorably, the disease will reduce 
adulthood to that of the vulnerable child within. Such representations of the 
disease call to mind Jackson’s notion of dissolution, more than Spencer’s or 
Freud’s construction of an animal-based biology imposed upon by an editing and 
censoring mind, regulating the material embodiment and permitting the 
‘contractual’ relationship with the public domain. Without such regulation, 
Franzen’s father, together with all who endure the disease, become marginalized 
‘children’ within mature bodies.
Wolffs interest in the creative instinct and the rhythm which accompanies 
it is echoed, in a different sense, in ‘John’s’ repetitions. The interim for him and 
others like him is that period between the diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease and 
the onset of the final phase of loss of function and memory. What is woven into 
‘John’s’ repetitious rhythms is also an inevitability as to outcome. His repetitions 
form an incantatory rhythm in that period between diagnosis and the final phase.
It is a time which is indicative of a future squeezed into a present - a future 
occupying the performance of the present. The repetitions may seem to keep time 
at bay, but paradoxically bring the future into the present. They echo ‘John’s’ 
sense of foreboding, like some haunting of the other self to come. Viewed from 
the perspective of Alzheimer’s disease as the harbinger of the birth of a 
contracting old age and a dependent childlike state, the repetitions are also 
reminiscent of childhood itself. The repetitions are, of course, important to ‘John’ 
as a way of keeping a grip, a purchase, on both his present and his presence. But 
the haunting of that self to come clearly marks the existence of the disease which 
begins its own tabula rasa. The repetitions draw attention to the self s incipient 
disappearance as the disease begins to write itself into the self, to determine and 
shape the story of another self to come.
Returning to the Body
The idea of incipiency and a state of being incipient becomes the paradigm in 
Julia Kristeva’s Powers o f  Horror: An Essay on Abjection (see Chapter 2).
This notion is central also to Freudian psychoanalytic theory in so far as that 
theory is concerned with the trauma of origins and the passage, or, in Kristeva’s 
paradigm, terrifying journey of the primary instincts or drives into the realm of 
language: put another way, from the biological to the psychological or from the 
private to the public. The process is one in which the body seems to be expelled 
by the power of language, which resonates with Terry Eagleton’s argument that 
the Western aesthetic has primarily ignored the body.37 Kristeva’s title indicates
37 Terry Eagleton, The Ideology o f the Aesthetic (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996). Eagleton’s
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her concern with origins, boundaries, change and mutability. She perceives
abjection as some sort of motif for these concerns - a form of casting off: a
rejection as well as a refusal:
There looms, within abjection, one of those violent, dark revolts 
of being, directed against a threat that seems to emanate from an 
exorbitant outside or inside, ejected beyond the scope of the 
possible, the tolerable, the thinkable.38
The essence of the paradigm seems to be the struggle between becoming T ,  and 
hence a subject and object in relation to others, and what is left behind in the deep 
unconsciousness of the body from its earliest and most vulnerable time.
But what is the ‘nature’ of this period? Kristeva argues that it is a time of non­
existence: a body incorporated into a world full of needs and wants and the 
satisfactions and disappointments that these desires and their fulfilment bring. It is 
a world of the exorbitant outside and inside, an undifferentiated being. Noelle 
McAfee refers to it as:
The pre-oedipal undifferentiated stage, one in which the 
child experiences itself as the receptacle of all being.39
As previously described in Chapter 2, McAfee characterises this undifferentiated
state as ‘the chora: this state of being one with all’.40 Kristeva explains the
splitting of the becoming subject from the wholeness of a maternal envelopment
in terms of the spasms and vomiting out of food:
text attempts to reveal the body within European thought from the Enlightenment to the twentieth 
century.
38 Julia Kristeva, Powers o f Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. by Leon S. Roudiez (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1982), p. 1.
j9 Noelle McAfee, ‘Abject Strangers: Towards an Ethic of Respect’ in Ethics, Politics, and 
Difference in Julia Kristeva’s Writings, ed. by Kelly Oliver (New York and London: Routledge 
1993), p. 117.
40 McAfee, p. 117.
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During the course in which ‘I’ become, I give birth to myself 
amid the violence of sobs, of vomit. Mute protest of the system, 
shattering violence of a convulsion that, to be sure, is inscribed 
in a symbolic system.41
Here Kristeva gives an emphasis to the primary processes of the body as a power
that incorporates itself into the deep recesses of the developing psyche, which,
represented in a violent gothicity, acts as a preamble to her evolving thesis about
the nature of the abjecting process. Symbolically, subjectivity becomes formed in
the process of expelling and spitting, and such expulsion encompasses becoming
‘I’ as well as refusing and rejecting the hitherto all-encompassing maternal. This
passage of unconscious but bodily actions creates the demarcation of the self and
the other. But although the ‘chora’ is rejected and repulsed in this becoming,
Kristeva alerts us to its nature as a boundary:
Abjection is above all ambiguity, because, while releasing 
a hold, it does not radically cut off the subject from what 
threatens it - on the contrary, abjection acknowledges it to 
be in perpetual danger.42
By using the term ‘ambiguity’, Kristeva underlines the basic nature of abjection
as a form, or as a capacity to migrate back to the past from a present situation,
with the past having the capacity to infiltrate the present. Abjection as a form is
both a presence and an absence, and has the power to cross boundaries depending
on the psychical condition and situation of the subject. Kristeva emphasises this
point about its nature thus:
Abjection preserves what existed in the archaism of pre-objectal 
relationship, in the immemorial violence with which a body 
becomes separated from another body in order to be.43
41 Kristeva, p. 3.
42 Kristeva, p. 9.
43 Kristeva, p. 10,
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Abjection is argued here as a condition which precedes memory, but which is
nevertheless preserved within the experience of separation: an experience so
powerful in its effects that it waits dormant, veiled, as it were, until the potential
of its return is conjured by circumstances. Kristeva claims that these
circumstances emanate from the ambiguity giving rise to a sense of ‘discomfort,
unease and dizziness’.44 Perhaps, above all, abjection indicates helplessness and
powerlessness stirred with a considerable sense of anguish underlying the
emotional, instinctual, pre-linguistic, non-cognitive aspects of horror which settle,
from a psychoanalytic point of view, into the unconscious.
The ambiguity, moreover, releases a balancing desire to resist such states
of unease by marking out a space in which resistance and refusal can take place to
minimise the seductive pull of the return: a return to a state of homogeneity from
a condition which Kristeva calls ‘heterogeneous’ - the space of diversity and
difference which collapses such seductions. Essentially, the paradigm indicates a
repression of the sense of undifferentiation to enable the self/other model to be
created. In her commentary on Kristeva’s paradigm, McAfee states:
The abject comes back in fleeting encounters, fleeting because 
we flee, horrified at falling back into the maternal body, where 
no difference - and thus no subjectivity - is possible.45
Kristeva’s model of abjection speaks of a moment when the subject becomes
human: an apartness that ‘legitimises’ the paradoxical and apparently violent
moment. Clearly Kristeva’s view of the body is that of something which is
44 Kristeva, p. 10.
45 McAfee, p. 118.
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powerful and dark, as it is expelled by culture (echoed in Eagleton’s argument 
above), to await the inevitable opportunities to come to re-assert itself through 
disease.
In contrast to Kristeva’s dark view of the expulsion of the body, Kitwood
perceives the body in benign terms, almost romantically welcoming its return at
the behest of dementia:
People who have dementia, for whom the life of the emotions 
is often intense, and without the advisory forms of inhibition 
may have something important to teach the rest of humankind.
They are asking us, so to speak, to heal the rift in experience 
that western culture has engendered, and inviting us to return to 
aspects of our being that are much older in evolutionary terms: 
more in tune with the body and its functions, closer to the life 
of instinct.46
Here instincts are being suggested as an essence and a chora of being which is 
supporting an innocence derived from being transcendent of culture. Moreover, 
language is seen as an inhibiting form causing a rift between body and mind. It 
may also be argued that this return to an intense body, with its seeming excess of 
instincts, has echoes of the Gothic body, which as Kelly Hurley illustrates, is also 
unrestrained by language - a kind of surrender to the flesh.
But McAfee’s point hints at the seduction of a personal nothingness, 
which is evoked by a sense of something familiar but forgotten. Such an idea has 
some of its origins in the work of Melanie Klein, and in presenting a critique of 
her ideas, Darian Leader describes Klein’s ‘interest in the way a child may think, 
at some level, that it contains ... another human being or part of a human being5 47
46 Kitwood, pp. 5-6.
47 Darian Leader, Freud’s Footnotes (Faber and Faber: London, 2000), p. 70.
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Leader explores Klein’s theory of introjection and the philosophical conundrums
that underlie it. He finds some possible explanation of the theory in Paul
Schilder’s work on body image:
Schilder argued that children tend to identify their interior 
with food substances, so that in the deep infantile strata of 
our minds we are not perfectly certain whether there is anything 
inside us except what is crammed into us from outside.48
This argument indicates a tension between empiricism and symbolism in so far as
it resists the notion of internal objects other than those which infiltrate from the
outside. But to make sense of this infiltration, Klein’s psychoanalytic theory rests
upon the idea of an imagination which conjures up internal objects, much as
children do when Schilder questions them about body image and they imagine
their bodies ‘crammed’ with food. Schilder’s use of this term is suggestive of too
much: it is an excess which bloats the image of the body. And, what is excessive
can be ejected. From the points of view of Klein and Kristeva, this form of
something extra is perceived in symbolically punitive terms yielding negative
results on the developing psyche in its archaic period. The Kleinian paradigm
views this punitive process as the cause of later depressive conditions, but
Kristeva’s argument relates the symbolism of the ejection to the passage of
becoming. Moreover, Kristeva adds the notion of sublimation -  the sublimation of
the ejection experience into what she calls ‘a structure within the body’.49 It is this
process which enables the subject to control the seduction and to reduce the return
to undifferentiation.
48 Leader, p. 73.
49 Kristeva, p. 11.
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Kristeva’s point about sublimation echoes the earlier discussion about
Shenk’s views on the middle stages of Alzheimer’s disease and the many ways
patients will deny or sublimate their fears and anxieties about the effects o f the
condition. To develop the point further, Shenk reports on the work of the
neurologist, Barry Reisberg, who suggests an ‘inverse relationship between the
stages of Alzheimer’s disease and the phases of child development’.50 The
Alzheimer subject becomes so full of fear about a return to absolute dependency
that, most commonly in the middle stage of the disease, he sublimates or denies
his fears. Kristeva’s thesis on becoming underlines the power within the notions
of splitting and difference, and the strangeness of the paradox. Sublimation,
therefore, appears to be a necessary defence against the force of this power. But
differences are essential to the creation of individuals, and identities create groups
and categories. Identities are by their very nature reductive, because, as Klein and
Kristeva intimate, an identity is not needed to become oneself: indeed, one needs
an identity to become like someone else. However, the mythical power of the idea
of unity and wholeness of self attempts to resist the return of nothingness, or the
‘chaos’ referred to by Jacques Lacan:
The illusion of unity, in which a human being is always looking 
forward to self-mastery, entails a constant danger of sliding back 
again into the chaos from which he started.51
This chaos is similar to Kristeva’s notion of abjection in that it refers to the
experience of spiralling into or out of subjectivity. Furthermore, alongside the
idea of being on one’s own there is a necessity, or a desire for self-mastery,
50 Shenk, p. 122.
51 Jacques Lacan, ‘Some Reflections on the Ego’, International Journal o f Psycho-Analysis, 
32(1951), 11-17 (p. 15).
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wholeness and unity - a phenomenon Lacan describes as illusory. But this desire
is a marked characteristic of those who are lodged within the confines of
Alzheimer’s disease. ‘John’s’ repetitions are just one such illustration of the
struggle which is shared also by Robert Davis in his personal account of his
spiralling descent into the condition:
Now that I am developing a ritual with which I can be 
comfortable, I begin to see the great value of establishing 
a routine within my limits. My experience has taught me that 
if I want to function at the top of my limited capacity, I must 
establish a routine and keep to it.52
It is Davis’s limits which frame his need for routine and ritual, and which confine
his ambitions. They are also expressions of sublimation, of pushing back the
encroaching psychic encryption of his notion of self-mastery. He goes on to
record his fear of nothingness:
As soon as I let go of my concentration to try and fall asleep, 
there is nothing there. This vacuum was filled with terrifying 
blackness. Blackness and darkness of the worst kind.53
Nothingness, it seems, is filled with blackness which creates Davis’s anxieties
about ‘sliding back ... into the chaos’ as he becomes some formless void of
matter. He gives additional emphasis to his understanding of the process of his
condition and such understanding underlines the paradigms of Kristeva and Klein
in an inverse manner:
Alzheimer’s disease is like a reverse ageing process. Having 
drunk from the fountain of youth one is caught in the time 
tunnel without a stopping place at the height of beauty and 
strength. Cruelly, it whips us back to infancy. First the 
memories go, then perceptions, feelings, knowledge, and,
52 Robert Davis, My Journey into Alzheimer’s Disease (Illinois: Tyndale House Publishers, 1989),
p. 88.
53 Davis, p. 48.
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in the last stage, our ability to talk and take care of our most
basic human needs.54
This inverse return to what Lacan has called a premature state resonates 
substantively with many theoretical themes alluded to hitherto: Jackson’s concept 
of dissolution; Reisberg’s notion of an inverse relationship between the 
development of Alzheimer’s disease and the stages of a child’s maturation; and 
Kristeva’s abjection paradigm. Davis’s statement reveals the possibility of the 
body’s potential return to an undifferentiated state, where subject and object are 
strangely entwined. For Davis and ‘John’, and many others, there is a sense of 
losing habitual bearings and having to institute different and new living regimes 
to structure daily lives. A kind of constant copying is apparent which assists in 
holding on to an image of themselves as subjects with boundaries and edges. But 
by these activities is also revealed an existential feeling of becoming unmoored 
from everything that they have taken for granted, cut adrift in an outer space of 
strangeness - a kind of traumatised irrationality.
Hiding and Revealing
The idea of the wholeness and unity of the self is crucial to the classical 
paradigms of psychoanalysis. It is the central point of departure in its challenge to 
the powerful Cartesian myth. Of course, the process of psychic concealment is, as 
has been argued earlier, essential to the concept of privacy, but the task of 
psychoanalysis is to search out the unspeakable secret and make it public. Often 
what is concealed seems strange, unruly and anarchic, but analysts mark the 
symptoms of a hidden trauma which are only revealed in linguistic or behavioural
54 Davis, p. 86.
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encodings. Kristeva and Klein, in their psychoanalytic paradigms, reveal the 
strangeness of the Other which is often projected outwards as both a form of 
defence and attack: a combination of fight and flight. Disease can be interpreted 
as the Other within; the hidden, awaiting through encoded symptoms, its ‘real’ 
revelation in the books of medical science. As a stranger within, disease creates a 
situation whereby the subject becomes a stranger to himself. Davis, for example, 
is acutely aware of becoming a stranger not only to himself but to others as well. 
Shenk writes that ‘as the illness progresses [the carer] will struggle to look 
through the disease and recognise the person inside’.55 The person on the outside 
is, presumably, perceived as some kind of strange and uncanny double of the 
person on the inside.
Shenk also reports on some biochemical changes that occur in the process 
of what may be called the shaping of Alzheimer’s disease, which mirror, 
metaphorically, the psychological alterations he has already noted. These changes 
refer to the effects of a protein - prion - that destabilises other nearby proteins, 
causing them to adapt to a shape and form more like prion itself. Ultimately this 
process yields the sticky sheet of protein tangles which acts as one of the main 
results of the condition.56 This biochemical process of shaping, or more properly 
reshaping, may construct similarities on the inside, but, paradoxically, it over­
determines a difference on the outside. Although Davis is aware of his developing 
difference and becoming more and more a stranger to himself, it is this very 
awareness which gives credence to Shenk’s point that:
55 Shenk, p. 160.
56 Shenk, p. 149.
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One essential component of self that Alzheimer patients do 
not come untethered from early on is their own emotional 
reservoir.57
It is this emotional reservoir of awareness of what is to come which begins the
initial psychological process of the over-determination of the self in acts of
repetition and ritual, and:
As the plaques and tangles proliferate and the brain begins 
to shrink, a psychic barrier arises between the victim and the 
outside world. The Alzheimer sufferer becomes an island.38
The imagery of an island portrays an aspect of being a stranger to oneself and
others with which ‘John’ and Davis are familiar. Both protagonists are painfully
aware of a different kind of self to come and the sense of strangeness this evokes.
Their ideas of their selves and their very egos are disturbed and it is in this
process that they appear to detect a strangeness activating the sense of the
uncanny. Additionally, the fear of the potential loss of their ego and a return to
something familiar but frightening becomes more and more apparent. Full of fear,
both protagonists are stranded at the edge of several forthcoming diminutions
from their hitherto familiar lives; as McAfee puts it: ‘dread (or anxiety) signals an
encounter that threatens the border between undifferentiated being and
subjectivity’.59 Encountering the foreign other within underlines the beginning of
indeterminacy.
The concept of the uncanny, with its sense of something familiar but 
concealed, suggests an experience, a feeling or event waiting to be revealed and in 
this way it can be seen as a bridge between the private and the public. In
57 Shenk, p. 202.
58 Shenk, p. 204.
59 McAfee, p. 122.
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psychoanalytic theory such revelations arise out of the leavening process of
analysis as forms of repression are slowly brought to the surface in the interaction
between the analyst and the analysand. The process in itself may seem uncanny as
‘secrets’ are moved out of the private into the public. The endeavour of
psychoanalysis is to search for and expose the origin of a symptom within a
language which not only names the symptom but the origin as well. It is therefore
not only a science of biology, but also of metaphysics, a kind of science of
forgetting and remembering. This paradoxical ‘losing’ something and ‘gaining’
something else - the economy of psychoanalysis - is also at the centre of the
activities of evolutionary biologists. Shenk reports:
Evolutionary biologists are also fascinated by the rapid increase 
in longevity and its unintended consequences. From their 
perspective, the central concept here is one of hidden disease - 
disorders that have always existed for human beings in a potential 
state, but that have never been fully realised until recently ...
The long term frailties are there somewhere, but they cannot
60be seen.
These hidden diseases, potentially, seal the fate of an individual at the moment of 
conception, and genetic research in the area of what was once known as ‘pre- 
senile dementia’ and now as early onset Alzheimer’s, suggests a strong defective 
gene component as the cause of the condition, a kind of immortal gene referred to 
earlier. It also suggests a gene preserved, ironically, by ‘memory’ within its own 
material home.61
Shenk’s description of the interests of evolutionary biologists indicates a 
structural concern with the material body and its secrets that may ensure, once
60 Shenk, pp. 164-165.
61 Shenk, p. 165.
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revealed, the emergence of a difference to be transformed into sameness by
medical classification. This idea is not unlike that of psychoanalysis in seeking
out conditions which await a realisation into another world. Both relate also to the
‘nature’ of frailty, something not quite right, or odd or strange in relation to the
norm. What he also describes is the body’s relative success in keeping its frailties
hidden, but with the condition of dementia this cannot fully succeed:
perhaps the most remarkable thing about the history of senile 
dementia is that it has been so conspicuous. In practical terms, 
it was a hidden disease with very few victims before the 
twentieth century, and yet references to senility are strangely 
ubiquitous throughout recorded history -  not just in medical 
records, but also in legal, political, and cultural terms.
Given its symptomatic relationships, the disease could hardly have remained
hidden, as neurological degeneracy outs itself in such dramatic symptoms by
returning its ‘victims’ to their material embodiments, and in the process ‘hiding’
their minds within that embodiment. However, as argued earlier, the symptoms
were perceived in history as a disease of old age and therefore a precursor to
death. Shenk provides two literary examples of neurological degeneracy from the
eighteenth and nineteenth century -  Jonathan Swift and Ralph Waldo Emerson. In
recording their diminishing later lives Shenk argues that ‘in myth and fable,
senility often intersects with immortality’.63 He refers to the Greek myth of
Tithonus, desired by the goddess Eos, who asks Zeus to give him immortality but,
ironically, forgets to ask him to be provided with immortal youth. So Tithonus
ages and becomes decrepit and senile. Swift’s deep personal fear about his loss of
62 Shenk, p. 165.
63 Shenk, p. 166.
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mental faculty seems to be represented in Gulliver’s Travels which provides a 
further example of immortality and senility in the form of the Struldbruggs ‘a 
subrace of immortal beings bom at random among the mortal Luggnaggians’.64 It 
is the Luggnaggians who disabuse Gulliver of the so-called advantages of 
immortality by pointing out that it is ‘in fact the worst imaginable curse’.65
A further paradox for evolutionary biologists in this history of hiding and 
revealing, and in the transformation of private ills into public issues, is, in 
Darwinian terms, the law of natural selection and the principle of adaptation. The 
latter is a requirement if long-term survival is to be achieved. However, if 
diseases and frailties are hidden, it would seem that they subvert the forces of 
natural selection. Longevity, it may be argued, rests upon what epidemiologists 
call ‘manufactured time’ - a phenomenon created by medical, environmental and 
technological advances. This same phenomenon suggests the uncanny and the 
strange as it outmanoeuvres God’s time. Furthermore, this manufactured and 
excessive time seems to have created opportunities for these hidden frailties to 
appear and to merge the private and the public in ways which provoke what 
Kristeva argues was the fundamental revelation of Freud’s work on the uncanny - 
the idea of anguish. As an emotion, anguish arises out of shock and astonishment 
as a private response to being diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease and conjures 
up a public response to its widespread and apparently sudden appearance as a 
major health and social care problem in the latter half of the twentieth century.
64 Shenk, p. 167.
65 Shenk, p. 167.
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As a biography of a disease, Shenk’s text reveals its birth, life and
‘suicidal’ death. The disease haunts its embodied state, contaminating its material
surroundings and, in the process, creating a ghost-like self. It menaces, and
eventually expresses the limitations of the body by producing and controlling the
distortions it creates. It may be said that the disease subverts the meaning of
medical science in its law-making desire for control and recovery. Longevity, as
Shenk suggests, has outwitted the manufactured time it has created for human life.
What Davis and others know is the command that the condition exercises on
empty minds: a haunting prospect, with Gothic resonances because it appears to
be a disease of excess. It is an excess in the sense of it being something additional
to the body, arriving, as it often does, from the added-on time of longevity.
Paradoxically, its effects are also excessive, notwithstanding that it diminishes our
cognitive abilities and capacities and all that we may need to construe our sense of
self. It is excessive, moreover, in terms of its overwhelming ‘nature’, not only in
the private sphere of intimate and domestic concerns, but also, according to
Gillies, in its global impact on the public mind, policies and purse.
These forms of extravagance, as Fred Botting points out:
reflect wider anxieties which, centring on the individual, 
concern the nature of reality and society and its relation to 
individual freedom and imagination.66
Botting goes on to argue that these forms contain the ‘disruptive return of archaic
desire and fears’.67 In fact it is these fears of a return to ‘emptiness’ or
‘nothingness’ which are the essential fears of the ‘victims’ caught up in the
66 Fred Botting, Gothic (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 11.
67 Botting, p. 11.
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transgressions of Alzheimer’s disease; fears which are, furthermore, almost 
universally considered to permeate the Western world.
Conclusion
Disease is a transformative space within which, in Western culture, reside notions 
of both good and evil. Alzheimer’s disease is so shocking in its nature that it tends 
to evoke feelings and attitudes which suggest that its degree of otherness 
generates fear because it transforms its ‘victims’, by destroying their natural 
inhibitions, into something very threatening. Disease, and certainly one that is 
defined as a state of being out of one’s mind, can, as Marina Warner puts it ‘sew
ASand weave and knit different patterns into the social fabric’. Here, Warner’s 
figurative pattern relates to her argument about the making of mythical monsters, 
but myths are often perceived as being synonymous with fantasy and hence 
having no basis in reality. However, in the transforming space of disease, there 
are clear ties with a grounding material, where both reality and the myths emerge 
out of the circumstances of a described shared world.
Myths also, of course, very often account for experiences which may be 
viewed as otherwise incomprehensible, and the incomprehension can be attached 
to circumstances which seem so shocking as to evoke the most Gothic of dreams 
and nightmares. The apparent excess which arises out of the loss of inhibitory 
boundaries or borders can be threatening, and it is this fear of being transformed 
into somebody or something different - to ‘die’, in fact - which animates ‘John’s’
68 Marina Warner, Managing Monsters: The 1994 Reith Lectures (London: Vintage, 1994), p. xiv.
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and Davis’s actions and underlines Jonathan Dollimore’s illuminating point about
the concept of the death drive:
Death is not simply the termination of life (that being the 
mystifying banality by which we live) but life’s driving force, 
its animating dynamic principle.69
What appears to animate ‘life’s driving force’ is the fear of the paradoxical
transformation into a kind o f ‘living death’ for the ‘victims’ of Alzheimer’s
disease. It is also this fear which animates the development of organisations to
raise funds for the care of Alzheimer patients, to research the condition, to lobby
and to inform; in short, to clamour for something to be done and cures to be found
before an epidemic turns into a plague. These activities, certainly in the United
States of America and in the United Kingdom, become part of Warner’s imagined
pattern by weaving themselves into the social fabric and cultural practice. Shenk
comments of America in the mid 1990s:
It seemed Alzheimer’s disease was everywhere. Nursing home 
dementia units were filling beyond capacity. Middle-aged 
children were moving back home to take care of their parents.
Community police were regularly being phoned to help track 
down wandering relatives. The disease was cropping up continually 
in newspaper articles and everyday conversation.70
This graphic description underlines the complex private and public anxieties and
fears about the disease and the ways in which it gets represented. Shenk
continues:
As the twentieth century came to a close, a shadow legacy was 
rapidly becoming apparent -  the dark unintended consequence 
of the century’s great advances in hygiene, nutrition, and medicine ... 
the number of cases of senile dementia mushroomed.71
69 Jonathan Dollimore, Death, Desire and Loss in Western Culture (London: Penguin Books, 
1998), p. 192.
70 Shenk, p. 29.
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Such a point of view suggests that by playing against nature, our interventions 
through progressive developments in environmental and technological knowledge 
have brought about these paradoxical problems that may otherwise have lain 
dormant. Shenk’s voice at the end of the twentieth century seems to echo, 
uncannily, Max Nordau’s scepticism with regard to modernity at the end of the
79nineteenth century. It may also be that it is these excesses that are, as Botting 
points out, at the very heart of the idea of the Gothic.73 Shenk’s use of language, 
its gothicity, dramatically represents the Gothic woven into the private and public 
visions of Alzheimer’s disease in a language that seems to conjure reason’s 
surrender to the flesh and the brutality of that fact.
71 Shenk, p. 31.
72 MaxNordau, Degeneration (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1993).
73 Fred Botting, Gothic (London and New York: Routledge, 1996).
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C hapter 4
The Brutality of Fact and the Consolations of Metaphor
Diseases whose cures have been found become mere diseases; those 
we do not yet understand become metaphorical carriers of everything 
we fear and loathe.
Michael Ignatieff
The classical goal of science has been to eliminate the personal 
subjective quality of language and replace it with the public voice 
of claimed objectivity.
Steven Rose
Literary imaginings in literary form, continue to haunt science, its demons, 
it seems, too intensely embedded in culture to expel.
Fred Botting
The damnable fact -  and possibly the saving grace -  of serious 
illness is that it has the power to strip away the evasions that mask the 
human soul... this stripping away has revealed a delicious gift for 
storytelling and a conspicuous passion for living.
Meg Rossof
When illness becomes metaphor ... it is wiser to acknowledge 
that such metaphors have proven irresistible to societies under stress.
Arnold Weinstein
Must the life of the body be given up on, as the sheer unthinkable 
other of thought, or are its mysterious ways somehow mappable 
by intellection in what would then prove a wholly novel science, 
the science of sensibility itself?
Terry Eagleton1
1 Michael Ignatieff, Scar Tissue (London: Chatto and Windus, 1993), p.67; Steven Rose, The 
Making of Memory (London: Vintage, 2003), p. 6; Fred Botting, ‘Metaphors and Monsters’, 
Journal for Cultural Research, 7 (2003), 339-365 (p. 342); Meg Rossof, ‘Passion for Life’, 
Guardian, 31 March 2007, G2 section, p. 10; Arnold Weinstein, ‘Infection as Metaphor’, 
Literature and Medicine, 22 (2003), 102-116 (p. 103); Terry Eagleton, The Ideology o f the 
Aesthetic (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. 14. These epigraphs suggest an ambiguity between a kind 
of certainty concerning the body and doubtfulness about language. Disease, particularly chronic 
and mental disease, requires language to establish their meanings. We become alienated from and 
lose our material embodiment in such circumstances, and here, as Catherine Belsey puts it in 
Culture and the Real, ‘language will always come between us and ... the real’ (p. 5). These 
epigraphs introduce the primary theme of this chapter which considers the collision o f the body 
with language in relation to illness and disease.
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The Brutality of Fact
Alzheimer’s disease is a condition in which the body corrupts the mind, 
dismissing it, as it were, from its material presence and, moreover, exiling it from 
any semblance of a self-presenting language. Thus the condition creates and 
enables surrender to the flesh and to the brutality of fact. It allows for the triumph 
of the body in which few consolations appear to be available. In the space 
established by disease and illness, the body speaks for itself, and others have to 
seek a language to respond and to create a relationship. Very often for the old, 
language has already imprisoned them within the commonplaces of social 
constructs that have them readily defined. So when the bodies of the old begin to 
tell stories which seem to fit these constructs, clearly something else is necessary 
to free them from the prison of the stereotype. Body and the imagination both 
have to be reconfigured somehow in the spaces of consolation and understanding, 
and such transformation has to seek an outlet for a challenging escape through a 
language that traces both light and darkness.
For the subject diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease, this trace, as has been 
seen in previous chapters, is a crucial aspect of the descent into the body, a body 
which Freud and his successors, such as Lacan and Kristeva, perceive to be one of 
material sensibility: in other words, a body alive with instincts which create forms 
of incompatibility requiring reconciliation through language. Alzheimer’s disease, 
however, breaks up the classifications of presence essential to psychoanalysis 
such as self-consciousness, self-reflection, self-awareness and self-censorship as, 
in its final stage, it returns the self to a body which then requires others to speak
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for it. Kristeva’s paradigm, outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, suggests that the subject 
of the disease has a body that is both past and present; one which brings its 
knowledge, its material sensibility to a performance that seems to others to be 
strange and dislocated, and for which they have to seek a meaning. The absence 
caused by Alzheimer’s disease can, therefore, be read as a social text as the other 
writes on the body, rather like reading a first-person narration in a novel. And 
how that body is to be written upon, as the epigraphs to this chapter suggest, is 
one of the primary themes of this chapter.
If, as Foucault argues,2 terror is necessarily characterized by an excess of 
language, Susan Sontag’s Illness as Metaphor is a text concerned to curtail a form 
of language which, from her point of view, is one that seeks to hide the brutality 
of fact. There are, perhaps two senses in which it can be said that her 
text is concerned with the related questions of surrendering to the flesh and 
rendering that flesh into fantasy. First, the text seems to argue the primacy of the 
diseased body over language, transforming each into a kind of fantasy, and, 
secondly, the text indicates some fascination with the idea of a corrupting disease 
being corrupted further by language.
Furthermore, within this second sense, a concern with strangeness is 
implied: that if disease is a familiar part of our lives it is somehow made 
unfamiliar by the use of figurative, metaphorical language which transforms flesh 
into a kind of fantasy. In this sense the body becomes estranged from language as 
language becomes separated from the body. Illness, it seems, is both deafened and
2 Foucault’s argument is cited in Fred Botting’s Gothic (see Chapter 1, p. 4) and Botting makes the 
point to indicate that the genre of the Gothic ‘signifies a writing o f excess’ (Botting, p.l).
exhausted beyond all language. However, the space of illness is one in which we 
become aware of how apart we are within ourselves as well as from each other, 
and it is the breakdown of illness which affords opportunities for reconstruction, 
with language, in all its variety, as the means by which reconstruction can be 
effected. Metaphoric language may, from Sontag’s point of view, disrupt 
meaning, but the argument in this chapter is that it opens the way to a range of 
new meanings and even to new ways of understanding, with metaphor enabling 
experience to be produced meaningfully. Medicine, in its institutional power, 
assists in the creation of this sense of estrangement through its ability and 
capacity to appropriate the materiality of the body at the expense of the subject. 
As Judith Butler puts it, the body becomes ‘the site of the transfer of power 
itself.3 Being, therefore, is reduced to materiality and becomes the image for the 
gaze of the other, particularly if that body is demonstrating a diseased condition. 
Havi Carel points out that the concept of illness ‘originates in a naturalistic 
approach’, within which physical facts are explained, particularly in the 
objectifying and, supposedly, neutral language of medical experts who tend to 
focus on the body, in its illness, as biologically dysfunctional.4 This approach 
marginalizes the lived experience of illness which usually gets represented in a 
more subjective language. But illness and disease do not stand still, they are 
protean, travel and journey and attack and defend, and their very description is 
migratory and difficult to pin down. Therefore language has to travel with these 
trespassing movements in turn.
3 Judith Butler, ‘Bodies and Power, Revisited’, Radical Philosophy, 114 (2002), 13-19 (p. 15).
4 Havi Carel, Illness: The Cry of the Flesh (Northumberland: Acumen Publishing Ltd., 2008), p. 8.
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However, in Butler’s paradigm, the body becomes classified. Her
conception of power and the body resonates with the work of Michel Foucault
who, like Sontag, but from a different theoretical point of view, has a major
concern with the language of appropriation and power. Sontag’s central argument
is that metaphorical language has the power to make the subject powerless: a
victim of that language, rather than one with the potential to master and transcend
a physical condition. From her point of view, metaphorical language is
dangerously subversive of the physical condition and her text argues the need for
it to be excluded in any understanding of the meaning of illness. Pain, seemingly,
is beyond discourse and language breaks before it.
It may be argued that Sontag’s thesis itself arises out of a late Renaissance
view that matter is rooted in reality; put differently - that matter is a thing and not
a collection of words. Things rather than words became the objects of observation
and fascination in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century medical science, and it was
through a process which observed things as objects that symptoms of disease were
described and ordered into classificatory syndromes. As Foucault puts it:
By limiting and filtering the visible, structure enables it to be 
transcribed into language. It permits the visibility of the [patient] 
to pass over in its entirety into the discourse that receives it.
And ultimately, perhaps, it may manage to reconstitute itself in 
visible form by means of words.5
It would appear that Foucault perceives a gap between words and things - a gap
which becomes filled with names which pattern the representation of both the
5 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (London: 
Routledge, 1997), p.135. This translation was first published in Great Britain in 1970 by Tavistock 
Publications Ltd. Foucault’s argument relates to the history o f natural science, but it has its echo in 
the human sciences which are main themes in his text.
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things and the words. In this respect, Alzheimer’s disease may be understood as 
illustrative of Foucault’s paradigm. It is also illustrative of the power to name; a 
power that is jealously guarded by medical science and its practitioners. Language 
and power come to be intimately connected in Sontag’s text and, as such, are 
primary points for consideration in this chapter.
It is Sontag’s contention that diseases ‘thought to be intractable and 
capricious’ are, by definition, mysterious.6 Tuberculosis in the nineteenth century 
and cancer in the twentieth are the two conditions cited in her text as diseases 
which began, and continue to begin, with a puzzle: they are diseases without any 
known cause, but with many effects. Her text argues that this gap in knowledge 
invites the use of metaphor and metaphorical language to fill this emptiness. 
Catherine Belsey makes a similar point in her interpretation of Jacques Lacan’s 
concept of the ‘Real’. Lacan argues that this idea refers to what we do not know 
and as such ‘the real enlists speculation’.7 If the idea of mystery is what we do not 
know, it clearly invites speculation. The Lacanian ‘Real’ is, of course, primarily 
concerned with what is not known to our conscious selves, that which is buried, 
hidden in our unconscious. Sontag’s text seeks, as she states, ‘a liberation’ of the 
disease from metaphorical speculation,8 whereas Belsey’s interpretation of the 
Lacanian ‘Real’ sees it as an opportunity, a quest, for personal and social change. 
Nevertheless, the quest in seeking to reveal this mysterious gap and bring it into 
everyday speech and discourse is as much at the heart of medical science as of 
psychoanalysis. As Sontag states, once a cause of a disease is revealed and
6 Susan Sontag, Illness as Metaphor (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1983), p. 9.
7 Catherine Belsey, Culture and the Real (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2005), p. xii.
8 Sontag, p. 8.
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established in what may be spoken, the mystery is solved; the speculation and 
speculative language is likely to become redundant and the patient liberated from 
its ‘secret invasion’ of both cause and effect.9
The argument that gaps, spaces, voids and other lacunae invite the use of 
figurative and metaphorical language, as it were, to advance into silence, suggests 
a need to combat fear, and the fact that there is no marked and defined origin such 
as a cause for the many symptoms of Alzheimer’s disease clearly provokes 
considerable fear. But would the language of loss and substitution be rendered 
redundant by conjuring a known cause into reality? The assumption on which the 
Sontag thesis is predicated is that once cause is known, cure cannot be far behind. 
However, it may be argued that Sontag’s text demonstrates a kind of utopian 
desire in that it seeks a clarity and self-sufficiency for the disease itself; in other 
words, that the disease should be purified of metaphorical language so that it can 
be seen for itself alone, somehow decontextualised or figuratively 
uncontaminated.
It is as if metaphor itself is a disease of language which requires to be 
expelled. Her commentary suggests a need to establish authenticity for a thing 
rather than to rely on language. Thus she argues for a closure - to close down 
articulation and to discourage interpretation, reinterpretation and ambiguity. 
However, the subject diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease is already being shifted 
to the margins of the symbolic order and, therefore, at the mercy, or otherwise, of 
the other’s symbolism. Their body has become a kind of concrete abstraction, a 
sort of facsimile - like, but unlike, themselves, no more than a vitality of signs that
9 Sontag, p. 9.
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require interpretation by others. In effect, the Sontag text seeks to put all this and 
the realities of human foible and frailty, as well as reassurance, in their place.
But such commentary passes over the real possibility that disease always 
teeters on the brink of another kind of narrative. Barbara Clow argues that 
Sontag’s
solution to the problems posed by disease metaphors was simply 
to eliminate them from the discourse ... she believed that, 
once the disease had been stripped of symbolic association, 
sufferers would realize cancer was a biological phenomenon 
rather than a social or moral one.10
In this analysis, biomedicine appears set on desocialising disease, its proponents
arguing that disease is defined solely by impersonal, natural laws, rather than
moderated also by social ties and interests. This is exemplified in the title of
Sontag’s text, which suggests a body not only weighted by disease, but also
encumbered by an extra and burdensome language. The weight of the disease and
an unfitting language, which is often used as a response to the condition, can be
cleansed and purified of its subjective nature, argues Sontag, so that it can be
returned to a perception of the thing-In-itself. Whether any disease of a
transforming nature (tuberculosis, cancer or Alzheimer’s), can be purified of a
language which articulates that transforming experience seems unlikely given
patients’ need to make sense of their condition.
Sontag’s argument is that metaphors hide the ‘truth’ of a disease and so
disable the patient’s resources to resist the ideas and images created by that
language. The idea of purification and therefore of being released from a shroud
10 Barbara Clow, ‘Who’s Afraid of Susan Sontag?’, Social History of Medicine, 14 (2001), 293- 
312 (p. 297).
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which hides the ‘truth’, a form of redemption, invokes a religious iconography 
which, paradoxically, is supposed to reveal a truth. But what is it that is supposed 
to be hidden here? Sontag argues that metaphor is not only an extra, an addition, a 
substitution, a moment of excess, but a very unwelcome filler of space. The dark 
and hidden space of the body, it seems, suggestively requires no other meaning 
than the condition in which it finds itself. Ironically, Sontag’s text begins with a 
metaphor incorporating images of identity, place and journeying between bodily 
spaces:
Illness is the night-side of life, a more onerous citizenship.
Everyone who is bom holds a dual citizenship, in the kingdom 
of the well and in the kingdom of the sick. Although we all 
prefer to use only the good passport, sooner or later each of us 
is obliged, at least for a spell, to identify ourselves as citizens 
of that other place.11
The metaphor’s metaphysical notions are of a body bom into shades of light and
darkness, but with a paradoxical fixed identity that is somehow sovereign in both
places. But a disease creates a difference, an estrangement from the idea of
normality and a different passport seems to be required, not a fixed one. The
subject inhabits a strange location with a language of difference in the ascendancy
where the idea of darkness is indicative of the mysterious void, that space which
is strangely inhabited by an illegitimate illness, illegitimate in the sense that it has
no known cause and hence is unnamed. Drawing upon the Lacanian ‘Real’ to
illustrate this void, Belsey asserts:
The real is not reality, which is what we do know, the world picture 
that culture represents to us. By contrast, the real, as culture’s 
defining difference, does not form part of our culturally acquired 
knowledge, but exercises its own, independent determination even so.12
11 Sontag, p. 8.
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The question here is what, if anything, is on the other side of language? Sontag’s
metaphor clearly hints at the other side, this space of darkness which hides away
from revelation, but which, as she argues, once revealed and brought into the
discourse of acquired knowledge, will be set in the language o f cause and effect.
Her metaphor is also indicative of strangeness, of being a stranger in another
place and at a distance from whatever or wherever may have been one’s origin,
which may arouse ‘punitive or sentimental fantasies’ in the new location.13
Illness, then, seems to create a psychological sense of apartness, not only within
but also outside. It drives the sick body from the ‘norm’, so that it becomes
detached, unanchored from its usual state of being. Illness, whatever its form,
makes a further space for language to give meaning to this different experience.
Therefore, changes in identity require a continual process o f ‘retranslation’, of
reconstructing the self depending upon social context. It is this process of
distancing and strangeness, and what it may evoke or provoke, which is of major
concern to Sontag in her inquiry into the forms of language which address
particular diseases:
My point is that illness is not a metaphor, and that the most truthful 
way of regarding illness - and the healthiest way of being ill - 
is one purified of, most resistant to, metaphoric thinking.14
Metaphor and metaphoric language, it is suggested, is not only the language of
strangeness, but also of deceit, of cheating, of lying. It is a language, in fact, not to
be trusted. Such configurations are clearly ones which seduce, in essence, the pure
12 Belsey, p. xii.
13 Sontag, p. 8.
14 Sontag, p. 8.
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and truthful, and, therefore, have to be resisted so as to enable the patient to be 
returned, via their good passport, to their former self. This suggests that the 
journey between light and darkness and back again, has no psychological or 
material effect which needs to be given meaning by those who make the journey 
as well as by those who act to assist.
Although in making her argument Sontag insists metaphorical language 
colours the experience of illness to the detriment of the patient’s capacity to deal 
with its reality, it is this very colour that is welcomed by Virginia Woolf.15 She 
argues that illness needs a language to reveal itself and its effects upon the body 
and mind, and to enable the sick to feel that they remain in the world and that they 
are not to be silenced by the condition or any attendant shame. Illness, it seems, 
can be one of those moments for reconstructing the self. For the Alzheimer 
subject, however, it is materiality which outwits the self by putting that subject 
outside the norm and at the mercy of a language which lays claim to its essential 
monstrosity in personal and social contexts.
Sontag’s argument does give an emphasis, and preference, to a medical 
discourse which invariably claims to seek a detachment in its quest to be specific 
and not to generalize. Certainly such a discourse aspires to employ and display a 
more concrete and less figurative language. The very idea of something more and 
something less is expressive of the values of medical discourse and therefore 
underpins the level of its importance in Sontag’s text. In other words, medical 
discourse seeks to place a so-called objective science over and above that of
15 Virginia Woolf, ‘On Being 111’, in The Crowded Dance o f Modem Life: Selected Essays, ed. by 
Rachel Bowlby (London: Penguin Books, 1993), Vol. 2, pp. 43-53. Woolfs ironic essay, first 
published in 1926, debates the question about why illness is ignored as a major theme in literature.
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subjective experience, which is often expressed in figurative language and which 
establishes the metaphorical myths that Sontag so disapproves of. To pursue the 
economic trope a little further, Sontag’s analysis suggests that metaphorical 
language has no surplus value as far as the discourse in which to understand 
disease is concerned; in fact, from her viewpoint, it holds no exchange value at 
all. If subjective experience is to be characterized by metaphorical language, it 
clearly cannot hold any substantial value within the discourse of medical science 
and the reality of the material diseases with which it deals. In these circumstances 
it can be argued that illness itself is, metaphorically, asking for the body to be 
abandoned by language and to be left to its own factual suffering. However, what 
is apparent in the narratives of those suffering from Alzheimer’s disease is the 
evacuation of the peculiarly human ache of longing, the base of the Lacanian 
‘Real’ and the need to try and express this, perhaps romantically, within the 
language not only of loss and fear, but also of love and hope.
Fact, ‘Truth’ and Fiction
For those with the condition, as well as those who observe them, Alzheimer’s 
disease creates a space which is eventually to be occupied by dead time, reached 
when the regulatory relationship we all have with temporality comes to be 
destroyed. This kind of reality, both for the observer and the patient, creates the 
sense of illness and disease re-constituting the subject. As Jacques Derrida puts it, 
‘the place of the subject is ... taken by another, it is concealed’.16 In other words,
16 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore and 
London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 315.
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the identity of the subject, unlike the fixed identity in Sontag’s metaphor, is 
transformed: taken over and concealed, by the illness.
This seems to be as factual as the fact of the disease itself and such a 
change in the subject suggests the need for a different form of language as the 
subject is translated into another sort o f narrative. Alzheimer’s disease creates one 
such narrative in its process of distancing the subject from a state of well-being to 
one that, in prospect, will lose that subjectivity and thus become not only strange, 
but come to be seen as somehow outside of nature. The disease is indeed one in 
which an involuntary exchange takes place, a kind of mutation of identity which 
is neither sought nor asked for, but is an illustration of a trick of nature. And it is 
the disease itself which procures the displacement of body and mind, requiring a 
different sort of language to that of medical scientific discourse with its concerns 
for the material specificities of the body, and requirement that form and function 
go together: a reflection of its modernist philosophy, with its emphasis on paring 
down to the essentials.
Such an approach does suggest a distrust of additions, of excess, of other 
things getting in the way of those essentials - and one of those things is the idea of 
metaphorical language. Sontag argues that tuberculosis in the nineteenth century 
and cancer in the twentieth were and continue to be perceived as ‘obscene ... ill-
17 ♦omened, abominable, and repugnant to the senses’. Sontag’s interpretation of 
the responses to these two diseases does underline the use of excessive, 
inflationary language, but it is a language clearly embedded in the social fabric. It 
is also a response to conditions that are both painful and terminal, and in which
17 Sontag, p. 12.
the idea of rationality, of objectification, seems to wither in the face of a gothicity 
of language. Indeed until cellular pathology became established in the late 
nineteenth century, tuberculosis and cancer were seen as diseases which corrupted 
and consumed, the body somehow being eaten away. These metaphors were, as 
Sontag points out, arrived at by people’s perceptions of those suffering from such 
conditions, in much the same way that language is used to interpret and give 
meaning to Alzheimer’s disease in contemporary society. If tuberculosis and 
cancer can be perceived within a language fuelled by a sense of something 
monstrous, such a situation resonates with Thomas De Baggio’s fearsome 
foretelling of his future after being diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease - that he 
will join a ‘parade of horror’.18
Certainly Sontag’s text does argue for a resistance to metaphorical 
language in relation to illness, displaying a wariness of the imagination, at the 
very least, as a way of defending fact against fiction. The impression imparted is 
that one form of language is more truthful than another. She sees fact as an asset 
and fiction as a liability when it comes to handling and understanding illness and 
disease. Her text suggests that the limiting of the imagination is to be provided, 
and bound, by scientific discourse. But in the face of something as desperate and 
intractable as Alzheimer’s disease, and other terminal conditions, another kind of 
language appears to be needed to establish understanding and meaning between 
communicating human beings. In any event, fiction can also be a place of truth, 
articulating fears that are generally suppressed and conveying emotional 
certainties that are usually based on facts which provide their context. Indeed it
18 Thomas DeBaggio, Losing my Mind (New York: The Free Press, 2002), p. 1.
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can be argued that facts only have meaning if they are shaped by the emotional 
truths which underlie them.
Kristeva’s concern with sub-verbal codes is suggestive of a way of 
approaching the theme of the imagination and the language by which it may be 
understood, and of exploring the ambiguities of the private and the public. From 
this theoretical point of view, the real work of the imagination is carried out by 
considering the gaps between words and their meanings, or the boundary between 
body and culture. These fascinations with the pre- and sub-verbal are an 
indication of the power of the body and its capacity to somehow speak for itself 
even when clothed with language and speech. This notion comes very close to 
Sontag’s textual argument. Illness and disease are spokespersons for the body, 
making visible the invisible. In Alzheimer’s disease, for example, there is 
something buried and hidden which then appears in the subject’s formless 
behavior outside of time and space. It becomes a visible language making present 
what is absent, or speaking its absence through its presence, all of which seems to 
underline the tension between body and mind and its private and potential public 
exposure.
i
However, the gaps present the possibility of a mix, the fluidity of which
may emerge in the work of the imagination. One way this is done is explained by
Terence R. Wright:
If narrative is the way we construct our sense of identity, 
metaphor is how we think, especially in areas in which we 
need to build our knowledge of the unknown by comparison 
with the known.19
19 Terence Wright, Theology and Literature (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), p. 11.
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Wright’s explanation of the purpose of metaphor goes part of the way to support
Sontag’s view, but crucially departs from her position by suggesting that
metaphorical language may enable the subject to meet and explain the unknown
and thus bring it into the domain of what may be said. Wright goes on to argue
that the devices of such language, figurative and poetic, tend to de-familiarize the
familiar, an understanding arrived at out of the work of both the Russian
formalists and Kristeva. Wright argues:
Paradox and ambiguity, like metaphor, symbolism and other poetic 
devices, are an admission of the limits of logic, an expression of the 
contradictory nature of experience.20
The body, as matter, is, of course, there, a thing, but it can never have a fixed
meaning in either health or disease, or science and reason because it is constantly
subverted by the imagination. Belsey asserts that:
A certain discontent inhabits the organisms-in-culture that we are: 
a dissatisfaction with the present state of things, an imperative to 
do better, or to change the world; above all a capacity to dream up 
alternatives to the way things are.21
Indeed both Wright and Belsey indicate that the way we are, and could be, is
primarily a matter of the way we think: the way of the imagination.
Subjective ‘Realities’
For the subjects of Sontag’s text, those suffering with the physical diseases of 
tuberculosis and cancer, their personal images of reality lie, as it were, beneath the 
level of discourse inhabited by the body in medical science, dreaming of 
alternative ways of thinking about themselves. Belsey sustains an affirmative
20 Wright, p. 152.
21 Catherine Belsey, ‘Biology and Imagination: the Role of Culture’, in Human Nature: Fact and 
Fiction, ed. by Robin Headlam Wells and Johnjoe McFadden (London: Continuum, 2006),
pp. 111-127 (p. 125).
attitude toward the discourse of the body against the reductionism of science with
its deterministic ideas of evolution, claiming that such views are often
undermined by the very mechanism which is supposed to separate the unfit from
the fit. We struggle with our own biology and give degrees of respect to our
‘natural’ world, but we also have a need to ‘figure’ it with imaginative language
so that it may become embedded in our culture. To find and say something
different is, in Belsey’s argument, ‘an imperative’. In other words, it becomes
necessary to re-defme, to renew and to re-write. To re-define is an important
concept in this analysis. Steven Rose, a neuroscientist, has argued for such an
understanding of the use of the imagination in shifting perspectives:
Yet I have to accept the limits of neuroscience, to concede that 
it has so far been left to the other half of our fragmented culture, 
the terrain traditionally inhabited by poets and novelists, 
to try to explore the subjective meanings of memory.22
There is a note of regret and reluctance in the tone of Rose’s admission of the
limits of the objective science of neurology, that capacity to distance the activity
from the effects of a damaged memory, but he still seems to insist on its primary
role over ‘the subjective meanings of memory’. The emotional nuance in the face
of scientific fact is still regarded as secondary in what is seen as our two cultures.
But the power of memory is in its capacity to drive the imagination in its
associative abilities, and it is through language that this association is best seen
and heard. The character and dynamic of metaphor is in its potential to get ideas
to interact and therefore go beyond the literal. Metaphorical language suspends
the literal sense and shifts it to a new level of reference so that a different
22 Steven Rose, p. 8.
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understanding comes into effect. In this way a re-defining of the literal takes 
place.
This process of re-defining and re-writing neuroscience is one which Rose 
seems to applaud, but of course this objective science is concerned with a 
language that describes Alzheimer’s disease as a primary degenerative dementia, 
a disease of the brain. But another way of considering this is to view such a 
dementia not just as a cerebral deterioration, but as a complex disease which is a 
disease of the brain with a parallel resonance for the mind, the mind being 
essentially a social construct. And, not surprisingly, it is the mind which is of 
most concern to the subject. It is the language of the ‘other half of our fragmented 
culture’ which seeks to imagine what this experience of deterioration is like, and 
what it is most like is most often expressed and represented in the language of 
difference, strangeness, loss and death: the language of the Gothic.
As Alzheimer’s disease tends to be an effect of old age, its symptoms can 
be regarded as constituting not only a disease but a stage of being. Illness and 
ageing are drawn inevitably together in the terminal stages of life’s cycle. Perhaps 
just as inevitably, the way Alzheimer’s is represented can be seen as figures of 
metaphor. The language used for its representation suggests that metaphor 
becomes, in a sense, the public face of private ills. The very elemental rawness of 
disease seems to demand the shelter of metaphor, a language of both tragedy and 
comedy, to ease the rawness of the condition. Metaphor, in fact, hides and reveals 
the ghosts of the literal, suggesting both mastery and loss. DeBaggio, in his 
autobiography, writes:
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There was something else that spring and it was unnamable.
As with all unknowns, it was unsettling and had nothing to do 
with the weather. It was something that gentle rains, bright 
sunny days, an optimistic outlook would not cure. It was an 
anonymous presence, yet I could feel its uneasy cadence ...
I might be tied to a teetering mind that had begun a slow 
descent into silence.23
This ghost-like presence of a Lacanian ‘Real’ in the springtime of DeBaggio’s
year evokes a subliminal fear of something to come, a fear of Gothic proportions.
The juxtaposition of an anonymous ghost-like presence with a world bright with
prospect has its own poignancy, but to DeBaggio, a market gardener, the language
is full of meaning and understanding of his situation. Each turn of the year brings
prospects of different kinds, but here the spring holds within it the seeds of
something much darker and less generous as it progresses into summer, autumn
and winter. The apparently normal rhythm of an external nature which touches the
inner is to be disrupted by an insidious internal presence which will eventually
strike out a perception of that nature in both its understandings.
DeBaggio’s metaphor strikes a note of the sublime, that mix of terror as
well as pleasure, but at the same time seems a clear example of what Wright
alludes to - a language is sought which indicates ‘the limits of logic and an
expression of the contradictory nature of experience’. Early in his text, DeBaggio
depicts himself as joining a group paraded as something horrific - bodies without
minds, zombie-like in appearance and behavior and therefore outside the norm.
Indeed, the parade is one full of horrific, posthuman substitutions, a series of
metaphors for the so-called real selves. DeBaggio’s use of nature as a metaphor is
indicative of a living in language: it is what he does as a horticulturist that attunes
23 DeBaggio, p. 3.
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him to the language of the nature which surrounds and influences him. It is this
experience which makes things comprehensible to him, but the language of horror
is a shift of perspective and register which relates to a wider cultural
understanding and is the language of de-familiarization and exile. His condition
first breaks a silence, and then descends into silence in his parade of horror. This
is a text which readily suggests a redrawing of personal boundaries not unlike the
process described by Kristeva where the subject is returned, at one and the same
time, to a sense of nothingness and wholeness. Anna Smith argues that Kristeva:
appeals to the visionary language of epiphany and apocalypse 
to elaborate the earth-shaking nature of those borderline states 
of language and human experience.24
DeBaggio’s moment of epiphany comes in knowing the prospect of that descent
into silence and of recognizing the apocalyptic nature of his existence between
language and body: that teetering at the edge of his mind descending into
something dark. The words he uses describe what is happening to him as a result
of the attentions of his internal rhythmic ghost, marking its life to the point where
all understanding of time and space is lost to an eternal present. Although there is
a clear and profound difference in kind, there is also a resonance with the idea of
the eternal present in Oscar Wilde’s The Picture o f  Dorian Gray. The book is
invaded by a sense of fatality as the primary character, Dorian Gray, leads what
can only be described as a double life. On the one hand he remains constantly
young, enclosed in an eternal present, while his portrait demonstrates the
coiTuption brought about by time. At the completion of the portrait he states:
24 Anna Smith, Julia Kristeva: Readings of Exile and Estrangement (London: Macmillan Press, 
1996), p. 6.
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How sad it is! I shall grow old, and horrible, and dreadful. But 
this picture will remain always young. It will never be older than 
this particular day of June ... If it were only the other way! If it 
were I who was to be always young, and the picture that was to 
grow old! For that -  for that - - 1 would give everything! Yes, there 
is nothing in the whole world I would not give! I would give my 
soul for that!25
The images of duality, a familiar motif in the Gothic genre, also seem to have an 
echo in DeBaggio’s memoir in the sense that he sees himself in two situations; 
one as himself and the other as an Alzheimer subject, the latter becoming the 
metaphor for the former in the same way as the portrait of Dorian becomes the 
substitute for himself. But given DeBaggio’s very human experience, the shelter 
of a metaphor seems a small thing, an inflation easily forgiven and understood. If 
language is to be so objectified as to rule out the human and the posthuman, and 
to be given always as a kind of understatement, it surely follows, as Adam 
Phillips points out, that there is something under the statement which needs to be 
addressed. If Sontag does contrast the visible characteristics of disease with an 
uncalled for and unfitting language, does it not beg the question posed by 
Phillips? Some kind of answer is supplied in DeBaggio’s response to his disease, 
which is the language of personal imagery layered beneath the bodily facts of his 
diagnosis.
As Sontag’s opening metaphor suggests, we are all likely to journey into 
periods of disease and discomfort of various kinds; we all die of something. And 
as we are all part of our cultures we must be part of its ways and meanings of 
understanding and coping with such predicaments. But Sontag seems to argue the
25 Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray (London: Penguin Books, 1985), p.31.
26 The Penguin Freud Reader, ed. and introduced by Adam Phillips (London: Penguin Books, 
2006), p. xi.
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American dream, that of overcoming, of transcending such cultural meaning as
we give to disease so as to combat and defeat it: ‘the person dying of cancer is
portrayed as robbed of all capacities of self-transcendence, humiliated by fear and
agony’.27 Sontag’s son, David Rieff, has written that:
My mother, Susan Sontag, lived almost her entire seventy-one 
years believing that she was a person who would beat the odds.
Even during the last nine months of her life, after she was 
discovered to have myelodyysplastic syndrome ... a particularly 
virulent blood cancer, she continued to persevere in the belief 
that she would be the exception ... her positive denial ... 
whether with regard to her health, her work as a writer or 
her private life, had not been extinguished by the hard facts 
of her MDS.28
This kind of optimism and belief in the face of the inevitable is often seen in 
cultural terms as brave and courageous, and R ieff s description of his mother’s 
attitude indicates her own desire to transcend her disease, and the language of 
robbery, corruption and being consumed by the fire of cancer.
The Language of Illness
The vocabulary of illness is replete with language which locates and spaces the 
subject who becomes ill. We often use the term ‘to succumb to disease’, to 
describe the idea that we are laid low beneath it, and when we say that we are 
‘afflicted by a condition’ the metaphor is that we are brought down by it. We are 
often said to feel ‘low’, ‘run down’ or ‘under the weather’, or, when in a terminal 
condition, ‘to be sinking fast’. All such language spells out as fact that illness is 
‘down’ and being healthy is, conversely, ‘up’. We say also that the body is 
‘attacked’, either by an internal organ such as the heart, or an outside virus such
27 Sontag, p. 21.
28 David Rieff, ‘Illness as More Than a Metaphor’, New York Times, 4 December 2005, p. 4.
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as influenza, sustaining an assault which in both cases has to be ‘fought o ff. If we 
‘fight o ff influenza we can prevent ourselves from becoming ill. These military 
metaphors are well established in our cultural understanding in which they signify 
the meaning of disease. The ‘fighting’ and ‘defending’ metaphors are particularly 
well worn and welcome because they tend to resist the idea of the sick person as 
victim, the theme uppermost in Sontag’s text and clearly a dominant idea both in 
her life and in her writing about disease.
To resist the idea of being a victim, it is necessary, in Sontag’s argument, 
to use one’s sense of self to transcend the condition which, it seems, fate has 
handed one. To be sick is to be at the disposal of accident, perhaps even necessity, 
both concepts, paradoxically, arrived at through evolutionary biology. But Sontag 
also cites aspects of the social fabric which suggest that personal characteristics 
may be responsible for the conditions she explores in her text. Similar social 
constructions have also been made in relation to Alzheimer’s disease. Sontag 
takes issue with the Romantic period’s depiction of tuberculosis as a disease 
affecting those who may be described as refined, sensitive, interesting, genteel or 
delicate. Incorporated in these personal characteristics is the notion of passion,
either too much or too little:
\
As once tuberculosis was thought to come from too much passion, 
afflicting the reckless and sensual, today many people believe that 
cancer is a disease of insufficient passion, afflicting those who are 
sexually repressed, inhibited, un-spontaneous, incapable of expressing 
anger ... as much as tuberculosis was celebrated as a disease of 
passion, it was also regarded as a disease of repression.29
29 Sontag, p. 26.
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Sontag cites the infamous psychoanalyst, Wilhelm Reich, as someone who 
associated ‘cancer with the repression of passion’,30 making it seem that those 
who sublimate their passionate natures are vulnerable to these diseases and she 
comments further that ‘the Romantic treatment of death asserts that people were 
made more singular, made more interesting, by their illness’.31 However, she goes 
on to state:
Doctors and laity believed in a TB character type -  as now the 
belief in a cancer-prone character type, far from being confined 
to the back yard of folk superstition, passes for the most advanced 
medical thinking. In contrast to the modem bogey of the 
cancer-prone character - someone unemotional, inhibited, repressed - 
the TB prone character that haunted imaginations in the nineteenth 
century was an amalgam of two different fantasies: someone both 
passionate and repressed.32
Here the imagination is aligned with fantasy, the latter apparently dominating and
promoting the idea of particular personal characteristics being open to certain
diseases. Sontag appears to divide the organic from the psychological, the body
from the psyche and language. But presumably, and paradoxically, the sick body
has to be mediated to enable it to transcend and combat its condition;
nevertheless, Sontag insists that ‘psychological understanding undermines the
“reality” of a disease’.33 In other words, fantasy, driven by metaphor, is an
illusory cloak to cover ‘the obscene mystery’of death.34 Such fantasies are also
seen by Sontag ‘as forms of self-judgment, of self-betrayal’,35 as the self is unable
to resist the power of cultural metaphor. In such instances the mind can betray the
Sontag, p. 27.
31 Sontag, p. 35.
32 Sontag, p. 43.
33 Sontag, p. 59.
34 Sontag, p. 59.
35 Sontag, p. 44.
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body: Sontag refers to the case of Franz Kafka, suffering from tuberculosis and 
writing to a friend - ‘my head and my lungs have come to an agreement without 
my knowledge’. This tripartite God-like imagery seems to suggest a body and 
mind co-operating against some other spatial self; but it is a readily understood 
image, confronted, as it were, by a form of difference within.
But the imagery is indicative also of what seems most to interest Sontag in 
relation to the idea of being a victim: powerlessness. The argument, however, is 
not one of helplessness in the face of the authority of an appropriating medical 
discourse inhabiting the terrain of the power of life and death and the language of 
the body, but against the cultural metaphors of the Romantic period and their 
successors in the late twentieth century. Sontag maintains that such forms of 
language create the idea of victims that are somehow to blame for the conditions 
from which they suffer. Her argument is that such language establishes a 
nonsensical mythology that acquiring cancer, for example, is the result of 
sublimating one’s desires, the mind resisting the body. These cultural metaphors, 
arising out of speculation concerning unknown causes, are, according to Sontag, 
driven by sentiment and sentimentality which deny the ‘realities’ of terminal, or 
potentially terminal, conditions. Sentiment can, of course, be a disengaging 
emotion, polluting the events and experiences of disease and illness. However, 
these experiences are, as DeBaggio’s responses indicate, a fluid mix of the real 
and unreal as they are traced into cultural metaphors. In this way the brutality of 
fact shades into the consolations of metaphor even where it is coloured by
36 Sontag, p. 44.
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gothicity. Sontag’s position is most clearly stated at the close of her polemical 
text:
The modem metaphors suggest a profound disequilibrium between 
individual and society, with a society conceived as the individual’s 
adversary. Disease metaphors are used to judge society not out of 
balance, but as repressive. They turn up regularly in Romantic rhetoric 
which opposes heart to head, spontaneity to reason, nature to artifice, 
country to city.37
Here the private and the public are seen to be opposed, and the oppositional mode 
of Romantic rhetoric, which indicates a critique of society, is one that, as argued 
earlier, Belsey applauds as acts of the imagination, acts of potential progression. 
But Sontag’s position is also one that echoes Freud’s ‘Civilization and its 
Discontents’, a discontent which is paradoxically unveiled in cultural metaphors.
The primary theme of Freud’s text is the tension between the demands of 
the body, its instincts, and the prohibitions of the external world. Illness, 
particularly mental illness, seems to isolate and detach the subject from what 
might be called their ‘real’ life, their condition throwing into relief the tension 
between body, mind and the wider environment. It might be argued that the use of 
figurative and metaphorical language actually minimizes, mitigates or explains 
such a tension. Freud’s text does suggest how a sense of the public, or in his terms
i
civilization, imposes a need for the individual to sublimate instinctual drives into 
the private, producing guilt as an inhibiting factor, an argument also used by Lord 
Henry Wotton in Wilde’s novel.38 However, it may be that it is through Romantic
37 Sontag, p. 77.
38 Oscar Wilde, p. 23. Wotton argues a case for the freedom of instinctual life - ‘The bravest man 
amongst us is afraid of himself. The mutilation of the savage has it tragic survival in the self- 
denial that mars our lives. We are punished for our refusals. Every impulse that we strive to
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rhetoric that such inhibitions can be released, which is only another way for the 
body to speak its inhibited desires. As Freud’s text points out, the body’s 
pathology subverts the belief in the unitary idea of the ego and blurs the 
perception ‘between the ego and the external world’.39 Freud goes on to argue 
that:
Life, as we find it, is too hard for us; it brings us too many 
pains, disappointments and impossible tasks. In order to bear it 
we cannot dispense with palliative measures.40
If life is so full of discontent, some forms of mitigation have to be established and
Freud suggests that there are three such palliative measures, one of which he calls
‘substitutive satisfactions’.41 These tend, he argues, to mitigate these many pains
and disappointments. He goes on to state:
The substitutive satisfactions, as offered by art, are illusions 
in contrast with reality, but they are none the less effective, 
thanks to the role phantasy has assumed in mental life.42
If art is a form of metaphorical illusion, then Sontag’s thesis would have Freud’s
support in its contrasting relationship with the ‘realities’ of science. Certainly if
fantasy is an aspect of the imagination, it is one that blurs the ego’s relationship
with an external world and may well be effective in handling and understanding
disease and illness. Sontag and Freud seem to agree that metaphor acts as a
creator of illusions, reminding us that they were both creative artists in their own
spheres of art. But if fear and desire are aspects of illness, this fear, as described
strangle broods in the mind and poisons us.’ Wotton’s argument seems to summarise Freud’s 
central point in his ‘Civilization and its Discontents’.
j9 Sigmund Freud, ‘Civilization and its Discontents’, in Civilization, Society and Religion, ed. by 
Albert Dickson and trans. by James Strachey, Penguin Freud Library, Vol. 12 (London: Penguin 
Books, 1991), pp. 243-340 (p. 255).
40 Freud, p. 262.
41 Freud, p. 262.
42 Freud, p. 262.
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by Derrida, is ‘the mistaken face of pity ... pity is the force of reconciliation and 
presence’.43 Such a model reconciles substitutive satisfaction, in the form of 
metaphor, in conciliating the subject to a terminal condition, particularly when 
read alongside the language used by DeBaggio when describing his impending 
destination.
Metamorphosing Monsters
Illness, as a distancing from the self, requires a language of reconciliation which 
the use of metaphor appears to meet. DeBaggio’s situation is both real and unreal 
as the spectre of the ghost to come invades his sense of reality with its promise to 
return him to nothingness. His apprehension of what is to come is revealed in his 
response. The image of horror and the spectre embedded in his reaction to his 
diagnosis of having Alzheimer’s disease is his way of imaging the consequences 
of that disease. The metaphorical language he uses indicates both resemblance 
and substitution to the literal condition - the name of the disease which conjures 
up such images. The literal is also the disease of the brain itself; the mind 
however stretches its understanding of this literal condition through a language of 
the imagination. DeBaggio’s language has an emotional reality as it explores, 
explains and recognizes the reconfiguration of his situation. In a sense, such
i
language becomes an act of faith, a transcendental terminology arriving out of the 
psyche which has psychological meaning. In these ways is it seen that 
metaphorical language is also a response to ‘contemporary western medicine’s
43 Derrida, p. 278.
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emphasis on biochemistry and technology in neglecting personal and social
dimensions of illness’.44
However, Fred Botting is one who takes issue with Freud’s views on the
role of art as simply a substitutive satisfaction:
Monsters give form to fears, desires and anxieties, allowing the 
channeling and expulsion of emotional energies. In its infectious 
myth-making, art, it seems, does not simply conjure up and 
circulate a series of colourful representations of science that develop 
independently and according to their own generic and cultural 
momentum: science is implicated in and affected by the process 
since it never remains outside the cultural sphere.45
Botting is concerned to argue that Frankenstein’s monster remains a persistent
myth within the activities of scientific research, and claims that it has a
‘monstrous metaphorical resonance’.46 Science and art are not necessarily
separate Botting argues, in contradiction to Rose’s notion of a ‘fragmented
culture’, but involved in a symbiotic and dialectical relationship, each using the
other to ease the ‘many pains, disappointments and impossible tasks’ of the
Freudian imagination. DeBaggio’s vision of his future illustrates both a lack as
well as a substance within that vision. The lack relates to a named diagnosis
which offers nothing, and the substance refers to a loss as becoming drawn
prospectively out of nature. His emotional reality is one which can be explored
within the images conjured by his response. In this instance the language used
implies science and art: the reality of the limits of medicine and the emotional
reality of his metaphors.
44 Anne Hunsaker Hawkins, Reconstructing Illness: Studies in Pathography (West Lafayette, 
Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1999), p. xi.
45 Botting, p. 341.
46 Botting, p. 339.
Botting agrees with the view that biochemistry and technology have 
shifted the ground away from the human subject and argues the reverse of Rose’s 
hierarchy in so far as Rose grudgingly admits to the imaginative power of the 
language of the arts, but still insists on the superiority of science. However, 
Botting maintains that ‘the language of the arts supplies the moral vision lacking 
in science’.47 He goes on to say that this is an attempt ‘to return technological 
innovation to an older framework based on the bounded opposition of humanity 
and nature’.48 In line with DeBaggio’s response, a similar idea is advanced by 
Anne Hunsaker Hawkins when she argues a necessity which puts ‘the welfare of 
sick persons’49 over and above that of technology and by so doing hears the voice 
of the subject. Carel, too, seeks to establish a voice for the subject who becomes 
ill. She argues that illness is ‘accounted for by physical facts alone’ and these 
facts are described in ‘objective and objectifying’ ways by medical science which 
ignores the ‘first-person experience’. She argues a phenomenological account of 
illness in response to the objectifying medical process - a philosophical model 
which enables a description of the lived experience of sickness that transcends the 
‘biological dysfunction’.50
Illness, of course, is experienced subjectively, which gives an emphasis to 
our perception that at such times we tend to believe we have been betrayed and 
alienated from ourselves by a foreign body. Carel’s argument primarily concerns 
those who are physically sick, but can a similar account be made for those
47 Botting, p. 340.
48 Botting, p. 340.
49 Hawkins, p. xi.
50 Carel, p. 8.
alienated from their minds? Maarten, the narrator of J. Bem lef s novel Out o f
Mind, seems to suggest so. He attempts to describe his experience in the early
middle stages of Alzheimer’s disease and his struggle to understand and keep in
touch with himself, wrestling between presence and absence. At one point, in
describing the process of the condition, he hints at a ghostly metaphor: ‘to see
something you must first be able to recognize it. Without memory you can merely
look, and the world glides through you without leaving a trace’.51 It is as if
experience floats, ghost-like through him, a ghost within a ghost and the very
opposite to the fact of the flesh. It can be argued therefore that metaphorical
thinking and figurative language may be seen as attempts to humanize a disease
sent by ‘nature’. Metaphors, as a language of fear, anxiety and desire, clearly
shape our perceptions as Mary Shelley intends when she writes in her introduction
to Frankenstein that her story was ‘one which would speak to the mysterious fears
of our nature and awaken thrilling horror’.52 But from Sontag’s point of view,
such perceptions do not fit the reality of disease.
Metaphors, moreover, as Maarten’s description of his illness emphasizes,
can be said to interrogate the very thing which creates them, and the response to
illness and disease is indicative of this process. DeBaggio writes about his
situation as someone with Alzheimer’s disease in the following terms:
Now we know it [Alzheimer’s disease] was not undefined evil, 
profligate activity, or witchcraft causing the strange behavior 
created by the disease. We are close to understanding 
mechanisms triggering this ghostly malady. The disease, 
or its potential, appears to rest secretly inside us until its evil time 
arises and a languid torture begins. This is a disease probably not
51 J. Bernlef, Out of Mind, trans. by Adrienne Dixon (London: Faber and Faber, 1989), p. 41.
52 Mary Shelley, Frankenstein (London: Penguin Books, 1994), p. 7.
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caused by something you did to your body. It is, most likely, 
a consequence of bad luck, subtle effects activated in the 
brain, and parents who earned corrupted genes.53
DeBaggio moves from a speculation about the possible causes of Alzheimer’s 
disease to its effects:
The disease works slowly, destroying the mind, stealing life in 
a tedious, silent dance of death. Slowly the memory is impaired, 
and you wander in a world without certainty and names.
Yesterdays disappear, except those long ago. Eventually there is 
a descent into silence and a dependence on caretakers ... 
a cipher takes your place ... by the end Alzheimer’s leaves its 
victims silent, quivering in their flesh.54
Although in his speculations as to the cause o f Alzheimer’s disease DeBaggio
rejects the classic Gothic metaphors of evil, witchcraft, ghosts and decadent
living, as does Sontag with tuberculosis and cancer, these cultural metaphors
remain part of his developing understanding of his condition and its effects on
him. He sees it as a secret and ghostly disease which tortures and then reveals its
evil nature in its own time, gradually diminishing his own life force. Nature seems
to have played this ghostly trick o f fate upon him through the possible inheritance
of immortal but ‘corrupted genes’. The disease puts him under some kind of
siege, destroying and stealing his life from him to the point where he becomes
homeless and without anchorage of any kind: his undefended identity is taken
from him. Is sucjb a Gothic language an excess of categorization, out of proportion
to his situation, or does it reveal an emotional, psychological reality which
underlines the limits of medicine and the ‘facts’ of the disease?
53 DeBaggio, p. 5.
54 DeBaggio, p. 5.
The facts are that his brain is becoming neurologically damaged and re­
making him as a human subject, but his mind is still embedded in culture. This is 
not to argue an artificial Cartesian division between brain and mind, a relationship 
remaining to be revealed, but to underline the fact of matter and the apparent 
tangibility of a consciousness which seems undefended in its symbiotic 
relationship with that matter and with culture. DeBaggio’s cultural metaphors 
charge his neurological condition with reducing him, his mind, to a cipher, an 
unreal image hiding his real self. In fact the language of metaphor charges the 
name, Alzheimer’s disease, with a kind of murderous intent. Matter, in the form 
and production of disease, is about to destroy the intangibility of his mind, that 
which makes him human and different at the same time. In DeBaggio’s language, 
Alzheimer’s disease becomes monstrous: it is a form which creates formlessness 
and, as in the genre of the Gothic, DeBaggio is aware of mutability and is in awe 
of it as there are no sure anchors to which to cling. If, at the end, the subject of 
Alzheimer’s disease is perceived as a silent, quivering victim, the condition seems 
to usher in a language to accompany such perceptions. Botting explains the 
language thus:
Metaphor - and hence its monstrosity as well as creativity -
is not just restricted to a realm o f poetry and rhetoric, it is
pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought
and action, crucial in structuring how we perceive, how we
think, and what we do ... metaphor exploits the creativity of language ...
[it] does not merely actualize a potential connotation, it creates it.55
DeBaggio’s language emphasizes that talking and writing about the experience of
illness and disease can never be isolated from existing cultural ideas, and certainly
55 Botting, p. 346.
being sick cannot be considered as some kind of pre-linguistic fact. If there is 
such a thing as ordinary language it needs the supplementation of metaphor to 
create a sense of understanding of the experience of illness. Western medicine, 
however, continues to have a powerful effect on individual subjectivity, and 
biological medicine, in particular, clearly locates pathology within that individual 
body, thereby handing authority to its practitioners. The medicalised body, 
therefore, has to become passive and disciplined as it becomes transposed into an 
object, a circumstance implicit in Sontag’s analysis.
Telling Alzheimer Stories
There is, however, a connection to be made here in relation to metaphor as a form 
of resemblance. There are both subjective and objective elements in the imaging 
of similarities between one thing and another, a resemblance in the pursuit of 
understanding. Such a paradigm is also to be noted in classificatory science, a 
certain requirement of repetitiveness involved in establishing similarity or 
resemblance. But DeBaggio’s responses are an example of a form of resistance to 
this objectifying by medicine. He explains his situation in terms which indicate 
the limits of biological medicine by its failure to be able to ‘normalize’ his 
experience by cure: they cannot bridge the gap, the void, and his language gives 
an emphasis to this as he mutates from being in ‘nature’ to being somehow 
outside of it. His language clearly attunes itself to this movement, re-describing 
his reality. Botting cites Paul Ricoeur as stating ‘with metaphor we experience 
the metamorphosis of both language and reality’, in other words a form of
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defamiliarization: as Botting argues, Ricoeur seems not to believe it possible ‘to 
produce a transparent language’.56
Responses to illness and disease can be as varied as disease patterns. As 
needs change so will the accompanying language, as the subject attempts to adjust 
or reconcile itself to these needs. Subjects have a vision of their circumstances 
enlivened by their experience of culture, but the language they habitually employ 
may seem deficient to explain and explore their situation. In particular 
Alzheimer’s disease subverts the idea of a benign ‘nature’ and all that such a 
concept represents, thus provoking the kind o f responses made by DeBaggio. This 
is a ‘nature’ making a lived life strange not only in mind and body but also in 
language. Alzheimer’s disease, it might be argued, promotes a sense of hyper­
reality on the one hand and leaves a kind of simulation of a self on the other, a 
memento as argued in Chapter 1. This seems to underline DeBaggio’s responses 
to his circumstances in which he senses a difference from others.
DeBaggio’s responses exemplify Botting’s argument that language 
contains resources which allow it to be used creatively. Two such methods of 
creativity, as he points out, are, first, the coining of metaphor, and, second, the 
fashioning of narratives. The first can both generate and regenerate meaning and 
therefore alter our understanding of reality. Disease acts as a kind of referent 
giving birth to metaphors and metaphorical language, and as such is a maternal 
offering which both gives and takes at the same time.57 DeBaggio’s response 
certainly indicates two archetypal metaphors with his disease as the reference
56 Botting, p. 347.
57 Botting, p. 365.
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point. One is the idea of journeying provoked by cause, and the other is o f death
at the end of the journey. He makes both a reference to the past and prognosticates
about what is likely to happen to him and such language enables him to order and
cope with his situation. As he points out:
The inspiration for this book appeared a few days after I was 
diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease. It was to be a word picture 
of the outside and inside, present and past, of man’s naked 
struggle with the unknown on his way to trembling silence and 
unexplainable torment without the torturer .. .Writing about it 
may be a way to legitimize my almost continuous contemplation 
of the subject.58
Here DeBaggio invokes a third archetypal metaphor, that of struggle; to fight and 
to do battle with his disease: in fact to fashion combat and to resist the disease by 
ordering it through writing. His struggle is nakedly elemental, and only language 
can help him in his fight. His tormentor obsesses him and this can only be made 
lawful by writing, and it is here that we have an interesting juxtaposition of an 
illegitimate disease facing a lawful writing: it is literally being brought to book. 
The archetypal myths, however, are invoked because they tend to represent shared 
cultural phenomena, the ways in which we have come to understand such 
experiences over time. In other words, they are universal myths. For DeBaggio 
such myths explain his idea of reality because he feels this is grounded in his 
experience. For the practitioner of biological medicine, reality is a kind of 
abstraction - a thing; but for the subjects of Alzheimer’s disease, such as 
DeBaggio, the disconnecting experience can be made to connect through 
metaphorical language.
58 DeBaggio, p. 7.
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Disconnection and connection are, after all, the essentials of metaphor. 
Somehow the gap between self and body created by disease has to be made 
meaningful for that self, and for DeBaggio only the invocation of metaphor can 
bridge such a gap. However, Ricoeur cites Gerard Genette as saying that 
metaphor is the ‘inner space of language’,59 and, in this sense, while such 
language may not be able to bridge the gap, it may create a condition which 
enables a connection to be made.
In terms of function, metaphorical language appears to be one in which 
connections can be both possible and impossible. Robert Davis’ autobiography, 
My Journey into Alzheimer's Disease illustrates this. He writes in the prologue 
that he wants:
To give to the concerned families some insight as to the 
devastation felt by the Alzheimer patient. Perhaps understanding 
the blackness and lost feelings will help families to be more 
understanding of the unreasonable actions they must deal with.60
Davis sees his journey as arriving into a space, a gap, a void of blackness,
engendering a sense of considerable loss. These metaphors are pervasive in the
writings about Alzheimer’s disease as they seem to describe the effects of the
condition with some accuracy through the use of dark language. If memory is a
kind of Freudian container, the emptying of it leaves a void, a nothingness, a
matter without past, present or future. Later Davis describes his sense of fear of
this void:
59 Paul Ricoeur, ‘The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination and Feeling’, Critical 
Inquiry, 5 (1978-79), 143-159 (p. 144).
60 Robert Davis, My Journey into Alzheimer’s Disease (Wheaton, Illinois: Tyndale House 
Publishers, Inc., 1989), p. 17.
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I am alone in the blackness. Suddenly, ridiculous, absurd fears 
creep into my mind. I know they are ridiculous and unreal, but 
they still come. Suddenly, in spite of my best efforts my mind 
becomes fixed upon these things -  glued to them so strongly 
that I do not have the power to get my mind off these absurd, 
ridiculous, devastating, fearful things.61
Here the gothicity of the language seems only too apparent and the mind seems
divided between Davis as a self, and something else that is being invaded by some
kind of ghostly fear which Davis is conscious of but can do nothing to evade. It is
reminiscent of DeBaggio’s tormentor, breaking into a consciousness to empty it
of its contents and leaving behind the other pervasive metaphor, that of the
paradox of the living corpse. These metaphors shape the psychological space of
Davis and DeBaggio, as well as their language. They expose and connect with the
idea of the gap, the spaces between the memories of past and present and thoughts
of the future, which are interfered with by neurological disasters that reduce the
power of Davis’s mind to resist the fears of the void. Their lived experiences of an
Alzheimer’s journey, marked by metaphors, end by what Iris Murdoch called
62‘entering a dark place’, one in which the self has been wiped away.
The accounts that DeBaggio and Davis both give of Alzheimer’s disease, 
are examples of that same self-combat which Sontag desires: of resisting, by 
writing, the notion of becoming a victim. Language for them defines their 
knowledge rather than simply reflecting it, and their stories unfold between the 
spaces of their descent into silence. In particular, these metaphors express un­
sublimated fears as the gaps, spaces and voids are perceived in terms of
61 Davis, p. 107.
62 Murdoch is reported to have used this phrase in talking to Martin Amis about losing her 
memory. He reports this in the Guardian, 25 January 2010, p. 3.
corruption: of a body corrupting its driving forces - consciousness and memory. 
DeBaggio’s obsessive contemplation of his condition is almost Gothic in its 
concerns with horrific ugliness as well as the mortality of the human body. It 
suggests an awareness of how his condition is announced in language while, at the 
same time, the language begins to displace him, in the sense that it emasculates 
him and moves him out of nature by cutting him off from his past, his history. 
Suggestively, both Davis and DeBaggio, in telling their stories, attempt a kind of 
body suicide by scooping out from the memories of their lives a substance which 
seems to create a hollow within the body; a grave in which another will dig even 
deeper to encrypt them. In the face of all this - the blackness, the gaps, the spaces 
- Sontag’s clinical rationalism rejects the very messiness and anguish of life, in 
which, she readily admits, illness and disease play such a large part.
Conclusion
Language meets the needs of both rationalism and the imagination, but it is 
evident that it is imagination, in the early stages of the disease, that seems to assist 
the subjects of Alzheimer’s in ameliorating and accurately describing their 
circumstances in a way that, for them, authenticates their situation. If language is 
desire, then Davis, DeBaggio and others seek to hold on to it for as long as 
possible to assist in continuing to define themselves as subjects still within nature 
and culture, until the life-threatening condition which makes them strange finally 
overtakes them and moves them into a void. Their texts occupy a kind of 
emotional twilight, a space of eclipsed intensity and identity. The disease, 
suggestively, writes a concluding chapter of lived lives and as such that space is
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haunted by a lost past; matter becomes a kind of empty house, no longer 
accommodating a life that has been lived. As subjects who have lived and 
continue to live through the void, their texts indicate their presence as well as 
foretelling their absence. In a sense they write what Hilary Mantel calls a ghost 
story:
A ghost story always exists on the brink between sense 
and nonsense, between order and chaos, between the rules 
of existence we know and the ones we don’t know yet.63
Their texts rest uncannily upon this cusp of being between one sense of self and
the ghost of the one to come, and this metaphor seems central to their personal
and social predicament. As their notion of being an T  disintegrates, it becomes,
paradoxically, displaced as an existence in their texts as their writing attempts to
keep them on the right side of being human, emphasizing that language, as a
symbol, acts in their place.
63 Hilary Mantel, ‘Ghost Writing’, Guardian Review, 28 July 2007, pp. 4-5.
175
Chapter 5
Buried Alive: Mourning, Gothic Images and Dying Words
The psychoanalytical experience has rediscovered in man the 
imperative of the word as the law that has formed him in its 
image. It manipulates the poetic function of language to give to 
his desire its symbolic mediation ... It is in the gift of speech 
that all the reality of its effects resides; for it is by the way of this 
gift that all reality has come to man and it is by his continued 
act that he maintains it.
Jacques Lacan
Like the half-dead, I hug my last secrets ... I fall, more and 
more into my own silences.
Theodore Roethke
Alzheimer’s disease is worse than death. It leaves bone and flesh 
intact while it erases judgement and memory. I could live with death. 
Death is part o f the cycle of life. It’s like spring, the end o f winter.
But this disease -  it’s unnatural. It’s the end of hope.
Jim Evans
The human problem: having a mind, being a body, is nowhere quite 
so painfully and clearly apparent as in medicine. Painful, because to 
be a body means you must die. Clear, because to have a mind means 
you know this.
Bert Keizer
we need to pay attention not only to an already conventional 
dialectic o f civilization and barbarism ... but also to a phenomenon 
of inner exile, in which whatever melodramatic scenario the spumed 
ego enacts for itself on the cave walls can be seen, under certain 
cultural circumstances, as a potential for acting out.
David Punter
No longer something to be dispatched, mourning becomes more 
amorphous and fluid, more interminable as one might say.
Jacqueline Rose.1
1 Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection, trans. by Alan Sheridan (London: Tavistock, 1977), p. 106; 
Theodore Roethke, 'Old Lady’s Winter Words’ in The Collected Poems o f Theodore Roethke 
(London: Faber & Faber, 1966), p. 103; Jim Evans, cited in Donna Cohen and Carl Eisdorfer The 
Loss ofSelfQAew York and London: W. W. Norton & Co., 1986), p. 60; Bert Keizer, Dancing 
with Mr. D: Notes on Life and Death (London: Black Swan, 1997), p. 1; David Punter, 
‘Introduction: the Ghost o f History’ in A Companion to the Gothic, ed. by David Punter (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2001), pp. viii-xiv (p. xiii); Jacqueline Rose, On Not Being Able to Sleep: 
Psychoanalysis and the Modern World (London: Chatto and Windus, 2005), p. 73. The slow 
psychological dying brought about by the neurological pathology o f Alzheimer’s disease - a kind 
of Gothic premature burial - is the main theme o f this chapter. The epigraphs which introduce this
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Buried Alive
If postmodemity can be said to be framed and characterised by forms of 
fragmentation, division, separation, space, void, incompleteness, remnants, 
repetitions, fracture, circularities, disappearance, ambivalence, ambiguity, depth, 
surface, absence and so on, then it may be observed that these concepts conform 
to the symptoms and effects commonly relied upon in the representation of 
Alzheimer’s disease. The concepts also seem to have contracted a place within the 
genre of the Gothic, in so far as all of them are concerned with the dissolution of 
boundaries, both of self and o f society, as meanings and identities are broken up. 
In particular, the space created by the disappearance of a personal history wrought 
by the disease resonates suggestively with the idea of being buried alive. This is a 
common theme in many Gothic texts, most notably in stories by Edgar Allan Poe 
as the commentary below sets out. Elaborated here in relation to Alzheimer’s 
disease, premature burial refers to the psychological self insidiously disappearing 
into the materiality of the remaining body which comes in turn to be seen as the 
remnant of that self: the surface o f a buried self. Thus the reality of the material 
body seems to encrypt the illusion o f that self and the space created by a lost 
history is one in which a mourning for the death o f a psychological self precedes 
and shapes the transitional space before material death. In fact, as much as in 
representation, Alzheimer’s disease takes you to the very edge of your mind and 
then tips you over that edge into darkness. And it is perhaps at this point that we 
have to accede to Freud’s exhortation that we look to the language o f the poets to 
supplement, as it were, what we may think we know about this space of absence
notion signal emotional and linguistic responses inhabiting the space between the diagnosis of 
Alzheimer’s disease and the eventual loss o f self. The vulnerability o f the Alzheimer subject to the 
possibility o f abuse within this space is also discussed.
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and darkness. This chapter will attempt to explore such a space and the 
psychological issues which arise, for individual, family and wider society alike.
Spaces, and how they are framed in meaning, are the primary themes in 
Catherine Belsey’s illuminating essay ‘Making Space: Perspective Vision and the 
Lacanian Real’. Belsey takes this ‘Real’ as a starting point to consider issues of 
reality and illusion, particularly in the form o f visual art. She argues that the 
perspective of space is crucial to our understanding o f reality and illusion, and 
asserts that ‘Truth exists in culture, at the level of the signifier, in this instance as 
a painting which denotes a building’.2 Architecture and buildings become objects 
of our perspective with their scale and drama as forms that tend to signify power, 
and Belsey tellingly uses Elizabeth Bennet’s first sighting o f Pemberley, in Jane 
Austen’s Pride and Prejudice, to illustrate this point and to begin her explication 
of space, reality and illusion. Her primary argument about architecture and 
buildings is that in so far as they are constructions that seem to speak to us not 
only of history and power, they also enclose emptiness; an emptiness, perhaps, of 
power and sterility which asks to be relieved by interpretation, which in the case 
of Austen’s novel, occurs through the alchemy of romantic love.
This emptiness is invoked in Hilary Mantel’s notion of the ghost story, 
referred to in the previous chapter, as something in-between, a story which has 
spaces between the forms which structure it,‘between sense and nonsense, 
between order and chaos, between the rules o f existence we know and the ones 
we don’t know yet’.3 It is within these spaces, perhaps, which bring to mind 
paralysis or redundancy, that we begin the transformation from fact to artwork 
which gathers to itself the signifiers o f emotional truth. Mantel’s structuring of the
2 Catherine Belsey, ‘Making Space: Perspective Vision and the Lacanian Real’, Textual Practice, 
16 (2002), 31-55 (p. 38).
3 Hilary Mantel, ‘Ghost Writing’, Guardian Review, 28 July 2007, pp. 4-5.
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ghost story indicates that one o f the ways we collide with the Real is through this
form and what we do not know yet may be journeyed towards through the
mysterious genuflections of the Gothic ghost story as it explores ways to write
about non-beings. The space which Mantel’s structured forms surround is, in the
Lacanian Real, ‘the place of the lost o b jec t... impossible to symbolize and
equally impossible to forget’.4 In the psychoanalytic paradigm, this lost object is
created by our abjection into a world o f difference and therefore ‘formed at the
expense of the little human organism that knows no distinctions’.5 But, so argues
the paradigm, once the notion of difference is introduced, desire follows as a form
in which to search and seek out the lost object. The theory seems to owe a good
deal to Aristophanes’ story in Plato’s The Symposium .6 However, the Lacanian
Real, being ‘beyond the signifier and beyond pleasure’,7 can only, it seems, be
attained in death, in annihilation:
To be united with the lost object even if  it were possible, 
would be to surrender our existence as subjects, dissolving 
into the real itself. We need, therefore, to keep our distance.8
If it is in difference that we become subjects then a fall into the Real is when we
dissolve into nothingness, the abjection in reverse of the body. The Alzheimer’s
disease subject seems to be no more than an object, lost in the space of
materiality. But the desire that has a need to seek this Real creates the language
which Susan Sontag takes issue with in Illness as Metaphor. In the instance of
4 Belsey, p. 32.
5 Belsey, p. 35.
6 Plato, The Symposium, trans. by Walter Hamilton (London: Penguin Books, 1951). Plato’s text is 
a discourse on love in its several forms and guises. The text is presented in the form o f a 
conversation between various members o f the Athenian elite, mostly friends o f Plato. 
Aristophanes’ contribution seems a satire on the notion of desire and its origins which involve, at 
the beginning o f creation, a set o f spheres sliced in two by their creator, Zeus, the 
consequence this being that the spheres search for their severed other half throughout their 
existence.
7 Belsey, p. 33.
8 Belsey, p. 33.
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Alzheimer’s, desire has a need to fill this enclosed space with a metaphorical 
language of sorrow, anger, regret, loss, consolation, fear and horror in that 
transitional mourning period between diagnosis and the onset of the worst effects 
of the condition. In a sense, it can be said that Sontag’s argument leads us towards 
burying alive the metaphor, leaving bodies to fall into a void and to resolve 
emotional truths concerning illness and disease by returning them to the brutality 
of fact. The metaphor, for Sontag, may be considered a difference too far, but for 
Lacan it becomes the essence of the psychoanalytic paradigm. And for those 
writing about the disease in a personal sense, or for those who pursue it through 
fiction and other genres, figurative language seems to authenticate the experience 
of this condition.
The desire for the lost object might also be construed as the metaphor for 
the death wish which was once a central motif of the psychoanalytic paradigm. 
Certainly, as Nicholas Royle remarks, the fear of being buried alive is a well 
established ‘literary preoccupation’;9 it is also one of the opening points in 
Freud’s ‘The “Uncanny”’. How the past has become buried is, of course, the 
central preoccupation of psychoanalysis, as it attempts to uncover emotional 
truths between the spaces of language offered up by analysands. However, it is 
the spaces left by the consequences o f Alzheimer’s disease which are the primary 
focus here, as existence is dissolved into the Real in much the same way as the 
Gothic ‘is always on the point of dissolving into something else, as are phantoms 
and spirits’.10
9 Nicholas Royle, The Uncanny (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2003), 
p. 155.
10 David Punter, Gothic Pathologies: The Text, the Body and the Law (Basingstoke and London: 
Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998), p. 200.
As Alzheimer’s disease progresses, it creates in the mind a sense of living 
between two worlds and being driven remorselessly out of one and becoming 
more and more entombed in the other. Earlier chapters have indicated something 
of the relationship between the disease and the discomforting, disorientating and 
fragmented language which often accompanies it. Following diagnosis and the 
early effects of the condition, there appears to be both a literal and a metaphorical 
tmth in the reactions to the disease of Thomas DeBaggio, Jim Evans and Robert 
Davis among others. And if Freud’s exploration o f the sense of the uncanny can 
be read as a way of systematizing the experience of anguish and Julia Kristeva’s 
paradigm of abjection can be read as an experience of the apocalyptic and 
epiphanic, then it seems that in the reactions of those diagnosed with Alzheimer’s 
disease, as well as those who care for such subjects, the deep structures of the 
language of the Gothic can also be read. To begin with, Sherwin Nuland argues 
that:
It is probably a universal teaching of all cultures that putting 
a name to a demon helps to decrease its fearsomeness.
I sometimes wonder whether the real, perhaps culturally 
subconscious, reason that medical pioneers have always 
sought to identify and classify specific diseases is less 
to understand than to beard them ... when we give sickness 
a name, we civilize it - we make it play the game by our rules.11
Naming is an instrumental process and, as Lacan points out in the first of the
epigraphs to this chapter, creates images, and the image of the self being buried
alive by dementia is a fairly common one. But being named as a subject of
Alzheimer’s establishes that the demon is alive and well, establishing a fear of the
potential to kill twice: once psychologically and then materially. The narrator in
Damon Galgut’s novel The Good Doctor exemplifies this hidden fear:
11 Sherwin Nuland, How We Die (London: Chatto and Windus, 1994), p. 105.
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I didn’t see it, I sensed it: a sudden little burst, a flexing 
in the dark. It had a will and life of its own. And in a second 
all my terror was back. Everything I most feared and dreaded, 
all the phantoms of the mind, had drawn together into a knot - 
a presence that had risen out of the dark.12
This is the kind of embedded fear shocked into wakefulness by something
unknown which Shelley and Lovecraft attempt to prise open in their work.
But naming in medicine has established its own law-giving practice, and
as Nuland indicates, provides some certainty that consequential action will follow.
Lacan’s playful psychoanalytic rewriting o f the essence o f the Bible as the
defining law of the Word of God is central to the idea o f postmodern humanness
in that the reality o f life and death is mediated by language. We are speaking
beings and construct in language our narratives o f life and death. There is,
1 ^however, a paradox within ‘the imperative of the word as the law’ and the law 
of naming in medical science and it is this: if  certainty is at the heart of law, then 
it must allow for an absence, what Lacan might call the Real, that speculative 
other side of language, something unknown but ready to come to the surface. The 
certainty of becoming absent and being removed from language with all its 
mediating efforts is what follows being named as a subject o f Alzheimer’s 
disease. Absence may also be recognised within the motifs of the Gothic: for 
example, the unseen virus in the epidemic of death in Poe’s ‘The Masque of the 
Red Death’, written about also, as with Alzheimer’s disease, with the certainty of 
an unreal existence yet to come. But if naming is seen as a civilizing process, 
Alzheimer’s disease is perceived as a kind of death sentence, as Jan Prescott’s 
reaction to her diagnosis indicates:
12 Damon Galgut, The Good Doctor (London: Atlantic Books, 2003), p. 179.
13 Lacan, p. 106.
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A sense of utter helplessness swept over me when the doctor 
said that I probably had Alzheimer’s disease. The very words 
“Alzheimer’s Disease” sounded harsh and unreal. I wanted to 
believe that he was talking about someone else - not me ...
I thought if I didn’t hear the words then I couldn’t have the disease.14
And Joan Didion’s memoir of her reactions to the death of her husband, John
Gregory Dunne, recalls not wanting to believe his death and her emotional
reaction to it as a kind of magical thinking, a way of substituting one form of
language for another in a further avoidance o f reality. She quotes the response of
a mother to the news that her army son has been killed:
T opened the door and I seen the man in the dress greens 
and I knew. I immediately knew. But I thought that if, 
as long as I didn’t let him in, he couldn’t tell me. And 
then it - none of that would’ve happened’.15
It appears that if you do not hear the fact of death, or its approach, it assists with 
the illusion that living seems to need. Didion’s recollection of her experience 
during the year following her husband’s death is focused on how she reacted to 
certain experiences, such as not wanting to get rid of his shoes in case he may 
need them on his return. She is, so to speak, brought up short against these ideas 
of his return, and it is this experience that she calls magical, a desire not only to 
disbelieve the fact of his death but also, paradoxically, a kind of need to re­
awaken him from the dead. Both she and Prescott react to loss in ways that 
display omnipotent thinking: a kind of magic-making. Prescott’s reaction to her 
diagnosis, however, is far from ‘decreasing its fearsomeness’ because this 
particular ‘demon’ refuses to be bearded. Her reaction is structured with a sense 
of shame, which from a psychoanalytic point of view would, paradoxically, be 
seen as a civilizing process. But this is compounded by a feeling o f undergoing a
14 Cohen and Eisdorfer, p. 58.
15 Joan Didion, The Year o f Magical Thinking (London: Harper Perennial, 2006), p. 13.
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terrible trauma, a trauma which seeks to escape the evasion of the truth o f the
disease so as to ensure that her imagined completeness of self remains intact. The
trauma makes her acutely aware of her self. Cathy Caruth describes the pathology
of trauma as an event which:
Consists solely in the structure o f its experience or reception: 
the event is not assimilated or experienced fully at the time, 
but only belatedly, in its repeated possession of the one who 
experiences it. To be traumatized is precisely to be possessed 
by an image or event.16
The words ‘Alzheimer’s disease’ which Prescott hears, but seeks to be deaf to, are
a death sentence to her sense of being somehow complete. She wants to deny it,
but this particular demon infiltrates and then destroys her sense of wholeness and
opens her up to a transformation which will place her in DeBaggio’s parade of
horror. Trauma is experienced as a fragmenting of identity having a profound
effect on the ways in which the self is constructed. The trauma of hearing the
words seems to split Prescott’s oneness into dislocated segments as the self
attempts to defend itself. Within the psychoanalytic paradigm the defensive drive
paradoxically comes up against the Real itself, the fear of dissolving into
nothingness. Prescott, at this early stage o f her condition, is her own witness to
the horror of a disease which seems beyond explanation or rationalization and
which exposes human vulnerability as it encounters such estrangement. Prescott’s
language can be seen to be replete with the demons which cause her body to feel
helpless against an estranging power destined to divorce her from herself and bury
her within. Her attempted defence is a psychic one, the mind taking the primary
defensive role, with the body in a state o f tension, helplessly struggling against
the words she does not want to hear. This reading relies on a construction of
16 Cathy Caruth, ‘Trauma and Experience: Introduction’ in Trauma: Explorations in Memory, ed. 
by Cathy Caruth (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), pp. 4-5.
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Freudian drives which places them at the interface of the inside and the outside; 
hovering in a somewhat ghostly manner between the two, located neither within 
the mind nor the body.
Jim Evans, in the third of the epigraphs which open this chapter, seems to 
predict his future as somewhere between life and death, seeing himself as a kind 
of living corpse, in a manner illustrative of the construction set out above. He, like 
Prescott, indicates an acute awareness of self and sees Alzheimer’s disease as 
robbing him of his self-awareness by removing his history and destroying his 
capacities, thereby abjecting him back to his body which will no longer seem to 
be his own. His despairing cry that the disease gives no hope is underscored by 
Nuland who states that it creates an ‘excruciating cul-de-sac’, an aporia with no 
signs to indicate a way forward. Evans claims the disease undermines a proper 
nature which recedes before its very un-naturalness, and he resents the reality of 
transience, becoming angry, despairing and fearful of the future in much the same 
way as Prescott. Both Evans and Prescott’s reactions to the trauma of diagnosis 
seem to incorporate feelings not only of horror, rage and a kind of shame, but the 
idea that they are being robbed of that capacity which Lacan argues is 
distinctively human. In other words, the loss of the possibility to manipulate 
language with all its poetic and symbolic potential, the opportunity to dwell in the 
imagination, something that Theodore Roethke’s epigraph illustrates, as it 
prefigures Evans, imagining the half-dead and half-alive state as the poet slowly 
falls into his own silences.
17 Nuland, p. 105.
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This lived-in space between life and death is evidenced not only by carers 
but also by psychologists such a Steven Sabat and the late Tom Kitwood.18 They 
argue that the reality of the self, although imprisoned by disease, is still to be 
found within this constructed space. In Julian Barnes’s short story, ‘Appetite’, the 
narrator discusses her husband’s dementia as if  in conversation with another, and 
declares ‘he’ll always be himself, there, underneath, through and through’.19 Here 
a buried self is clearly being suggested. By contrast Kitwood and Sabat advocate 
relating to parts of the former self through the use of focused listening and 
observational skills concentrating on the dislocated, fragmented language and 
behaviour of the Alzheimer subject. This conjuring of aspects of the former self is 
similar to the idea of linking the past to the present through the wraith-like figure 
of the Fetch who is conjured from the past into the present, portending death.20 
This is an idea tellingly used in A. S. Byatt’s story ‘The Pink Ribbon’, when the 
husband is visited by the figure of his wife from earlier years portending her death 
in the present from Alzheimer’s disease.21 To many carers o f those with 
Alzheimer’s disease, the subject seems to have an uncanny likeness to their 
former selves, but only in the sense that they have become a kind o f ghostly 
resemblance to it.
Evans’s judgment about an un-natural nature is echoed in Freud’s short 
essay ‘On Transience’ which was written in response to an invitation from the
18 Steven Sabat, Experience o f Alzheimer’s Disease: Life through a Tangled Veil (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 2001); Tom Kitwood, Dementia Reconsidered (Buckingham: Open 
University Press, 1997). Both these clinical psychologists have investigated the extent to which an 
essential self remains embedded notwithstanding a dislocated and dislocating language, and the 
relationship of that essential self to the language it speaks and hears.
19 Julian Barnes, ‘Appetite’, in The Lemon Tree (London: Picador, 2005), p. 169.
20 Fetch - a word of uncertain origin - refers to the disembodied ghost o f a living person. Fetches 
most commonly appear to friends and relations at the very moment before the death
of those they represent.
21 A. S. Byatt, ‘The Pink Ribbon’, in Looking into Later Life: A Psychoanalytical Approach to 
Depression and Dementia in Old Age, ed. by Rachel Davenhill (London: Kamac Books, 2007), 
pp. 246-268.
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Berlin Goethe Society in 1915.22 Freud was an admirer of the work of Goethe and
in 1930 received the Goethe Prize, the highest literary award in Germany at that
time. It seems the genesis for the subject of the essay arose out of a meeting that
Freud had had with the poet Rainer Maria Rilke and his companion, Lou Andreas-
Salome, a psychoanalyst and writer, in 1913, a year before the outbreak of the
First World War. The essay and its history chime with Freud’s ‘Mourning and
Melancholia’,23 published in 1919, but written earlier in the war. Both works
reflect Freud’s feelings of sadness and despair during a period of considerable
social and economic upheaval and the death of many millions of people, but a
period which also, paradoxically, fostered substantial creativity in his written
work. At the beginning o f this essay, Freud writes that he and his companions
were out walking in the countryside where:
The poet admired the beauty of the scene around us but felt 
no joy in it. He was disturbed by the thought that all this beauty 
was fated to extinction, that it would vanish when winter came, 
like all human beauty and all the beauty and splendour that men 
have created or may create. All that he would otherwise have 
loved and admired seemed to him to be shorn of its worth by the 
transience which was its doom.24
Freud’s response to what he called ‘the proneness to decay’ of all that lives, was
to maintain that Rilke’s attitude could be said to arise from ‘two different
impulses in the mind’. One o f these was Rilke’s despairing reaction, and the other
was to feel that something as beautiful as life, in all its facets, ‘must be able to
25  •persist and to escape all the powers of destruction’. The questions which seem to 
arise out of both impulses are ones that are of central concern to psychoanalysis:
22 Sigmund Freud, ‘On Transience’, in Art and Literature, ed. by Albert Dickson, trans. by James 
Strachey, The Penguin Freud Library, Vol. 14 (London: Penguin Books, 1990), pp. 287-290.
23 Sigmund Freud, ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ in On Metapsychology, ed. by Angela Richards 
trans. by James Strachey, The Penguin Freud Library, Vol. 11 (London: Penguin Books, 1991).
24 Freud, ‘On Transience’, p. 287.
25 Freud, ‘On Transience’, p. 287.
187
how do we attempt to survive dissolving into the Real? How do we struggle
against, or with, a return to death? The first of these questions carries aspects of
mourning which Freud developed further in his later essay on ‘Mourning and
Melancholia’, while the second continues his concerns with the denial of death
and feelings of immortality as he goes on to say:
Mourning over the loss of something that we have loved or 
admired seems so natural to the layman that he regards it as 
self-evident... we possess ... a certain amount of capacity 
to love ... which in the earliest stages of development is 
directed toward our own ego.26
Given that psychoanalytic theory suggests that nothing is lost, only psychically
buried, this love of self presumably remains and, at times of crisis or trauma in the
face of impending loss, is psychologically re-activated, as illustrated in Prescott’s
reaction to the words of her diagnosis. She, Evans and DeBaggio are clearly
emotionally involved in their psychic demise, and their potential extinction seems
to bring images o f decay in its trail. O f course, if  nothing is lost but simply buried,
it presumably has the potential to be re-awakened. In the psychic topography of
Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, images of phantoms and crypts proliferate
and these are the very materials which also flourish, of course, in the Gothic
27genre.
In psychoanalytic terms, Abraham and Torok’s work seeks to provide both 
a meaning for repressed emotional problems and to exorcise these awakened 
phantoms; but the buried self created by Alzheimer’s disease resists this priestly 
approach. Freud’s argument in ‘On Transience’ is that the value of life and nature
26 Freud, ‘On Transience’, pp. 288-289.
27 Nicholas Abraham and Maria Torok, The Shell and the Kernel, edited, translated and with an 
introduction by Nicholas T. Rand (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994). 
Rand writes that ‘The broadest aim o f The Shell and the Kernel is to restore the lines of 
communication with those intimate recesses o f the mind that have for one reason or another 
been denied expression’ (p. 4).
rests within what he calls its ‘scarcity value5, which should increase the 
possibility of enjoyment. However, the transient and transitional time and space 
between the symptoms of Alzheimer's disease appearing and the burying of self- 
consciousness is seen by both Evans and Roethke in much the same way. Both 
begin to show the symptoms o f mourning the loss of themselves and that process 
continues in a different kind of way as the disease makes its inevitable progress.
In that buried state, the Alzheimer subject will often cry out in bewilderment at 
the loss of their self and often physically wander about in ways which suggest 
they are seeking the consciousness o f themselves, reflecting a desire to return 
from the underworld to which they have been confined by the disease. 
Alzheimer's own patient, Augusta D., during a clinical examination, told him 
repeatedly that she had lost herself, and it was following her death that Alzheimer 
described the condition which subsequently came to bear his name.
In a sense Alzheimer's name entombs all those who are diagnosed with 
the condition, as all proper names do according to Royle in his commentary on 
‘The Premature Burial', a short story by Edgar Allan Poe, where the narrator
• 90describes what he thought was his own burial while still alive. However, the 
story turns back on itself as a work o f the imagination by suggesting to the reader 
the drawbacks of a too vivid, excessive and, more tellingly, morbid imagination.30 
The power to think such things, it is being suggested, must be met equally with 
the power to overcome them and so enable one to return to reason - a theme 
pursued by Freud in ‘The “Uncanny"’.31 Poe’s narrator suggests at the beginning
28 Freud, ‘On Transience’, p. 288.
29 Nicholas Royle, p. 145.
30 Edgar Allan Poe, ‘The Premature Burial’ in Selected Tales (London: Penguin Books, 1994), 
pp. 322-336.
31 Sigmund Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’ in Art and Literature ed. by Albert Dickson and trans. by 
James Strachey, Penguin Freud Library, Vol. 14 (London: Penguin Books, 1991), pp. 335-376.
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of his account of his own and other people’s experience of being buried alive, 
which is told in the form of a kind of reportage, that the subject is such that it is 
‘too horrible for the purposes of legitimate fiction’.32 The idea of legitimacy 
returns us to the law and the issue of examination which is at the centre of Freud’s 
essay on ‘Mourning and Melancholia’.
Mourning the Loss of Self-Possession
If Poe’s story relates to a fear of being buried alive presaging the arrival of ghosts
between ‘the boundaries which divide life from death’,33 then ‘Mourning and
Melancholia’ speaks of Freud’s profound despair at the loss of western
enlightenment values during the First World War and the transience and fragility
of all cultures. Ostensibly the paper traces the similarities and differences between
mourning and melancholia, but with ‘On Transience’34 and ‘Our Attitude towards
Death’, ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ struggles to hold the centre against the
ghosts and the influences of the past and their re-appearance in the present and the
future. In the early part of the paper Freud proposes that:
Mourning is regularly the reaction to the loss of a loved person, or to the 
loss of some abstraction which has taken the place of one, such as one’s 
country, liberty, an ideal and so on.
The ghosts that have arrived out of the loss of ideals, liberty and reason and the
necessity to return to them, are essential components of the psychoanalytic
paradigm fashioned and polished within the trauma of the First World War. The
primary distinction that Freud makes between mourning and melancholia is that
32 Poe, p. 322.
33 Poe, p. 322.
34 Freud, ‘On Transience’, pp. 287-290.
35 Sigmund Freud, ‘Our Attitude Towards Death’, in Civilization, Society and Religion, trans. by 
James Strachey, ed. by Albert Dickson, The Penguin Freud Library, Vol. 12 (London: Penguin 
Books, 1991), pp. 77-89. The essay argues that ‘hi the unconscious everyone o f us is convinced of 
his own immortality’ (p. 77), but in relation to other people’s death, from primeval man to the 
present, we construct the notion of spirits to accommodate loss.
06 Freud, ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, pp. 245-268.
37 Freud, ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, p. 252.
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mourning is a conscious emotional piece of work which has a beginning, middle 
and an end so that at its conclusion those who have mourned a loss have regained 
their emotional equilibrium once more. Melancholia, on the other hand, is 
pathological in that it has unconscious elements that help sustain the relationship 
with the dead object, a kind of unwillingness to shake off the ghosts of the past 
and so retain some emotional contact with them for reasons which need to be 
examined if that stasis is to be relieved or removed.
The work of mourning, it seems, is normal and in the end can be driven 
away with the mourner returned to a state o f normality; melancholia, by contrast, 
suggests some blind identification with ghosts as a way of living, as it were, with
n o
what Freud terms The shadow o f the object’. However, where mourning comes 
to an end followed by an emotional rapprochement, it indicates that we can live 
without the ghosts of the past. But in practice, as the work of Abraham and Torok 
suggests, to be a subject in difference means continuously to be haunted and to be 
able to accommodate such ghosts. It seems clear, from the various remarks of 
Alzheimer’s disease subjects quoted elsewhere in this and earlier chapters, that 
they are only too conscious of death as the absent presence which stalks them in 
the transitional space between diagnosis and the onset of the worst features of the 
disease. In fact, the Alzheimer subject deals not so much with the taboo of death 
as with the taboo of dying, being held, as it were, on the threshold o f death. James 
Thomas puts it this way:
No theory of medicine can explain what is happening to me.
Every few months I sense another piece of me is missing.
My life ... m yself... are falling apart. I can only think
38 Freud, ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, p. 258.
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half-thoughts now. Someday I may wake up and not think
at a l l ... not know who I am. Most people expect to die some day,
but who ever expected to lose their self first.
Thomas sees his psychological self slowly disappearing into his body and his
sense of himself seems to be breaking into bits, but do the pieces fade away or do
they fill and expand the space of the body? The narrator o f J. B em lefs novel, Out
o f Mind, Maarten, subject to Alzheimer’s, states:
No way back, no way forward. Fill this space more and 
more. (Breathe as little as possible, therefore, so as not 
to expand even more in the emptiness around me.) 40
The speaker seems to see himself in a state of aporia, but in danger o f filling up
his inner space with nothingness. Putting the last sentence into parenthesis seems
to emphasise Maarten’s desire not to expand because as the story goes on the
words get less and less. Both Thomas and B em lef s narrator see no way out of
their predicament and no opportunity to re-arrange or re-transcribe their
problematic situation. Clearly, from Thomas’s point of view, the disease has
created within him something strange and unfamiliar, and he has been uprooted
from his sense of self and reconfigured into ‘half-thoughts’. So the mourning of
these subjects for themselves inevitably entails a language of loss and, as the
sense of their ideal wholeness is undermined by the disease, that language speaks
out of the body. Moreover, the sense o f loss of the Alzheimer subject is
exacerbated by a search for the lost self: those pieces which Thomas says he is
losing and which seem to elicit the frustration and poignancy in his language as
the image he has of himself begins to fragment.
Darian Leader represents this in a psychoanalytic paradigm by suggesting
it is a depressive position. It is:
39 Cohen and Eisdorfer, p. 22. The authors quote a patient, James Thomas, writing a year after his 
diagnosis.
40 J. Bemlef, Out o f Mind (London: Faber and Faber, 1989), p. 113.
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One linked to the destruction of the Ego and one linked to pining, 
reparation and the wish for the whole and complete ob ject... 
there is the fragmented state of the body and then there is the 
wholeness promised by the image.41
Leader argues a theoretical point of view concerning a notion of identity and how
we only sense wholeness through an image of ourselves, which is reminiscent of
Lacan’s mirror stage when the child perceives the reflection of its body as whole
and mistakes it for a psychological sense of oneness. However, there is an inverse
to this youthful illusion when old age arrives, as Kathleen Woodward points out:
As we age we increasingly separate what we take to be our 
real selves from our bodies. We say that our real selves - 
that is our youthful selves - are hidden inside our bodies.
Our bodies are old, we are not. Old age can thus be described 
as a state in which the body is in opposition to the self, and 
we are alienated from our bodies. This is a common psychological 
truth.42
Both Leader and Woodward argue that mirror images at either end of the age 
spectrum establish and create illusions about the self. However, in old age the 
elderly recognise themselves in the other and are, as Woodward points out, 
‘compelled to acknowledge ... the other which has, as it were, installed itself in 
our body’.43 But the image of wholeness is seemingly transformed by the disease 
and the representation becomes one o f being less than human: creating, as it were, 
something of the posthuman.
So in the period between the diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease and the 
inevitable decline into its dislocating effects, a space exists within which the 
experience of the subject invariably seems like something else. Unsurprisingly, 
the language of metaphor and simile is often used in such instances as when the
41 Darian Leader, Freud’s Footnotes (London: Faber and Faber, 2000), p. 201.
42 Kathleen Woodward, ‘The Mirror Stage o f Old Age’ in Memory and Desire, ed. by Kathleen 
Woodward and Murray M. Schwartz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), pp. 97-113 
(p. 104).
4 Woodward, p. 104.
subject is attempting to understand this transformation of self while 
simultaneously trying to keep in touch with a fading memory of both that self and 
others. In the epigraphs which open this chapter, for example, both Evans and 
Roethke resort to the use of simile as a means of describing this mutation and the 
prospect of death. The disease and the prospect o f death put their experience at 
the disposal of the mourning process as their dying selves begin to grieve over 
their forthcoming demise. In a sense, one form o f death precedes the other and the 
passing of the self, uncannily, becomes a substitute during this transitional period 
for the other physical death. The space occupied by Alzheimer’s disease is a space 
of suspension, the subject being both dead and alive, or neither dead nor alive, 
and a space, also, within which mourning and, maybe, reconciliation occur.
Donald W. Winnicott’s theoretical work on object-relations opens up what 
he called an ‘intermediate area’: spaces and stages in suspension in a child’s 
development. These areas, he argues, are times for reconciling the various stages 
of maturation, in a way tracing maturational developments from one stage to 
another. Transitional objects such as toys, play and stories are taken gradually into 
the child’s psyche and are forms of introjection which become part of their self- 
fashioning processes and create a sense o f difference from others. All of which, 
according to Winnicott, enables the child to ‘link with the past and with the 
future’.44 This process of self-fashioning and differentiation, forming a sense of 
self and a belonging to self in tandem with an appreciation of being different from 
others, may also be understood in relation to Alzheimer’s disease. In other words, 
the time between diagnosis and the appearance of the worst features of the 
condition, can also be seen as an ‘intermediate area’. In the child’s development,
44 Donald W. Winnicott, Playing and Reality (London: Penguin Books, 1964), p. xii.
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Winnicott states, ‘the infant’s capacity to recognise the object as “not me”’45 is a
crucial stage in the differentiation between it and the external environment in its
becoming world. He also states that:
The object represents the infant’s transition from a state 
of being merged with the mother to a state of being in relation 
to the mother as something outside and separate 46
Winnicott first wrote about transitional objects in 1951 and Julia Kristeva’s ideas
about abjection were published some thirty-two years later. Her much later
concerns about the effects of this differentiation and its power were only partially
conceptualised by Winnicott when he states that objects are transitional, but assist
as ‘a defence against anxiety, especially anxiety of a depressive type’.47
The power of loss, of abjection and the establishment of a lack and its effects
upon the psyche and the body do not seem to hold the same terror for Winnicott
as they do for Kristeva. However, the ‘not m e’ process within the ‘intermediate
area’ for Alzheimer subjects seems to be at the centre of their mourning for a lost
self. Any understanding of wholeness in Alzheimer disease subjects bifurcates
what they consider to be the real self as it gets buried by the condition. The
objects which seem to act against the anxiety of this burial process are ones of
repetition and obsession as described by Davis and others, but this merging back
into the body, and being buried within it, is an experience that cannot be
prevented by objects of any kind, as neurology outwits psychology.
When Auguste D. says she is lost, she not only expresses the paradox of
her sense of subjectivity but also acts out the loss in her behaviour. The narrator in
45 Winnicott, p. 2.
46 Winnicott, p. 17.
47 Winnicott, p. 4.
195
Samuel Beckett’s The Unnamable declares: ‘Where I am there is no one but me
A Q
who am not’. Here, as Gabriele Schwab points out:
Is not only the expression of a paradoxical subjectivity beyond 
the notion of a self, [but] also the expression of a voice that is 
conscious of the paradoxes of its own performance ... destroying 
our ease with such basic categories as life, death, time, language, 
and other.49
Auguste D. has, as others in a similar position, an awareness of herself in a
predicament of loss, but it is an awareness which will inevitably fade during this
‘intermediate’ phase as she and they are propelled into a space of unbecoming.
They all seem to express a fear of the abject:
The place of the abject is where meaning collapses, the place 
where I am not. The abject threatens life, it must be radically 
excluded from the place of the living subject, propelled away 
from the body and deposited on the other side of an imaginary 
border which separates the self from that which threatens the self.50
For the Alzheimer subject, however, whatever is left in the mind is slowly
deposited into the body. But, rather like the child in Winnicott’s theoretical space,
there appears to be a need for transitional objects to enable Alzheimer subjects to
cope with the anxiety of becoming separated from themselves, and such objects
tend to be expressions of what may be described as mourning, particularly in
relation to repetitious behaviour. The disease and the language used to describe it
create the image of the dying subject: the psychological death. If denial, say in the
form of Didion’s ‘magical thinking’, is performed in terms of repetitious and
obsessive behaviour, it seems also to be an illustration o f mourning and a way of
adapting to the loss of oneself. In The Loss o f  S e lf Cohen and Eisdorfer record the
response of a patient recently diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease:
48 Samuel Beckett, The Unnamable (New York: Grove, 1958), p. 94.
49 Gabriele Schwab, ‘The Intermediate Area between Life and Death’, in Memory and Desire, 
ed. by Kathleen Woodward and Murray M. Schwartz, pp. 205-217 (p. 206).
50 Barbara Creed, Horror and the Monstrous Feminine: an Imaginary Abjection (London: 
Routledge, 1993), p. 27.
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One patient, a physician, told us that he wanted to develop 
“the courage to make a series o f silent retreats”. He spoke of 
his need to gain power over his disease and to die a little each day 
without losing the desire to live.51
This patient’s effort to transcend the liminal dimensions of Alzheimer’s disease
and survive in the living world is an attitude welcomed by the authors and one
they adopt in providing a context to support families who care for those with the
condition.
O f course, immortality and death can only be imagined and being out of
one’s mind, that feeling of not being where one thinks one ought to be, is a
repetitious thought in the early to middle stages of dementia and one very familiar
to the Alzheimer subject, its refrain haunting the subject’s imagination. Thomas
DeBaggio asks the question of his imagination in this way:
How do you express the true nature of tears in words?
How do you define the limits of evil bom of a secret disease?
These thoughts lie silently on my mind and work their way 
through my body.
For DeBaggio, evil arises out o f secrets which seem to be buried within the body.
Their revelation spells out his psychological demise as language begins to lose its
mediating effects; and this loss, as language seeps away into the body, relates to
another loss upon which DeBaggio also remarks:
Getting used to the idea of dying is difficult, emotionally and 
physically, but what awaits me is losing the idea of dying and 
that is incomprehensible and at the same time may be liberating.53
To be conscious of your future demise is central to the condition of being human;
it is a realisation which guides the very forms of life which differentiate
humankind from the rest of the animal world. When that awareness fades and
disappears and the Alzheimer subject is left without the knowledge of their future
51 Cohen and Eisdorfer, p. 65.
52 Thomas DeBaggio, Losing my Mind (New York: The Free Press, 2002), p. 9.
53 DeBaggio, p. 18.
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fate, does it liberate the subject, or does it put the subject outside of human nature, 
reduced to an animalism suggestive of the Gothic? As Neil Badmington’s 
epigraph to Chapter 1 points out, it is Descartes’ philosophy which distinguishes 
mind and body, with the former enabling us ‘to tell the difference between the 
human and the non-human’.54 But where language seeps away into the body, it 
would seem to find the internal grave of the lost self as it filters and fades into that 
nothingness. The remnant which is left behind suggestively searches for itself, 
striking, as it were, the very chimes of John Donne’s bell with its vivid realisation 
of mortality:
any man’s death diminishes me, because I am involved in 
mankind, and therefore never send to know for whom the bell 
tolls; it tolls for thee.55
The Alzheimer subject, located within the ‘intermediate area’, is split between
being in the living world and existing in the world of the dying. David Shenlc
reports that it is usually at this stage that the subject is most likely to make what
he calls ‘the most emotionally healthy choice’ of being in denial.56 Nicolas
Abraham’s essay, ‘The Illness o f Mourning and the Fantasy of the Exquisite
Corpse’, focuses on this matter from a psychoanalytic point of view. He identifies
various forms of unconscious motivational denials within the psychoanalytic
paradigm and states that his clinical experience suggests that one such form
occurs in the process of mourning. He maintains that following the death of
someone close, the subject often reports a sharpened sexual appetite, but the sense
54 Neil Badmington, ‘Introduction: Approaching Posthumanism’, in Posthumanism, ed. by 
Neil Badmington (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000), pp. 1-10 (p. 3).
55 John Donne, Selections from 'Divine Poems Sermons, ‘Devotions and Prayers, ed. and 
introduced by John Booty, in the Classics o f Western Spirituality (Paulist Press: New York, 
1990), p. 272. Donne’s well known lines are from a Devotion, a meditation on the Divine 
and its relationship to humankind. The theme of death in the particular moves on to death in 
general, to give emphasis to the notion o f the universality o f humanity as sewn together by death 
wrought by the Divine.
56 David Shenk, the forgetting: Understanding Alzheimer’s: A Biography o f a Disease (London: 
Harper Collins, 2002), p. 115.
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of such a bodily excitation at a time of mourning creates a feeling o f deep shame
which is consequently repressed. Abraham writes:
The illness of mourning does not result, as might appear, 
from the affliction caused by the objectal loss itself, but rather 
from the feeling of an irreparable crime: the crime of having been 
overcome with desire, o f having been surprised by an overflow 
of libido at the least appropriate moment, when it would behove us 
to be grieved in despair.57
Nicholas T. Rand, Abraham and Torok’s editor, comments that this desire
focuses:
On the psychological weight of unwanted, shameful, or 
untoward reality and our tendency to isolate painful realities ...
This removal of an unbearable reality and its confinement 
to an inaccessible region of the psyche is what Torok calls ...
“preservative repression”.58
It would appear from these representations, that those with Alzheimer’s disease
desire to hold on to and preserve as much of themselves as is possible for as long
as possible, poised at the margin between awareness and denial and in a space
which secretes that awareness into another part of the psyche, at least for a period
of time.
With the ‘intermediate area’ signified by mourning and the ‘not me’ phase 
of losing a sense of self-possession, it is also a period when the realisation of what 
its outcome is to be can encourage thoughts of suicide. DeBaggio, Evans, Prescott 
and Thomas structure an understandable feeling of depression about their 
situation, and this mood is a common precursor to thoughts of suicide and the 
possibility of its realisation. In so far as postmodern culture can be characterised 
by a loosening of bonds between the individual and society through a greater 
emphasis on social mobility and changing family structures to meet the needs of a
57Abraham and Torok, p. 110.
58 Nicholas T. Rand, in Abraham and Torok, p. 102.
post-industrial capitalist system, it would seem to create an increase in
normlessness and a sense of helplessness which underlie issues of personal and
family stress. This is clearly a broad sociological generalization and not an
unfamiliar political argument, but earlier analyses about the status o f and attitudes
towards the elderly as a group, particularly the dependent elderly, signify this to
be a matter of considerable concern, as witnessed by any number of official
reports in recent years from both national and devolved governments and a variety
of voluntary organisations acting as a voice for the elderly such as Age Concern
and the Alzheimer’s Society. At best these reports express disappointment, and at
worst horror at the way the elderly and the dependent elderly are treated by a
whole cluster of service providers. Derek Beeston, who has compiled a report
entitled Older People and Suicide, comments on how the devaluation of the
elderly can have serious effects upon their mental health and states that:
Syndromatic factors refer to the presence of a cluster of 
symptoms strongly related to suicide ... these include: 
depression accompanied by anxiety, tension, agitation, 
guilt and dependency; rigidity, impulsiveness and isolation; 
changes in sleep and eating habits.59
Such a concentration of symptoms is often seen as simply being age-related and
therefore somehow acceptable, but how the issues of old age are reported will, as
Beeston argues, write its effects into culture more generally by demonstrating the
ambivalences and ambiguities about older people which it contains. Kitwood
underlines these points when he argues that:
Many cultures have shown a tendency to depersonalize those 
who have some form of serious disability, whether of a physical 
or psychological kind. A consensus is created, established in 
tradition and embedded in social practices, that those affected 
are not real persons.60
59 Derek Beeston, Older People and Suicide Centre for Ageing and Mental 
Health, Staffordshire University, December 2006), p. 16.
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Generally speaking such groups are powerless and therefore liable to be
particularly devalued. Kitwood further argues that the United Kingdom is
‘permeated by an ageism which categorises older people as incompetent, ugly and
burdensome’,61 all suggesting a form o f dehumanisation or what may, in the
context of this thesis, be termed as a kind of Gothic posthumanism. Beeston
points out that one of the consequences of this devaluation is that ‘people over the
age of sixty-five are more successful than any other age group at taking their own
lives’.62 This age group, it appears, are not only more successful at growing older
than those in any other decade, they are clearly more efficient at killing
themselves than any other age group too. Beeston reports that ‘in the general
population the ratio of suicide attempts to completed suicides is approximately
15:1’; among the elderly, however, ‘this ratio is approximately 4:l ’.63 People
diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease, as one study carried out in 2002 points out,
are at more of a risk of a suicide attempt in ‘the less severe stage of the disease’,64
and Beeston agrees with this assessment:
It may be the case that Dementia is a risk factor for suicide 
in older people early in the course o f the disease, when 
insight and the ability to plan and act are still present.
Later in the course of Dementia the presence of the disease 
may be protective insofar as insight may be lost.65
As Alzheimer’s disease begins to erode any sense of self-regard, the subject may
not wish to continue living in the face of such depletion. Christopher Manthrop
writes that the condition is so ‘frightening for people to encounter ... it frequently
60 Tom Kitwood, Dementia Reconsidered: The Person Comes First (Buckingham: Open 
University Press, 1997), p. 12.
61 Kitwood, p. 12.
62 Beeston, p. 10.
63 Beeston, p. 10.
64 Yoram Barak and Dov Aizenberg, ‘Suicide amongst Alzheimer’s Disease Patients: a Ten-Year 
Survey’, Dementia and Geriatric Cognitive Disorders, 14 (2002), pp. 101-103 (p. 103).
65 Beeston, p. 151.
terrifies those undergoing its early stages [to the extent that]... dementia has a 
higher suicide rate than any other mental illness’.66 The name and the diagnosis 
frame the subject’s reality, supporting the identity which has been, unwelcomely, 
given to him or her. The name stays the same as identity changes and, in a sense, 
a surplus of self occurs which cannot be relieved; so it is carried about - inside, a 
constant and palpable absence. This diminishing experience echoes Roethke’s 
simile of being half-alive and half-dead, creating, as it were, a kind of hybrid. 
Nuland cites the Roman orator Seneca concerning the loss of mental faculties and 
suicide:
I will not relinquish old age if  it leaves my better part intact.
But if it begins to shake my mind, if  it destroys its faculties 
one by one, if it leaves me not life but breath, I will depart from 
the putrid or tottering edifice ... I know that if  I must suffer 
without hope of relief, I will depart.67
Seneca sees his mind as his better half, but if it should begin to erode he sees
being half-alive as no life at all and indicates he is prepared to destroy himself if
such a situation should arise. For Seneca, as for others, the idea of
depersonalisation, of un-becoming, is not something he feels he can tolerate. The
insidious nature of this loss of self, becoming less and less of a recognisable
human being, was not something that Seneca felt could be sustained. Depression,
as a precursor to attempted or successful suicide, may, of course, be remediable,
but if  it is a reaction to a condition which will kill you in the end, it could be
argued to be a rational response.
66 Christopher Manthrop, ‘Living in Fear of the Kindness of Strangers’, Guardian, 13 December 
2006 (Society section), p. 6.
67 Nuland, p. 151.
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Mourning, Melancholia and Alzheimer’s Disease
By calling mourning an illness, Abraham radically departs from Freud’s view that
it is a common and understandable emotional response to the death of another
who is dear to the mourner. But if such a loss is a traumatic event it seems
psychologically unlikely that the mourner can return to an integrated and
complete self, to make a return to what we might be called a ‘normal self. Freud
sees the emotional work involved as having a beginning, middle and, most
importantly, an end which enables mourners to return to being themselves.
However, by claiming that the mourning process is an illness, Abraham
designates it as a pathological psychic problem and, therefore, something to be
cured only through the psychoanalytic method. It is melancholia which Freud sees
as a problem needing to be explored through these methods, but as James
Strachey points out:
In very early days (probably in January 1895) Freud had sent 
Fliess an elaborate attempt at explaining melancholia ...
In purely neurological terms ... this attempt was not particularly 
fruitful, but it was soon replaced by a psychological approach 
to the subject.68
Eventually, in ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, Freud draws a comparison between
what he viewed as the two psychological processes:
Mourning is regularly the reaction to the loss of a loved person, 
or to the loss of some abstraction which has taken the place of one, 
such as one’s country, liberty, an ideal, and so on. In some people 
the same influences produce melancholia instead of mourning and 
we consequently suspect them of a pathological disposition ... 
although mourning involves grave departures from the normal attitude 
to life, it never occurs to us to regard it as a pathological condition 
and to refer it to medical treatment. We rely on its being 
overcome after a certain lapse of time, and we look upon 
any interference with it as useless or even harmful.69
68 Editor’s note to ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, p. 248.
69 Freud, ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, 1991, p. 252.
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From Freud’s point of view, mourning is a process when, for a period of time, the
ego devotes itself entirely to the painful feelings related to loss. Mourning is a
private experience and it can be no other: it is a kind of narcissism which
eventually releases itself back into the public world to relate to new objects of
interest. The loss of an abstract idea, such as a country, suggests Freud’s
preoccupation at that time with the tragedies of the First World War. Freud argues
that the characteristics of the mourning process are a loss of interest in others and
the outside world, and an inability to adapt to changed circumstance.
Anna Aragno, in a contemporary account of her reaction to a personal
loss, relates to this argument and views it as a traumatic and transforming
experience, one that can change the mourner:
It is, however, the personal encounter with death and its severance 
of a cherished relationship that hurtles us into an adaptive crisis 
from which we cannot emerge but transformed.70
Aragno views the mourning process as having an inherently potential opportunity
to be arrived at out of loss, but like Freud also suggests its other and darker side
which creates obsessive and repetitive behaviour, denial and avoidance and
displacement activities. The issues at stake in these emotional responses to loss
are, of course, ones of identity. Aragno, herself a psychoanalyst, declares that:
The predominance of ambivalence and hostile reproach turned 
against the self in [melancholia] precludes the smooth transition 
from object cathexis to identification.71
Freud, as Aragno acknowledges, is the father o f this notion of melancholia, but
she sees it within the relatively new diagnosis of depression rather than the much
older melancholic paradigm. Freud puts it this way:
70 Anna Aragno, ‘ Transforming Mourning: a New Psychoanalytic Perspective’, in Death and
Endings, eds. by Brent Willock, Lori C. Bohm and Rebecca Curtis (London: Routledge, 2007), 
pp. 21-41 (p. 21).
1 Anna Aragno, p. 24.
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The melancholic displays something else besides which is lacking 
in mourning - an extraordinary diminution in his self-regard, 
an impoverishment of his ego on a grand scale. In mourning 
it is the world which has become poor and empty; in melancholia 
it is the ego itself.72
It has already been noted that denial and avoidance can be features in the response
to the diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease when awareness of the effects of the
condition are well known, or explained for the first time; or they may arise at a
later stage as the disease progresses. Denial and avoidance are not dissimilar to
the early responses in the mourning process when disbelief characterises the
initial response to the death of someone very close. Bodily responses such as
weeping, moaning, restless yearning for the person who is dead later give way to
anger, blame, anxiety and so on.
With Alzheimer subjects this cluster of responses may well be traced into
a kind of melancholia as they lose their sense of self. DeBaggio, Evans, Prescott
and Thomas all seem to indicate in their responses a fear for the loss of their
reason as well as feelings of shame, anger, anxiety and restlessness about
themselves akin to both processes o f mourning and melancholia. In their personal
response to Alzheimer’s disease, they seem to reflect Aragno’s view on how
identity is affected by loss:
Identity ... is in disarray, the self depleted and deprived of familiar 
narcissistic comforts and sustenance. Suddenly, the self-with-other 
identity has been supplanted by a self that is without. Initially, and 
for a long time, we are defined by what we have lo s t ... Neither what 
we were, nor yet what we will become, we hover uncomfortably 
in the disintegrative space of liminality.73
For them, and many others who have the condition of Alzheimer’s, it seems that
reason is both a separate and an integral part of each of them, and its potential
72 Freud, ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, p. 254.
73 Aragno, p. 35.
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absence is reconfigured in a variety of ways in their language as they, uniquely,
experience its insidious loss as a kind of vanishing. And because experience is
defined and influenced by language which organises it around the social
constructs of loss, those subjects who have ‘vanished’ continue to demonstrate
some of the features of mourning and melancholia.
Absence, it seems, defines us. Nuland, for example, in writing about
Alzheimer’s disease, cites the 1838 text of Jean Etienne Esquirol’s Des Maladies
Mentales, concerning the behaviour of patients suffering from dementia. Nuland
argues that the French physician’s description of the clinical course of his
patient’s behaviour can be seen as much in the twentieth century as in the
nineteenth. Esquirol is quoted as stating that his patients:
Rejoice little at the pleasures which are procured for them.
What is passing around them, no longer awakens interest 
[and they cannot connect] with any hope. They are irascible 
[and] their anger ... is only of a moment’s duration ... some 
are constantly walking about as if seeking something they 
do not find ... words succeed words.74
In considering the history of dementia, Nuland also cites James Prichard, a noted
English physician of the period, whose 1835 text, A Treatise on Insanity, argues
that there are, in the clinical course of dementia, ‘several degrees of incoherence’
which include impaired memory, irrationality, incomprehension and a loss of
reasoning power.75 Clearly these are patients who are at the latter end of the
disease, but who continue to display a kind of searching for their lost selves; but,
as Nuland points out, the language used by Esquirol and Prichard will be just as
familiar to those who practice within psychiatry today.
74 Nuland, pp. 109-110.
75 Nuland, p. 109.
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Such language speaks of ghosts, the loss of a self to be searched for
restlessly in a quest to be released from a kind of claustrophobia. Modernism is,
as David Punter argues:
... [a] movement of the mind that seeks to exorcise the ghost, 
to clean out the house, ruined though it may be, and assert 
the possibility of a life that is not haunted as it situates itself 
resolutely in a present that strains towards the future.76
But then postmodernism subverts it by its own assertion which declares that life is
so full of fragments, dislocations and remnants, that ghosts will be with us in our
mortal existence, particularly when forms of mental distress accompany so many
events in our lives. The Gothic speaks of crypts, ghosts, phantoms and demons,
and all such linguistic forms play their part in our cultural practices of meaning
and all suggest that there is no sure foundation, only different kinds of distortion.
Gothic ideas, encapsulated within a literary genre, may well have been understood
at one time as a kind of escape from social concerns, but as Punter argues:
Gothic was, from its very inception, a form that related very closely 
to issues of national assertion and social organisation, and which, 
on occasion, could ‘take the stage’ in foregrounding social issues
77and in forming social consciousness.
Social concerns, of course, can create a plague of images and a terror o f 
repetition, which are the very materials o f the Gothic and which can be argued to 
constitute the subtexts of several official reports which follow, all dealing with the 
condition of the elderly within contemporary culture.
Exclusion and being Buried Alive
If Enlightenment values can be seen as inscribing the administrative and legal 
regulation of official and semi-official documents relating to the health and
76 Punter, ‘The Ghost of History’(2001), p. ix.
77 Punter, ‘The Ghost of History’(2001), p. xi.
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welfare of an older, and apparently virtuous, generation, they also describe what
Punter calls a Gothic which:
Has come to serve as a kind of cultural threshold, or as a 
repertoire of images that fatally undercut the ‘verbal compact’ 
on which, among other things, the modem state rests.78
The Audit Commission report of 2000 and that in 2007 o f its successor
organisation, the National Audit Office, both critically evaluate the shortcomings
of the modem state’s institutional practices and provision of health and social care
services for the elderly mentally dependent.79 Adding to these concerns the
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights proceedings on the human
rights of older people being treated and cared for in the National Health Service
and other services, states that ‘There are concerns about poor treatment, neglect,
abuse and discrimination’ and considers ‘that an entire culture change is
needed’.80
Neglect, abuse and discrimination underline Beeston’s points about how 
the elderly and the vulnerably dependent are devalued and put to the margins in 
contemporary cultural practices, resulting in depression and possible thoughts of 
suicide. Examples provided to the Joint Committee of the ways in which an older 
and generally dependent group of people are devalued suggest a proliferating 
repertoire of images which subvert the Enlightenment values of our twenty-first- 
century state. Furthermore, these publicly announced anxieties by the Committee 
about the abuse of the elderly sick, infirm and demented, underline the 
psychological loss of self generated by these types of oppression. Certainly such 
images test enlightened attitudes. They attack and undermine perceived values of
78 Punter, p. xiv.
19 forget me not (Audit Commission: London, 2000); Improving Services and Support for People 
with Dementia (National Audit Office: London, 2007).
%0The Human Rights o f Older People in Healthcare (London: The Stationary Office, 2007), p. 3.
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a civilized national identity, with its incorporated progressive welfare aspirations
and, suggestively, they haunt the myths of progress by burying this oppressed
demographic alive. Buildings house the elderly demented subject, and the space
within can emphasise their sense of loss and emptiness. The abuse of older people
clearly does not attract as much attention as the abuse of children; in fact it is a
hidden problem:
Reporting on elder abuse in 2004, the House of Commons’
Health Committee found that abuse of older people was a 
hidden, and often ignored, problem in society, and was a 
violation of their Human Rights. It concluded that, unlike 
child abuse, whose profile had been dramatically raised in 
the past few years, abuse of older people remained hidden.81
The images of such a group suggest dissolution, instability and fragmentation
which clearly challenge the idea of the integrity o f the human subject and
consequently symbolise the darker side of progress. Perhaps, too, the reports
reflect an introspective modem state which looks, as it were through Caliban’s
mirror, to see only the darkness within. Certainly those responsible for elder abuse
in contemporary society appear to pay no heed to Donne’s exhortation cited
earlier, or could it be that being faced with the void in the Alzheimer subject, they
see only their own nothingness?
The condition of Alzheimer’s disease in the elderly creates a void which
excites a desire in others to seek a response which cannot be made, thus exposing
the essential vulnerability of the subject. The ‘dead’ cannot be brought back to life
by magical thinking, and this mirroring of non-existence suggestively creates in
those who are supposed to care for and understand the demented, a sense of
fmstration acted out in ways which are heavily criticised by the Joint Committee.
Freud argues that:
81 The Human Rights o f Older People in Healthcare, p. 11.
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We have recognised our mental apparatus as being first 
and foremost a device designed for mastering excitations 
which would otherwise be felt as distressing or would have 
pathogenic effects.82
Echoing Herbert Spencer’s nineteenth-century argument about the mind’s primary 
task, Freud visualises the mind as a piece o f machinery designed to control the 
excitations of the body, to understand and delay its needs. The Joint Committee 
makes no reference to the possible causes for abusing the elderly buried 
psychologically within their dementia, other than the lack of adequate and 
appropriate training of staff.
But Freud, in quoting Heine about the beginning o f creation, might offer 
up a clue: God is imagined as saying: ‘Illness was no doubt the first cause of the 
whole urge to create. By creating, I could recover; by creating I became 
healthy’.83 If neither the carer, nor the Alzheimer subject, is able to establish or 
create their sense of self through the mirror o f the other, then it seems quite 
possible to feel under threat and to respond with aggression.84 Punter’s remarks 
quoted above encapsulate this idea, and the Audit Commission and Joint 
Committee’s reports are, arguably, part of what he calls ‘the conventional 
dialectic of civilization and barbarism’. Moreover, the Joint Committee’s report 
exemplifies what he describes as a ‘phenomenon of inner exile’ demonstrated in
82 Sigmund Freud, ‘On Narcissism’ in On Metapsychology, pp. 65-97 (p. 79).
83 Freud, ‘On Narcissism’, p. 85.
84 The narrator of Michael Ignatieff s novel Scar Tissue refers to differential qualities of 
caring in the Home where his mother, diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease, is a resident. He 
distinguishes between carers and nurses who have a ‘secret capacity’ or ‘the gift’ o f ‘an 
intuitive natural tenderness’ to assist such vulnerable and difficult residents, and those who 
‘are just doing a job’. The former, he argues, ‘know how to feel the pain o f their patients’ and 
not to be frightened of it whereas the latter have to keep such pain ‘at a distance’. The narrator 
claims that those who have a ‘natural intuition’ could ‘hear the messages my mother tapped out 
through the walls of her prison’. The metaphor of imprisonment can, it seems, only be 
understood and responded to if carers have this gift. Distinguishing the capacity to care in this 
way emphasises the propensity to mental and physical abuse by those who cannot empathise 
with the pain of that imprisonment. Ignatieff, Scar Tissue (London: Chatto and
Windus, 1993), p. 110.
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the neglect, abuse and discrimination of the elderly demented - a condition which 
buries them alive. To emphasise this point Punter also points out that 
‘representations do not “hold” in the cultural psyche unless they find an 
answering response’.85
If the Gothic of the eighteenth century signified a lack of reason, morality 
and beauty, it ‘resonates as much with anxieties and fears concerning the crises 
and changes in the present as with any terrors of the past’.86 It can be argued that 
these various official reports are indicative o f a contemporary crisis of reason and 
morality, but as Scott Brewster indicates in citing Derrida, ‘madness can be
o n
thought within reason, but only by questioning, or thinking against, reason’.
This opposition to alienation, within and against, may well be an element 
involved in the various forms of abuse reported by the Joint Committee, and such 
a list of shortcomings in care indicates a lack of touch and understanding of the 
other. It is likely that the elemental behaviour of Alzheimer subjects at the latter 
end of their condition might well provoke fear in carers resulting in abuse because 
the subject, existing within a mature body, seems well beyond reason. The 
writings of DeBaggio and others in a similar situation are examples of minds 
dying, but still working to find some kind o f reason for their predicament; but as 
Jacqueline Rose points out ‘there is ... no rhyme or reason to death’.88
However, the forms of conduct by carers reported to the Joint Committee 
might well be considered to be a type of mourning - mourning for their own 
selves seeing a possible future that is too frightening to contemplate. Indeed these
85 David Punter, p. xiii.
86 Fred Botting, ‘In Gothic Darkly: Heterotopia, History, Culture’, in A Companion to the Gothic, 
ed. by David Punter (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), pp. 3-14 (p. 3).
87 Scott Brewster, ‘Gothic and the Madness o f Interpretation’ in A Companion to the Gothic, pp. 
281-292 (p. 82).
88 Jacqueline Rose, ‘Virginia Woolf and the Death of Modernism’, in On Not Being Able to Sleep 
(London: Chatto and Windus, 2003), pp. 72-88 (p. 82).
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various Reports may also be read as demonstrating a similar contemplation in
relation to a wider culture. Rose’s epigraph, with which this chapter begins,
suggests that mourning is part of our lives, announced and accounted for, perhaps,
by abjection, and therefore, to be lived with. Mourning is not necessarily
recognised until events and experience conspire to bring the feeling to life,
provoking the darkness within. It is, perhaps, this conspiring of events which also
stimulates the desire to strike out against its overpowering insistence. In so far as
language helps to organise and define experience, what may be understood from
the Joint Committee’s following statement?
Older people in healthcare are especially vulnerable to 
ill-treatment because of their dependency on others for 
their basic needs ... It is by no means all older people who 
are vulnerable to human rights abuses, but some groups are 
more vulnerable because of ill-health, disability or dementia.89
It appears that abuse of older people is relative -  some older people are more
vulnerable than others. Vulnerability, in the form of physical and mental
dependency, is conjoined with ill-treatment as cause and effect. The Joint
Committee defines the experience o f ill-treatment as discrimination towards the
dependent elderly. Hence, vulnerability is something that must be protected
against, as if in itself vulnerability invited abusive behaviour. As an act of
exclusion, discrimination creates a space for a sense of loss of self; a sense of
being devalued, of not belonging and of being of low worth. Dependency, which
it may be argued invites compassion, sympathy or even empathy, is viewed as
also being able to invite anger, aggression, assault, and other forms of hostility.
Dependency may also be understood through the language of loss when
the language of protective power is diminished by ‘ill-health, disability or
89 The Human Rights o f  Older People, p. 19.
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dementia’. Vulnerability defines dependency before, in relation to Alzheimer’s
disease, it defines a return to archaism in the body which has, in turn, to speak for
its loss through its ‘basic needs’: a form of dying words. In the pre-socialised
stages of becoming, the affiliative needs are dependency, succour and attachment
and such needs remain within the body, in relative terms, throughout life,
demanding a basic rapport with the world. Dependency in old age returns the
body to this pre-socialised kind of need if  it is not to be buried alive by those who
carry out a caring role and who face the prospect of their own nothingness which
may be too fearful to contain.
This combination of losses is compounded by evidence provided to the
Joint Committee about other forms o f discrimination and devaluation which
suggest that institutional rights have priority over the rights of individuals. Given
an ageing population and the increase in the number of people diagnosed with
Alzheimer’s disease, it is clear that they must be significant users o f health and
social services, but they appear to be given no priority and even less service than
other heavy user groups. The Joint Committee reports that witnesses giving
evidence to them ‘criticised the poor provision for mental health o f older people’
and goes on to state that:
Older people do not have access to the range of specialist 
mental health services, such as talking treatments, available 
to younger adults despite having the same, and often greater, need.90
The report goes on to indicate further forms of age discrimination in the provision
of services:
90 The Human Rights o f  Older People, p. 22.
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Younger people receive higher levels of community services 
than older people. Older people are moved into residential care 
even though a small amount of additional support at home could 
help someone to maintain their independence in the community 
for far longer.91
Identifying these gaps and spaces within our health and social care system, the
Joint Committee’s report tellingly announces a policy subtext to all our futures
which seems to sustain Simone de Beauvoir’s argument that:
We carry this ostracism so far that we even reach the point 
of turning it against ourselves: for in the old person that we must 
become, we refuse to recognise ourselves ... nothing should be more 
expected than old age: nothing is more unforeseen.9
Conclusion
What is seen in dependent old age is a mirroring of a self to come which can be 
denied through systems of personal and institutional abuse. This is the structure 
underlying de Beauvoir’s argument: one o f private and public paradigms and the 
complex nature of their interrelationship. If  old age can be expected or anticipated 
because it is preferable to death, its depredations are too horrific to contemplate 
and thus have to be denied even by public agents in the public realm. The young, 
who enjoy the privileged priorities of service provision, are, of course, the 
dwelling place of their own future old age. But, as de Beauvoir points out, ‘age is 
removed from us by an extent of time so great that it merges with eternity’,93 
appearing unreal; except when one is faced with age and all its vulnerabilities and 
dependencies, its realities so awful to look upon that it must be put far from the 
private and the public gaze. As de Beauvoir indicates, to contemplate this 
otherness as oneself is clearly too problematic; it is a mirroring of the future
91 The Human Rights o f Older People, p. 22.
92 Simone de Beauvoir, Old Age (Harmonds worth: Penguin Books, 1985), p. 10.
93 De Beauvoir, p. 11.
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which the imagination seems to need to deny. And once denied, the experiential 
void which follows permits a tolerance of the devaluation and discrimination of 
the elderly dependent in both the private and public realms of service provision; 
this is the state of affairs to which public commentators take such official 
exception.
In the vacuum of reason which is created by Alzheimer’s and given 
emphasis by the notion of the subject being buried alive by the effects of the 
disease, there is the added horror of this mental disability inviting denial, 
devaluation, deprivation, exclusion, discrimination and other forms of abuse. In 
such situations the dependent body is left to try and indicate its own dying words, 
usually in the most elemental of forms. That these dying words are not responded 
to in any language other than the horror o f others, gives emphasis to the self s 
mourning as it expresses its being as buried alive. It may be said that the 
dependent body underlines the paradox o f modem medicine in that medical 
development has assisted in extending God’s time, but has failed to find the 
solution to the many conditions which have turned ‘acute death’ into ‘chronic 
death’, leaving the final stages of life to a condition of acute dependency, 
particularly for those with neurological problems such as Alzheimer’s disease. In 
these circumstances it may be argued that it is in the interests of pharmaceutical 
companies to maintain the status quo whereby drugs which mitigate conditions 
rather than cure them continue to be developed, produced and sold. The emphasis 
given to biomedicine with its priorities towards curing disease rather than 
mediating illness (in other words the dominance of a paradigm which focuses on 
singular disease conditions affecting one or more bodily organ rather than the 
holistic notion of illness encompassing the whole person), underlines the very
dependency of the body. The fact of illness may prefigure both meaning and 
unmeaning in its ‘chaotic and incoherent quality’,94 and it is in the various forms 
of chaos demonstrated in dementia that the discourse of being buried alive, its 
Gothic images and its mourning for a lost self, are played out.
94 John Wiltshire, ‘Biography, Pathography and the Recovery o f Meaning’, in The Cambridge 
Quarterly, 29 (2000) 409-422 (p. 413).
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C hapter 6
The Struggle between Memory and Loss
People with Alzheimer’s ... are on a voyage into deep space, 
sending back messages that it is our job to decipher.
Linda Grant
In its causes and effects ... imagination finds itself inextricably 
bound up with, even as it remains in excess of, reality.
Fred Botting
The self of pathographical writing is the self-in-crisis: when 
confronted with serious and life-threatening illness, those 
possibilities, fictions, metaphors, and versions of self are 
contracted into a “hard” defensive ontological reality.
Anne Hunsaker Hawkins
Imagination provides models for reading reality in a new way.
Paul Ricoeur
Remember, God of history, that you created man to remember.
You put me into the world, you spared me in time of danger and 
death, that I might testify. What sort of witness would I be without 
my memory.
Elie Wiesel
The pathologist’s identification o f senile plaques in my father’s 
brain served to confirm, as only an autopsy could, the fact with 
which [my mother] struggled daily for many years: like millions of 
other Americans, my father had Alzheimer’s disease ... This was 
his disease. It was also, you could argue, his story. But you have 
to let me tell it.
Jonathan Franzen1
1 Linda Grant, Remind Me Who I  Am, Again (London: Granta Books, 1998), p. 42. Grant cites an address
given to the Alzheimer’s Society by the Canadian author, Michael Ignatieff; Fred Botting, ‘Metaphors and
Monsters’, Journal for Cultural Research, Vol. 7, No. 4, (2003), 339-365 (p.340); Anne Hunsaker Hawkins, 
Reconstructing Illness: Studies in Pathography (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1999),
p. 17; Paul Ricoeur, ‘The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling’, Critical Inquiry,
5 (1978/1979) 143-159 (p. 157); Elie Wiesel, The Forgotten (New York: Schocken Books, 1995), p. 10; 
Jonathan Franzen, ‘My Father’s Brain’ in How To Be Alone (London: Harper Perennial, 2004), pp.7-38 
(pp. 10-11). These epigraphs encapsulate notions o f memory and loss. How they are represented in 
contemporary and other fiction and genres such as poetry and memoir is the theme of this final chapter.
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Bearing Witness
To go ahead evokes the notion of precedence, and echoes Jacques Derrida’s idea that 
‘one must always go before the other’, thus creating a hiatus in the space between one 
and another. Within this hiatus Derrida establishes a discourse on death and mourning.
•"y
And it is the concept and inhabitation of mourning which takes forward reading 
Alzheimer’s in theory, literature and culture. The texts considered in the last chapter 
illustrated how the loss of the mind through Alzheimer’s disease preceding the death of 
the body, rooted the Gothic motif of being buried alive in a process which itself 
inaugurated mourning for the loss of self. Writing The Work o f Mourning, as his friends 
and relations predecease him, Derrida comments that the gap will be filled by a 
mourning which, as Wiesel’s and Franzen’s epigraphs imply, becomes the expression of 
fidelity -  the quality of being faithful to a person or to a set of ideas or beliefs. This idea 
echoes Freud’s definition of mourning as a ‘reaction to the loss o f a loved person, or the 
loss of some abstraction which has taken the place o f one’.
Of all the epigraphs cited above, it is Wiesel’s that most clearly seeks some 
kind of fidelity, pleading that memory exist to establish such a possibility. Without 
memory, he argues, one cannot testify or honour what has gone before. Only memory 
can bear witness to the past and anticipate and imagine the future, and the loss of 
memory means neither past nor future can be accommodated. Franzen’s epigraph 
implies a similar, but slightly different, point. His father’s loss of memory, through 
Alzheimer’s, fathers his own sense of being faithful to that memory and, with his 
father no longer master of his own identity, compels him to become responsible for
2 Jacques Derrida, The Work of Mourning, ed. Pascal-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Chicago and London: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2001). The idea is discussed in the editors’ introduction ‘To Reckon with 
the Dead: Jacques Derrida’s Politics of Mourning’, pp.1-30 (p. 1). The text brings together, as an illustration 
of fidelity, Derrida’s reflections on the death o f a number o f his friends.
3 Sigmund Freud, ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, in On Metapsychology, ed. Angela Richards, trans. by James 
Strachey, Penguin Freud Library, Vol. 11 (London: Penguin Books, 1991), pp.245-268 (p. 252).
218
telling his father’s story. As we have already seen, Thomas DeBaggio’s memoir makes 
clear that in the social formation of Alzheimer’s disease, the illness is such that the 
Alzheimer’s subject is frightened of being frightening. Seeing a living image construed 
in this guise tends to evoke the uncanny, and the elderly patient, in particular, 
becomes, in biomedicine, an anatomy of disgust. Franzen has witnessed his father’s 
decline and seeks to memorialise him and the effects of the disease as an act of 
fidelity, as a way of reckoning ‘with death, or with the dead’4 in the sense that his 
father somehow remains in him.
Wiesel also bears witness in his plea with God that he live with the victims of
the Holocaust. Linda Grant, in her story about her mother’s decline into dementia, adds
a paradoxical turn to Wiesel’s plea when she writes:
I don’t know if it is a tragedy or a blessing when Jews, 
who insist on forgiving and forgetting, should end their 
lives remembering nothing. My mother, the last of her 
generation, was losing her memory. Only the deep past 
remained, which emerged at moments in bits and pieces.5
Such ghosts within inhabit the work of Franzen and Wiesel, DeBaggio and Robert
Davis, as they too mourn their own ghosts to come, bearing witness and being faithful to
the loss of their own selves:
Fidelity thus consists in mourning, and mourning -  at least 
in a first moment -  consists in interiorising the other and 
recognising that if we are to give the dead anything it can 
now be only in us, the living.6
Perhaps it is not only a fidelity to the other that matters in mourning and memorialising,
but also a fidelity to oneself. Derrida, ironically, rephrases Descartes’ ‘cogito ergo sum’
by stating that ‘I mourn, therefore I am’.7 Mourning, it is argued here, constitutes
4 Derrida, p. 2.
5 Grant, p. 15.
6 Derrida, p. 9.
7 This is cited in Sean Gaston, The Impossible Mourning o f Jacques Derrida (London and New York: 
Continuum, 2006), p. 6.
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selfhood because it is a feeling of life, a jokingly paradoxical twist of imaginative 
language putting Derrida inside of oblivion if  not quite of it.
But fidelity as practised by the narrator o f Michael Ignatieff s novel Scar Tissue 
seems to edge into a kind of chaotic melancholia as he struggles to believe in his 
mother’s continuing awareness of what is happening as Alzheimer’s disease takes its 
malevolent hold and she slips deeper and deeper into oblivion. It is a disease which 
frames the narrator’s sense of both the real and the unreal as his self-knowledge and 
self-possession crack under its weight. Paradoxically, this textual act of faith, or fealty, 
is also to the idea of betrayal inherent in a disease where the body betrays the mind and 
which requires, as the memoirs of DeBaggio and others bear witness, a voice to 
articulate the betrayal. As in Wiesel’s novel, there is also a fidelity in Ignatieff s work to 
the idea of humanity subverted by a Gothic pathology as well as to the inhumanity of 
the Holocaust.
Possibly the most defining characteristic o f ageing in the latter half of the 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries is dementia, particularly Alzheimer’s 
disease, which is its most common form. Literary depictions of this condition may be 
described as fonns of witness to the needs of the ghosts created by the disease as they 
fall out of this world and into another. Grant’s citation, taken from Michael Ignatieff s 
address to a conference of the Alzheimer’s Disease Society, suggests that since 
Alzheimer subjects can no longer bear witness to their own life, others have to take up 
that responsibility. The disease, seemingly, wipes the mind clean for others to write on 
it and for it in a process resembling a palimpsest. Ignatieff s metaphor of the body 
being a ‘deep space’ into which the dissolving mind travels, creating a distance that 
makes the messages more and more difficult to decipher, is one whereby the recipients 
of the message have necessarily to use imagination to interpret and provide meaning.
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A ‘deep space5 also suggests, or hints at, fears buried in the awful unconscious, a cave­
like location holding within it the scattered bits and pieces of a life now lost except to 
those who may have shared parts of it. The facts and the effects of the disease, are, of 
course, ultimately bigger, bolder and more disastrous than can be expressed in stories, 
either metaphorically or plainly, entailing, as they do, the triumph of the body over 
language.
Nevertheless, as earlier chapters have indicated, this uniquely suffered 
condition spills over into the public realm to exercise the broader cultural, economic 
and political discourse to a degree which suggests an anxious desire to fill the space 
created by the disease. Genres as varied as autobiography, biography, drama, fiction, 
memoir, poetry, policy papers and scientific research reports are all summoned to 
reflect the struggle of memory and loss in narratives which give voice to public 
concern and personal fears. All of this varied discourse bears witness to these concerns 
and fears either through the pedestrian language o f the bureaucrat, the scientific 
language of the medical researcher or most tellingly, through the language of fiction, 
poetry and drama, precisely because when Alzheimer's subjects can no longer 
themselves bear witness, the word of others is pressed into the service of that 
responsibility. Indeed writers such as Ignatieff, J. Bem lef and Samantha Harvey, who 
bring their imagination to the task of deciphering the latter stages of the disease, may 
be read as keeping a hold of something of the mind as it seeps into the body.
Botting seems to suggest that the Gothic, as a genre, tends to emphasize the 
needs of a body which creates the reality the imagination tests. But, as Suzanne Raitt 
points out, ‘we have no language for our own mortality. We die at the limits of our
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own observable experience’ and so it would seem that it is only in the imagination 
that we can explore what it is like to have Alzheimer’s and the imagination is only too 
aware of the horrors which the condition and its effects bring. Contemporary novels 
which concern themselves with representations o f Alzheimer’s disease, particularly 
those referred to above, tend to be primarily character-led rather than plot-driven and 
such texts typically explore and express the disintegration of the mind. If the purpose 
of forgetting, within the psychoanalytic paradigm, is to escape from uncomfortable 
‘truths’, then it may be said that the purpose o f writing about Alzheimer’s through the 
various imaginative genres, is to reveal the realities of those truths brought about by 
neurological forgetting.
Pathography as Memoir
Pathography, argues John Wiltshire, has become ‘a new form, genre, or sub-genre of
biography’ and memoir.9 Texts such as the writings of Thomas DeBaggio, Robert Davis,
Havi Carel among others referred to in earlier chapters, foreground personal experiences of
illness, and there are also first-person accounts o f the illness of a family member such as
John Bayley’s narrative of Iris Murdoch’s journey into a dark space. And fiction, of
course, has something of a long history of covering matters of ill-health, and has, claims
Wiltshire, been the means:
by which the patient’s view can enter the public domain and 
contribute to the understanding o f medical issues. Moreover, 
contemporary illness narratives are rarely self-consciously and 
exclusively about illness: pathography appears in different forms, 
nestled into a book about something else, disguised as a novel, 
philosophical meditation, or sociological treatise, or offered as 
instructional handbook.10
8 Suzanne Raitt, ‘Freud’s Theory of Metaphor: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Nineteenth-Century Science 
and Figurative Language’, in Literature, Science, Psychoanalysis, 1830-1970: Essays in Honour o f Gillian 
Beer, eds. Helen Small and Trudi Tate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 118-130 (p. 128).
9 John Wiltshire, ‘Biography, Pathography and the Recovery of Meaning’, The Cambridge Quarterly, Vol. 
29, No. 4 (2000), 409-422 (p. 422).
10 Wiltshire, p. 410.
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Hawkins’s view about the writing of pathographies, arguing that they demonstrate ‘the 
self-in-crisis’, might also be suggested for Gothic tales and for Ignatieff s Scar Tissue, 
which is a kind of dialogue with death. Wilstshire suggests that this text ‘looks like a 
memoir ... presented as fiction’, showing the impact of the mother’s dementia on the 
unnamed narrator and the rest of the family.11 Helen Small agrees with this point of view 
when she writes that ‘Ignatieff s first-person narrator is sometimes hard to distinguish 
from Ignatieff him self, and such a form does have a sense of immediacy and intimacy for 
the reader.12 Hawkins and Wiltshire both argue that pathographical writings have become a 
popular genre due to the rise of biomedicine, which tends to disregard the experience of 
illness, particularly the chronic kind, and concentrate much more on the disease. The 
discussion earlier in Chapter 4 set out how biomedicine seems to ignore the needs of the 
body to be touched, loved, cared for in response to illness, signalling thereby the loss of 
the human in medicine. In other words, patients, and their carers and relatives, are trying in 
these texts to wrestle back some humane control over the body, to reach a kind of 
rapprochement and meaningful understanding o f it in its diseased form. So, if  pathography 
is a genre for the forgotten subjective experience of illness, it is clearly one in which 
disease, the unforgiving interpellator, is challenged.
To the extent to which the genre seeks to re-establish the subject as being in control 
of his or her own life, it speaks up for the human in the context of a biomedicine where, as 
Wiltshire and Hawkins claim, the human is absent. The genre’s popularity seems to have 
something to do with a curiosity in how others overcome very difficult circumstances. But, 
it may also be argued, underlining Botting’s point, that such a genre ‘supplies the moral 
vision lacking in [science]’ by providing a human response to a disease sent by nature.13 It
11 Wiltshire, p. 410.
12 Helen Small, The Long Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 255.
13 Botting, p. 340.
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is this human moral response which forms the major theme of this final chapter, which will
also examine how self-knowledge and self-possession are taken apart in various texts.
Cryptomimesis is a neologism suggested by Jodey Castricano, a term proposing
making present that which is absent. It is a notion with classic Gothic overtones evident in
Franzen’s account of his father’s disintegrating mind, where, in keeping with other similar
accounts in fictional form, the purpose is to write the other into being, bringing them back
to a kind of life and in a sense mimicking such lives. Steven Bruhm comments thus:
To write the other in a Gothic mode is not only to draw upon spectres 
that may already be said to exist [such as those who might be considered 
to be buried alive due to Alzheimer’s]; it is also to create those spectres, 
to construct... the spectralization of the other, by which elements of 
culture are imbued with a haunted, supernatural presence where only 
materiality [exists].14
Furthermore, texts, such as those of Ignatieff, Bem lef and Harvey, among others, which 
have Alzheimer’s disease as their primary theme, are not necessarily pure creations by 
their authors, but representative productions o f the society within which they work, a point 
made by Terry Eagleton and elaborated earlier in Chapter 2. These writers create texts 
which are within the social praxis of modem medicine and provide a social and 
psychological commentary on it. For example, Ignatieff s Scar Tissue displays a close 
familiarity with Alzheimer’s disease revealing an acute understanding of the space 
between the ‘actual experience and the written narrative’ which shapes that experience.15 
The text shows how the familiar, in the person o f the narrator’s mother, becomes 
unfamiliar and how meaning becomes meaningless. And if the Gothic genre is one that 
explores the limits of human reason, it would seem that Scar Tissue fits within this model, 
especially given its unforgiving meditation on the processes of losing one’s mind.
14 Steven Bruhm, ‘Encrypted Identities’, Gothic Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2000), 1-7 (pp. 4-5). This is an 
introduction to a number o f other articles on the theme of writing the dead which includes Castricano’s 
neologism -  cryptomimesis.
15 Wiltshire, p. 410.
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Ignatieff s text may be placed, ambiguously, between novel and personal memoir,
as the narrator, who never identifies himself by name, describes his mother’s decline into
Alzheimer’s, a disease which first threatens and then destroys her character. Unlike Oscar
Wilde’s The Picture o f  Dorian Gray, the narrator’s mother cannot trade off her situation
for something different. She cannot be doubled except in the sense that her narrator-son
tells her story through the chaos of his emotional reactions which, uncannily, parallel the
effects of his mother’s disease. In this way he seems to be inside her biological disaster.
There is, of course, both an irony and a paradox in a story told by an anonymous narrator
who, by not naming himself, suggests he has no meaning, but whose narrative is
meaningful in its creation of a subject who loses a named identity, meaning and purpose
just as the unnamed narrator seems to do in the telling of her story, one ghost seemingly
creating another. And although Wilde’s novel is a fictional account of a character in fear of
growing old, it also reflects the author’s interest in biology. Suzanne Raitt argues that
The curious replication of Dorian by the portrait whose existence 
keeps Dorian’s death at bay echoes Weismann’s account of the amoeba, 
whose division gives rise to two new individuals, as if  death and 
reproduction were the same thing.16
Ignatieff s novel, or memoir, also reflects and displays an interest in neurological science
and medicine. Small calls his text ‘a meditation on both literature and philosophy in
relation to science’ through its representation o f personal fears and social concerns as the
narrator ‘puts into words ... what it is like to be on the inside of biological disaster’.17
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein displays similar interests. And it is such representations of
Alzheimer’s which provide an opportunity for gothicity to infuse the condition and yield
imitation -  true reality in the form of material and appearance, an echo of Victor
Frankenstein’s creation. In other words, the Alzheimer’s subjects appear no longer to have
16 Raitt, p. 126.
17 Small, p. 260.
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a clearly defined place other than one o f appearance as they become a replica of 
themselves, a disorganised creation organised by the disease. This kind of imitation 
suggests that if  the Alzheimer’s subject is not enough of the same, which defines a kind of 
acceptable difference, then they may well appear ‘monstrous, queer, or socially
1Rcatastrophic’.
Ignatieff s text indicates that the narrator’s mother is somehow both herself and 
other as he seeks to gather together her history as wife and mother in order to hold her, as 
it were, in one piece. But Ignatieff s unnamed narrator finds himself on the inside of 
biological disaster and suffers a kind o f trauma in the face o f his mother’s dementia as his 
personality divides between a dutiful and loving son and the container for her 
fragmentation, which eventually creates a terrible breakdown. It is as if his mother’s 
disease has reconstituted itself within him and therefore destroys the role o f being her 
thinking apparatus. The narrator expresses a Gothic transgenerational haunting of 
inheriting a gene which will tip him over into the dementia suffered by his mother and 
maternal grandmother. This seems to be a legacy which awaits him and perhaps his 
children as a biological law of previous generations indicates a vitality which destroys. It 
seems in Scar Tissue that the dead and the dying can shape the lives of the living as the 
narrator goes back to his childhood to trace the beginning of his grandmother’s and 
mother’s disease. As the narrative unfolds, the unnamed narrator seems to have inherited 
the immortal gene, and so is not only inside his mother and grandmother’s biological 
disaster but his own as well. This situation creates, as it were, two images; one that exists 
in the past and present and the other in a displacing future. As referred to in earlier 
chapters, this immortal gene also creates a demonic metaphor -  its vampiric nature. 
Frankenstein, talking about his own disastrous relationship with his creature, says it is his
18 Bruhm, p. 5.
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‘own vampire, my own spirit let loose from the grave and forced to destroy all that was 
dear to me’.19 The creature becomes the metaphor for the darker elements in 
Frankenstein’s personality, a grave that has been opened up to create his other, and, 
similarly, the immortal gene is carried within for Ignatieff s narrator until it too begins to 
express itself in the personality of its carrier.
As explicated in Scar Tissue, the narrator’s role is to take on responsibility for the 
story telling when the other can no longer think for themselves, taking on, as it were, a 
Frankenstein-aspect in recreating this other. The narrator, in Scar Tissue, becomes a 
character driven by events rather than attempting to control them, but he, like Maarten in 
Bem lef s Out o f Mind, Jake in Harvey’s The Wilderness, all dealing with states of Gothic 
chaos, has to take cognisance of that chaos in representing that condition.20 
Forms of Representation
Texts that deal with the chaos of dementia represent these chaotic, traumatic states, 
experiences and events within an ordered language which takes cognisance o f such 
conditions in clear and structured ways that endow them with sense and meaning. Such 
texts remind us that this kind of language arrives out of the ‘other half of our fragmented 
culture’ which seeks to imagine what the experience of mental deterioration is like; and 
what it is most like is often expressed and represented in the language of difference, 
strangeness, loss and death, the language of the Gothic. But whether such an ordered 
representation is always necessary is brought into question by the work of Bryan Stanley 
Johnson and Bemlef. In particular, Johnson’s House Mother Normal demonstrates through 
forms of typography the regressive nature of what he calls senility. The word ‘senile’
19 Mary Shelley, Frankenstein (London: Penguin Books, 1994), p. 74.
20 Samantha Harvey, The Wilderness (London: Jonathan Cape, 2004). Harvey uses a third-person structure in 
the present and past tense. Using the present tense enables Jake to inhabit his experiences, thoughts and 
feelings. And sections written in the past tense allow him, and the reader, to get inside his fragmenting 
memory as he reviews his life. Such shifts o f tense symbolise the nature of Alzheimer’s disease. Jake’s 
professional life also symbolises the building of his narrative life and its disintegration, and how in that 
disintegrating space fractured memories appear.
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comes from Latin and refers to age, but with no negative significance. The word became
extended to ‘senility’ to cover the effects of mental and physical deterioration in old age in
later times. Its use is still not uncommon, but Alzheimer’s disease and the names of other
forms of dementia are more widely used in contemporary society to cover such states of
deterioration and to ease the negative images o f the term (as Franzen points out ‘senility is
not merely an erasure of meaning but a source o f meaning’).21 Johnson’s use of the word
‘senility’ in his text, first published in 1971, would have been negatively understood by his
readers at that time and left in no room for ambiguity by the way he represents the
condition as death’s portent. The novel does not show any particular interest in
deciphering the messages being sent back from ‘deep space’, but portrays the rawness of
human existence at the edge of such a space. The text begins with an ironic introduction by
the House Mother to the reader as if they were a visitor to the old people’s home of which
she is in charge:
Friend (I may call you friend?), these are also our friends.
We no longer refer to them as inmates, cases, patients, or 
even clients. These particular friends are also known as 
NERs, since they have no effective relatives, are orphans
99in reverse, it is often said.
The attempt to establish a kind of humanity is clearly subverted by the language of 
dehumanisation indicating the isolation of the residents of the home. This welcome 
introduces several monologues by the ‘friends’, with each showing a developing 
regression as one follows the other with gaps increasing in the typography to indicate their 
mental confusions. In the later monologues, the ‘friends”  loss of coherence is represented 
by the typography straying over the page, leaving large gaps between words which bear 
little relation to each other, until the final pages become blank.
21 Franzen, p. 25.
22 Bryan Stanley Johnson, House Mother Normal (London: Picador, 2004), pp. 5-204 (p. 5). House Mother 
Normal is published with two other novels by Bryan Stanley Johnson in the B.S. Johnson Omnibus.
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To indicate the narrator’s deteriorating mind, Bem lef s novel Out o f  Mind also 
leaves the final pages blank. This visual and graphic way of representing the loss of self 
can be very discomforting for readers, putting them, as it were, in a position of being in 
front of the demented person, trying to make sense of their incoherencies. To be faced with 
gaps, a series of white spaces, between un-joined up writing can be bewilderingly fearful, 
as if one is confronting a void or a thing seeming less than human, and Johnson’s text 
shows the importance of language in all its human and dehumanising effects, making use 
of blank spaces and random typography to represent how the mind disintegrates. But in 
these gaps and voids there seems to be a return to the pre-linguistic and the maternal, as 
well as an escape from the paternal law o f language and culture as dementia loosens the 
purchase on the symbolic. No doubt for Johnson, who was considered to be an 
experimental novelist in his time, House Mother Normal is a realistic representation of 
dementia, an act of fidelity, a mimetic but truthful account of its effects on the human 
condition.23
A more ordered way of representing disintegrating and disintegrated minds and 
decrepit old age is portrayed graphically in Philip Larkin’s poem ‘The Old Fools’. The ‘old 
fools’ are also residents in an old people’s home and, like Johnson’s ‘friends’, seem to be 
incarcerated within a space in which Gothic horrors are locked away to be occasionally 
visited and gazed upon, as if these places were utilitarian institutions rather like Jeremy 
Bentham’s Panopticon, where residents are under constant observation. Larkin’s fearful 
anticipation of how time corrupts is graphically described in this poem, which is a raw and 
elemental work about dementia foretelling death, and uncompromising in its description of
23 Aristotle argues in Poetics that mimesis represents men in action, in the process of doing. The concept is 
central to the notion o f representation, particularly in what is called realist fiction. Michael Taussig argues in 
Mimesis and Alterity (London and New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall, 1993) that ‘the wonder of 
mimesis lies in the copy drawing on the character and power of the original, to the point whereby the 
representation may even assume that character and that power’ (p. xiii). This comment is well made in 
respect of Johnson’s novel.
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decrepit old age. The poem’s opening lines set a scene of Hogarthian terror in their 
posthuman depiction:
What do they think has happened, the old fools,
To make them like this? Do they somehow suppose
It’s more grown-up when your mouth hangs open and drools,
And you keep on pissing yourself, and can’t remember 
Who called this morning?24
As Small comments, this opening indicates ‘the absolute loss of agency [which is] for
Larkin the defining characteristic o f being human’ 25 But it is not only the loss of agency
that causes Larkin anxiety, it is also the loss o f body control. Such a loss parallels
abjection and Dani Cavallaro makes an interesting point when she states that:
Especially threatening are those borderline parts o f the 
physiological apparatus through which abject materials 
pass and the materials themselves: blood, semen, urine, 
faeces, tears, milk, sweat. These question the body’s self- 
containedness, for they are neither totally contained within 
the organism nor fully external to it.26
Larkin’s repugnance and disgust at the loss o f body control in decrepit old age underlines
the fear of being menaced from inside. The narrator’s interrogation and fearful anticipation
of a dependent old age is distanced at the beginning by the use of ‘they’, ‘them’ and
‘your’, but the emphasis is upon loss and the mutability o f the body:
Not knowing how, not hearing who, the power 
Of choosing gone. Their looks show that they’re for it:
Ash hair, toad hands, prune face dried into lines -
•  77How can they ignore it?
It seems clear that Larkin’s speaker cannot ignore it and the images created by this almost 
visible documentation of dried-out skin create and portray bodies in extremis, at the end of
24 Philip Larkin, ‘The Old Fools’ in Collected Poems, ed. and introd. by Anthony Thwaite (London: Faber 
and Faber, 1990), pp. 196-197 (p. 196).
25 Small, p. 139.
26 Dani Cavallaro, The Gothic Vision (London: Continuum, 2002), p. 200.
27 Larkin, p. 196.
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their tether. Choice, it seems, has been overtaken by disease, a predicament about which
the narrator of Ignatieff s Scar Tissue gives due warning:
You can choose to die, or you can choose that life beyond 
selfhood, the life beyond the gates of truth. How you choose 
... depends on the value you place on self-consciousness.
No one can decide that for you. You can choose life or you 
can choose consciousness ... the illness does not allow you 
both. If you do not a c t ... on the first signs of its presence 
within you, the illness will not even allow you the dignity 
of a choice.28
Larkin’s old fools have gone beyond making such a choice, as has the narrator’s mother in 
Scar Tissue, but Ignatieff s narrator meditates more on this moral issue as he becomes 
convinced he has inherited the disease from past generations. However, within the image 
in Larkin’s poem lies a fearful preparation for extinction, what Julia Kristeva calls ‘a 
vortex of summons and repulsion’. It is a kind o f revolt o f being by Ignatieff s narrator, 
who is at once haunted by what he sees in his mother and fearful o f old age drawing him to 
a ‘place where meaning collapses’ and where he gazes at living corpses which are, as 
Kristeva argues, at ‘the utmost of abjection’. In Kristeva’s paradigm, abjection is ‘at the 
border of my condition as a living being. My body extricates itself, as being alive, from the 
border’.29
The border for the ‘old fools’ has been crossed by the disease of dementia which 
‘lives’ in that gap between mind and body, leaving the latter helpless and without direction 
and purpose. The disease becomes the object which has caused body and mind to be rent 
asunder, leaving the Alzheimer subject living between the borders of past and future.
If one shudders at the image, this suggests not a failure of transcendent imagination, but a 
clear hold on a palpable reality, at least on the part of Larkin’s narrator, who 
acknowledges that, in some, the process of ageing is akin to an act of violence whereby the
28 Michael Ignatieff, Scar Tissue (London: Chatto and Windus, 1993), pp. 185-186.
29 All the brief citations here are taken from Julia Kristeva, Powers o f Horror, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1982), p. 4.
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body turns its owner into a thing. As Susan Sontag puts it in relation to particularly violent 
photographic images, the narrator’s shocking and mocking images, ‘arrest attention, 
startle, surprise’.30
It is as if Larkin’s narrator has burnt these images within his memory, and his point
of view is one of fearful and horrific anticipation of decrepit and disintegrating old age.
These ‘old fools’ are like ‘the corpse, seen without God and outside science [and are] the
utmost of abjection. It is death infecting life. Abject’.31 But although the narrator is acutely
aware of what he observes, he also attempts to imagine what it is like to be old and inside
the head of those he gazes upon in such terror:
Perhaps being old is having lighted rooms 
Inside your head, and people in them, acting.
People you know, yet can’t quite name; each looms 
Like a deep loss restored, from known doors turning,
Setting down a lamp, smiling from a stair, extracting 
A known book from the shelves; or sometimes only 
The rooms themselves, chairs and a fire burning,
The blown bush at the window, or the sun’s
Faint friendliness on the wall some lonely
Rain-ceased midsummer evening. That is where they live:
Not here and now, but where all happened once.32
These metaphors of lightness and space inside the head of the ‘old fools’ underline the
absence of cognition and language, but ghosts somehow stir within these metaphors, as
whatever memories are left restore them to some kind of life - like actors whom one ‘can’t
quite name’. Small remarks that Larkin imagines in this stanza that old age ‘is not really a
psychological state [but] a condition of alienation from one’s own psyche’.33
Lightness, space and rooms echo the dreamlike spaces of Poe’s castellated abbey in 
his ‘The Masque of the Red Death’, referred to in Chapter Three, in which the inhabitants 
also lead a life of exile in order to escape the contagion of the ‘Red Death’. They, like the
30 Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain o f Others (London: Penguin Books, 2004), p. 20.
31 Kristeva, p. 4.
32 Larkin, pp. 196-197.
33 Small, p. 139.
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‘old fools’, find that they cannot escape rooms, disease or death. Larkin’s narrator both 
witnesses physical and mental deterioration and imagines what such an absence o f self 
might be like, and then completes his witness with the overhanging threat th a t4 We shall 
[all] find out’ what it will be like to be an ‘old fool’.34 This third verse in Larkin’s poem is 
a reminder of what Steven Bruhm refers to as the Gothic aesthetic concern ‘with the 
phenomenology of loss’, and that this loss has usually to be accompanied by the idea of 
resurrection, ‘to conjure up from the crypt’ a kind o f ghost that must be made visible in 
language. What Larkin’s verse does is to make visible, paradoxically, a kind o f dream 
which conjures up ghosts o f the ‘old fools”  encrypted past, half-revealed associations 
from a sleepless psyche. Larkin’s ‘The Winter Palace’ also shapes the fear o f growing old 
into six two-line stanzas, the last three indicating an ambiguity concerning the loss of 
mind:
And [I] am starting to give offence by forgetting faces 
And swearing I’ve never been to certain places.
It will be worth it, if  in the end I manage
To blank out whatever it is that is doing the damage.
Then there will be nothing I know.
My mind will fold into itself, like fields, like snow.36
The mind folding into itself seems to bring a sense o f relief from knowing, to be absent
from the anxiety of what is happening to the self. It is the knowing, the anticipation of
ageing with all its losses and depredations, which causes Dorian Gray to be absent from
the process represented in his portrait. If  ‘The Winter Palace’ is a metaphor for an absent
mind, Dorian Gray’s portrait is a metaphor for an absent mutable life, with both the poem
and the story revealing, in different ways, an uncanny troubling presence as well as
absence. But these notions o f  presence and absence are also a demanding reminder to
34 Larkin, p. 197.
35 Bruhm, p. 1.
36 Larkin, p. 211.
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Dorian Gray and to Larkin’s narrator o f extinction and death, about which they both feel 
angry and fearful.
‘The Old Fools’ clearly has a relationship with the Gothic genre’s fascinated 
obsession with the ugliness and mortality of the human body, giving it what some 
contemporary cultural critics call a posthuman quality. However, the first-person narration 
of Bem lef s Out o f  Mind and Harvey’s third-person narration in The Wilderness also show 
the drift between presence and absence as the narrators struggle with the effects o f a 
seemingly malevolent and indifferent disease. Jake’s drift in The Wilderness between the 
two is emphasised when he states ‘that it is not the happiness of a memory that he is 
looking for, it is the memory itself; the taste and touch of it, and the proof it brings of 
him self.37 And later, ‘How strange, then, was memory -  that a whole interval of one’s life
' X  Rcould be blotted out like the sun behind the moon, and then emerge again so intact’.
Scar Tissue also represents these notions. His narrator’s fatalism, derived from 
believing he has inherited the disease that eliminated the mind of both his mother and 
grandmother, is accentuated when his brother, a neuroscientist, shows him scans of a brain 
attacked by Alzheimer’s disease. He subsequently realises that the scan is of his mother’s 
brain:
We are standing side by side, and I am looking down the eyepiece 
of an electron microscope ... The cells have been stained in order 
to highlight neurons, axons and dendrites, the stmctural architecture 
of the brain. My brother is guiding me through these regions of 
inner space. The blurred brown oblongs are normal neurons. The 
dark blotches with long curving tails are called neurofibrillary 
tangles. At the centre of the image is a compacted black mass 
surrounded by a halo o f inflammation. This is a deposit o f amyloid 
protein, a form of scar tissue deep within this patient’s brain. Under 
the microscope, it resembles a galactic storm, a starburst from an 
extinguished universe.39
37 Harvey, p. 3.
38 Harvey, p. 24.
39 Ignatieff, p. 130.
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The narrator s perception o f these images o f his mother’s brain seems suggestive o f
mysterious passageways which, in the story, he peoples with ghosts, in a manner akin to
Poe’s ‘Masque’. He and Poe perceive the mind filled with irrational thoughts, a weird
place in which sensations arrive at a surface that can no longer regulate them and where
reason has seemingly given way to the uncontrollable and the frightening. Both these texts
suggest an awe-fulness in the face o f a seemingly evil disease. Ignatieff s narrator, a
teacher of philosophy, uses language to create images o f a cosmic space, darkness and
light and the metaphor o f ‘an extinguished universe’ to show both a presence and an
absence in relation to his mother. This seems to echo H. P. Lovecraff s idea o f cosmic fear,
that unknown thingness which touches, from his point o f  view, most o f us and which
seems so unsettling in its compulsive pull. The paradoxical juxtaposition o f evil and
goodness, ‘black mass’ and ‘halo o f inflammation’, is striking in its Gothic overtones
within the centre of this image. Later in the text, when Ignatieff s brother points out a
defect in one o f the chromosomes, similar dark images are created:
The cascade begins there, he says. To my brother the word 
cascade means only the sequence o f pathological effects, 
but for me the word has menace. I see a body tumbling down 
a black, liquid-filled shute.40
Ignatieff s narrator points out the clear differences between the languages o f medical
science and philosophy, one seemingly distanced and the other responsive to the human
tragedy of someone losing their mind as it slips into a black morass. The notion o f falling
in ‘cascade’, is particularly apt in the philosopher-narrator’s telling o f his mother’s disease,
as his emotional life, in response, spreads and infects his family and others. But how are he
and others to deal with chronic and terminal disease? The narrator is grief-stricken by his
mother’s insidious demise and turns in hope, relative to the pessimism since her diagnosis,
to what he refers to as ‘health and personal growth’ texts, which argue that the power of
40 Ignatieff, p. 131.
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the mind can overcome physical states and improve the body’s immune system.41 He sees 
a particular cultural trend in North America with these sorts o f  texts as they fit the notion 
of idealism and individualism which inform the American dream. Such texts can also, in a 
sense, be seen as concerned with loss and resurrection; the transcendence o f the body in 
order to conjure up a new self and the power o f  the mind to put the body in its place. Self- 
help texts do tend to ‘shuttle between physical and psychological wholeness5, emphasising 
‘the consciousness o f loss, absence and dismemberment5 and therefore may be seen as one 
kind of definition o f the uncanny 42
Certainly such texts seem to hint at Freud’s idea of formlessness, a sense of falling 
apart. Jake, in Harvey’s The Wilderness, places considerable emphasis on trying to retain 
memories and plays memory games in the same way as Dr. Fleischmann does in Giorgio 
Pressburger’s The Law o f  White Spaces, stating that ‘he simply must not fly apart’.43 He 
also attempts to establish patterns in his life to put ‘limits on chaos’44 and believes his 
memory games helps this process and feels that ‘there is a satisfactory quality about 
gathering the words into his mind, filling him like stones filling his pockets’.45 Like other 
narrators in these meditational Alzheimer texts, Jake clutches at words in a way which 
suggests that they weigh and hold them together. This appears to give them a sense of 
wholeness that, for Jake, is undermined when he recollects the feeling of terror and ‘the 
utter blankness’ o f what he was supposed to do next.46 But for the narrator o f  Scar Tissue, 
the words o f the self-help texts have only a brief influence before something else is written 
in their place, overwriting such desire. The philosopher-narrator turns instead to Stoicism - 
indicating acceptance o f any misfortune without complaint, particularly if  that misfortune
41 Ignatieff, p. 62.
42 Bruhm, p.2.
43 Harvey, p.74.
44 Harvey, p.85.
45 Harvey, p. 98.
46 Harvey, p. 41.
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cannot be understood -and it is the narrator’s struggle to understand and believe which is at
the centre o f his imprisoning grief and melancholia.
The narrator states his need to remember his mother, her disease and its effects, ‘to
rescue her from her dying’.47 This form o f  fidelity is also concerned with, and expressive
of, his sense o f  fatalism:
When does dying begin? It was within her from the beginning, 
an illness passed from cell to cell, from mother to daughter. In my 
brother’s job  I have seen those cells, the dark starbursts o f scar 
tissue, invisible to the naked eye. I have seen the inheritance, the 
family silver.48
His mother is a painter who paints a portrait o f him as a young man, an image which he 
says did not make him feel himself: ‘It is a portrait o f a child watching his childhood 
vanish before his eyes’49 This echoing o f  Basil Hallward’s portrait o f Dorian Gray and the 
mutability and corruption o f time symbolises the gradual vanishing o f his mother’s skills 
and personality under the duress o f  the inherited disease. As his mother’s condition 
worsens, his own reluctance to admit to this is expressed in his irritation with her 
forgetfulness: ‘Her absences can be uncanny. Sometimes it is as if  she has decided to take 
a vacation from m e’.50 Unlike Helen, in Alice Sebold’s The Almost Moon, he does not 
murder his mother, but contemplates such an act. Helen uses her mother’s dementia to 
excuse her motivation for killing her: ‘W hen all is said and done, killing my mother came 
easily. Dementia, as it descends, has a way o f revealing the core o f the person affected by 
it’.51 The narrator o f Scar Tissue thinks about smothering his mother with a pillow while 
she sleeps, feeling that he has ‘the right to save her’ from her disease. It seems that, as in 
Larkin, the narrator believes that agency is the central value o f life and once it is gone
47 Ignatieff, p. 1.
48 Ignatieff, p. 1.
49 Ignatieff, p. 16.
50 Ignatieff, p.48.
51 Alice Sebold, The Almost Moon (London: Picador, 2007), p. 3.
52 Ignatieff, p.51.
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there is only materiality left. What seems to stop him joining Helen’s murderous route is a 
belief in the mother’s intactness as a person:
I want to say that my m other’s true self remains intact, there at 
the surface o f her being, like a feather resting on the surface 
tension o f  a glass o f water, in the way she listens, nods, rests 
her hand on her cheek, when we are together.53
Jake too believes in his essential intactness:
The old man who looks in the mirror and sees an old man beholds 
also a man who has given up. This is not him. There are vast tracts of 
his life which he believes unassailable by disease, and strings o f days 
in which he is no less coherent and lucid than he was as a twenty- or 
thirty-year old. He is amazed, thus far, at the banality o f this land 
o f forgetfulness.54
For Jake there is both denial and stoicism in these inner thoughts, but for the narrator of
Scar Tissue this belief in his m other’s intactness takes him to the self-help texts, which
creates a tension between him and his wife, who feels that his mother’s illness is taking
him over while he feels he ‘was struggling to work [himself] free’.55 This notion o f freeing
himself sets up a kind o f ambiguity. Is he attempting to free him self from the idea o f his
mother’s intactness and thus understand her condition and situation more clearly and
truthfully, or struggle with the hand that fate seems to have dealt him? This latter notion
seems to be the key when he lectures about illness and declares that:
Living an illness without giving it meaning would seem 
to require us to be as individualistic as we can, refusing 
to succumb to the contagion o f fear which sweeps through 
everyone when we learn that we are ill. Living without 
metaphor also means trusting the doctor, because only 
medicine approaches disease non-metaphorically.
The language o f medical science, it is being suggested here, is a neutral tool that does not
match our feelings and thoughts, but as Karl M arx and Frederick Engels argue in The
German Ideology, language is as a thing in itself, as capable o f creating our thoughts and
53 Ignatieff, p.58.
54 Harvey, p. 43.
55 Ignatieff, p. 63.
56 Ignatieff, p. 67.
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feelings as it is o f reflecting them. Meaning, in illness, it seems, is established in
metaphoric language: it has to be like and unlike other things otherwise materiality is left
to its own devices. And this is an argument with which Sontag would agree, as, in the end,
language is there to save us from our own flesh, a point which Ignatieff s narrator
underlines when he states:
When you strip us right down, when illness pares us back 
to our core, we remain creatures o f the word. Nothing can 
save us but the word, the messages we send in the shaft 
o f  sickness.57
What we know of ourselves, and others, is the result o f additions, the extras and excesses 
o f materiality and it is out o f  this that we weave our meanings about our bodies and the 
defects it imposes upon us, physically and psychically.
Memory, Loss, Metaphysics and the Supernatural
The values o f self-mastery are, o f course, subverted by neurological conditions such as 
Alzheimer’s disease. They were also challenged in the nineteenth century when Victorian 
society showed considerable interest in matters such as phrenology, vitalism and 
magnetism - forms o f pseudo-science which had some influence in that period. George 
Eliot shadowed these interests in the story o f the narrator, Latimer, in The Lifted Veil 
As with the narrator o f Scar Tissue, Latimer too is fated to know his forthcoming death, 
not through inherited disease but through what he calls a ‘superadded consciousness’.58 
Waiting brings considerable apprehension and anxiety to both narrators as an unalterable 
and pre-determined fate awaits them.
If, as David Punter has suggested, the Gothic genre is where memory and loss 
meet, then Latimer and the narrator o f Scar Tissue meet in a space where the metaphysical 
and the supernatural collide. Ignatieff s narrator is concerned with the issues arising from a
57 Ignatieff, p. 140.
58 George Eliot, The Lifted Veil (London: Virago Press, 1985), p. 19.
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and the supernatural collide. Ignatieff* s narrator is concerned with the issues arising from a
disease which confuses time and space and Latimer, in The Lifted Veil, the metaphoric title
for his ‘superadded consciousness’, has visions of future events and experiences as well as
the ability to see into other minds: it is a story o f serious uncanniness. Latimer has an
intense dislike o f his body and nature. He seems to represent an androgynous figure and
character, seen as poetic, with a sensibility prone, it is suggested, to visions; seeing and
hearing other people’s thought-processes, which take him into experiences beyond the
reach o f the ordinary and familiar and into something ‘real’. It seems, at times, that he
becomes a kind of alternate self, an uncanny configuration outside his usual self. This is
also the condition which the narrator o f Scar Tissue inhabits, and, as his first-person
narrative progresses, both narrators seem to be in the process o f falling apart. However,
Latimer, in The Lifted Veil, comes to believe the characteristic poetic visions he has are the
result o f  a diseased consciousness and they become burdensome for him:
... my diseased participation in other people’s consciousness 
continued to torment me; ... The weariness and disgust of this 
involuntary intrusion into other souls.59
Latimer longs for a release from these visions and perceptions o f other souls and desires to
abandon them. Similarly, Ignatieff s philosopher-narrator meditates on self-knowledge and
the abandonment o f self in seeking transcendence as depression overtakes him. He refers
to Melanie Klein’s notion that depression is
a longing for the lost oneness with the maternal breast. The 
individuation o f  adult life is thus haunted by a preconscious 
memory o f a time when we had no selves at all ... [a] longing 
for a return to the beginning.60
This idea is clearly in tension with that o f Kristeva’s paradigm o f abjection. She argues
that there is a horrific ambivalence in this longing, one from which fear grows at the
59 Eliot, p. 26.
60 Ignatieff, p. 181.
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prospect of losing the self. She claims that we do not wholly seek this form of self- 
abandonment.
The narrator’s depression in Scar Tissue may, of course, be perceived as a kind of 
abandonment o f self as he returns to and struggles with his emotions concerning his 
mother. His descriptions o f these struggles for self-mastery are echoed by Latimer in The 
Lifted Veil who feels that he has been somehow abandoned by his real self and given over 
to something diseased and terrorising. These notions o f abandonment reverberate within 
the Gothic genre, as, for example, in the reckless psychological and social abandonment by 
Victor Frankenstein o f the creature he has created and the terrifying and horrific 
consequences it sets in train. And the psychological and social consequences o f  the self 
being somehow forsaken and renounced through the process of Alzheimer’s disease have 
been at the centre o f most o f the texts referred to in this and preceding chapters.
Maarten in Out o f  M ind  begins to feel this sense o f being abandoned when he
declares that ‘it worries me that you can suddenly be so cut off from the most ordinary
actions. I have no explanation for it’.61 As his disease progresses, he states:
I can think o f nothing but vanished memories and therefore 
dare not think o f the past anymore. Even less dare I talk to 
Vera [his wife] about it. Perhaps it is only temporary, perhaps 
they will come back. Memories can sometimes be temporarily 
inaccessible, like words, but surely they can never disappear 
completely during your lifetime? But what are they exactly, 
memories? They are a bit like dreams. You can retell them 
afterwards, but what they really are, whether they are real, 
you don’t know, no one does.62
Maarten’s rhetorical questions are clearly difficult for him and reflect the m ind’s gradual
disappearance. This form o f disappearance is rather like a dream as he oscillates between
periods of absence and presence. For Maarten, loss, longing and memory tussle for
ownership. These notions can be applied to naming — and the possessive noun of
61 J. Bemlef, Out o f  Mind, trans. by Adrienne Dixon (London: Faber and Faber, 1989), p. 13.
62 Bemlef, p. 15.
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Alzheimer’s disease indicates foreclosure on meaningful life. A noun connotes possession: 
it clutches at the loss and longing that announces a departure from memory.
But there seems a strange and uncanny similarity between the three narrators of 
The Lifted Veil, Scar Tissue and Out o f  M ind  in referencing the mind and its surrounding 
material mass. Latimer’s mind is lit up with visions and the thoughts o f other people; 
Maarten declares, after waking from a dream, ‘My head was one large brightly lit space, 
completely empty. And outside it, there was total calm’. Ignatieff s narrator emphatically 
states
I want to be done with metaphors. I want to see the thing 
itself. I want to see deep into the hippocampus, deep into 
the parietal and occipital, down into the brainstem itself 
to the places where the protein deposits are building up, 
millisecond by millisecond, forming plaques and tangles, 
shutting down the neurotransmitters, causing the circuits 
to close down, causing me to forget, more and more 
every day ... This dream o f the transparent body, 
of seeing inside yourself, has always been the fantastic 
underside o f the official history o f the self.63
This is an intensely poignant and desperate description o f an internal landscape of
character, some kind o f search for origins with its own dark message from the deep, both
like and unlike the metaphors o f  light for Latimer and Maarten. It also alludes to the
Gothic idea o f  the brain as an essential betrayer o f the mind as the seat of self: once
Alzheimer’s destroys the neurotransmitters, the brain and self both begin to fold and
shrivel together, creating a posthuman self.
But if  this is a search for the rational based upon a neurobiological certainty, it is 
one that arrives out o f the terrifying messiness and anguish of life. The search seems to be 
a quest for a re-connection to nature, and in this way Ignatieff5 s narrator desires to cross 
the divide between medical science and the humanities. In a sense he and his brother stand 
on either side of their mother as the twin interpreters o f her condition; one seeks the secrets
63 Ignatieff, p. 194.
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of death, the other the secrets o f  life. However, although Maarten and Ignatieffs narrator
are beginning to lose consciousness of self and Latimer has an excess of consciousness,
they remain within culture, within language and therefore metaphor. Furthermore, as
Catherine Belsey points out in somewhat a materialistic Gothic idea, ‘we are inescapably
rooted in biology as products o f evolution’,64 a point exemplified by Marx and Engels
when they argue that ‘The phantoms formed in the human brain are also ... sublimates of
their material life-process’.65 Belsey writes further in relation to the disciplines o f the
humanities, that:
The days of the free-floating consciousness as the determinant 
of human nature are gone, and yet this recognition does not 
necessarily diminish the importance of human culture.
On the contrary, it locates and grounds the processes by which 
we come to make sense o f  our world. For example, developments 
in neurobiology, by showing that thoughts, perceptions and 
feelings have a material existence, which can be mapped as the 
actions and interactions o f neurons, give those supremely human 
experiences more weight, not less. The scientific challenge to 
Cartesian mind-body dualism takes ideas out o f a nebulous realm 
o f unearthly abstraction and gives them substance, the same 
substance as the materiality of the organisms that human beings 
also are. Culture -  as the virtual world produced
fifsby the physiology o f  the brain — is real.
Belsey’s rational and enlightened view o f the inter-connectedness o f biology and culture, 
the propensity o f the Humanities’ disciplines to analyse and comment on this, underpins a 
diversity of textual practices critically to expose our fearful differences. Culture, fiction 
and other genres illustrate Belsey’s thesis and Latimer in The Lifted Veil is an example o f a 
materiality which creates a virtual as well as a hyper-reality.
Neurobiology, it is being argued here, provides us, almost invites us, to begin the 
journey o f self-invention, where the subject, as it were, arises out o f  the body: the very
64 Catherine Belsey, ‘Biology and Imagination: the Role o f  Culture’ in Human Nature: Fact and Fiction, eds. 
Robin Headlam Wells and Johnjoe McFadden (London: Continuum, 2006), pp.l 11-127 (p. 111).
65 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, ed. C. J. Arthur (London. Lawrence and Wishart,
1999), p. 47.
66 Belsey, p. 111.
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stuff of the birth o f the Alzheimer’s subject. It also suggests that culture is a result o f a 
biologically based psychic structure. So, if  Ignatieff s narrator seeks some kind o f certainty 
in biology to escape the unease which the language o f metaphor seems to bestow on him, 
Belsey’s commentary, in ‘Biology and Imagination: the Role of Culture’, indicates that 
while there may be a sympathy and understanding for such a search, history and culture 
reveal in their human waywardness that the search for certainties can be a very 
troublesome journey. Can one be sure, Belsey postulates, that we all know fact from 
fiction in the way, for example, Ignatieff s narrator seems to suggest? Or does he confuse 
the two? Latimer and Maarten both begin to understand that they have diseased minds, but 
rely on culture, in the form o f words, meanings and cultural understandings, to reach this 
point. And Ignatieff s novel/memoir arrives out o f a philosophical meditation on modem 
medicine to reach a similar point, giving an emotional and subjective account o f fear - an 
instinct seemingly embedded in biology — in the process. Indeed it may be argued that 
modem medical science, with its emphasis on biomedicine, demonstrates an acute fear o f 
the body, a desire to conquer and put it in its place as an accompaniment to the mind.
Ignatieff s Scar Tissue is a story which tracks not only a mother’s death but also 
the narrator’s, as Alzheimer’s disease shadows them both, and shows the twin faces of 
tragedy — pity and terror — as its power creates the narrator’s emotional chaos. His mother 
no longer carries the weight o f her own history, but the narrator-son takes this weight on as 
an act of fidelity in the same way as, within the biographical genre, Franzen does for his 
father and Grant for her mother in turn. Each carries the weight of pity for a parent and a 
terror o f what has happened to them, a terror which may be described as a kind o f tyranny 
created by the parent’s dementia. Michael Berkeley, writing about his father, the composer
Lennox Berkeley, states:
I encountered death in an emotionally involved way
(for the first time) in 1989 when my father was admitted
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to hospital [he had Alzheimer5 s] ... I was strangely relieved 
that ‘the old m an5s friend5 pneumonia, would finally release 
him, with relative tenderness, from the tyranny o f dementia.
He had always been so quietly spoken, modest and private 
that the descent into Alzheimer's, with its rampant invasion 
of privacy, seemed to be particularly monstrous.67
Berkeley echoes the distressed anger o f the narrator o f Scar Tissue about Alzheimer’s and
what he calls its monstrous5 effects, the tyranny o f the condition, its overwhelming power
to foreclose life and its capacity publicly to expose that tyranny. The fact that his father is
released into death by another condition is welcomed with relief and the tyranny passes,
but for the Jake of Harvey’s The Wilderness, it is a continuing threat:
He pauses, interrogating his brain aggressively for the clarity 
that sometimes comes out o f  temporary confusion, but this 
time it doesn’t come. After a lifetime o f well-founded reliance 
on things just fixing themselves, he finds it disturbing to accept 
that they are more likely, now, to stay broken.68
Ghost-Writers
The gaps that occur in Jake’s and others’ memories are widened as the disease inserts itself 
as a kind of ghost-writer, moving through the gaps that it has created, leaving the body to 
its unmediated and lonely self. What becomes broken is the links between the past, the 
present and the future which normally ground the self in time and space. It is a loss of 
narrative, but what is the interplay between absence and presence in these various 
characters’ lives? What hovers in that space when the links are broken?
What may be suggested here is a ghost-writer, one who creates a self out o f a ghost 
and makes animate the inanimate, but who, paradoxically, cannot do so without unlocking 
deep fears about such representation. This is because the organising principle of writing as 
a medium and literature as a genre is a responsibility to organise reality, to give it an extra 
depth and dimension in exposing the differences which make us afraid. Each of the
67 Michael Berkeley, ‘Lennox Berkeley’, Guardian 2, 10 February 2003, p. 7.
68 Harvey, p. 61.
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characters examined above are represented in our culture through language which 
considers Alzheimer’s disease in seismic terms precisely because it creates a non-identity 
and an unnatural body out o f a natural disaster: a movement out o f one space into another, 
like some kind of migrant from culture. And it is this fear of exile which stirs within the 
sentences of these ghost-writers. The disease establishes a kind o f stilled life, a silence 
within a space, but literary art can recover and conquer time to bring a language and a life 
and thus break the silence, recovering meaning and understanding in recreating something 
akin to authenticity. These ghost-writers may be described as explorers o f ‘deep space’, 
filling it with the imaginative language o f cryptomimesis.
Castricano’s neologism seems an appropriate paradigm for the works o f biography, 
autobiography and memoir concerning Alzheimer’s disease and is particularly apt in 
relation to fiction, poetry and drama which also cover this subject-matter, providing 
emphasis to Hilary M antel’s notion o f the ghost story and the way such stories live on the 
brink o f the in-betweeness o f things. The stories o f Ignatieff s narrator, Jake and Maarten 
move between these gaps, exploring the depth o f their own and others’ messages and 
certainly the work o f carers such as Franzen, Grant and John Bayley, is one o f deciphering 
the messages that come through these ghostly gaps as they reconstruct their relatives’ 
lives. This notion of recovering and deciphering messages underlines Punter’s statement 
about metaphor, that it is ‘an innate property o f  language’ and therefore an expression ‘of 
constant excess or dissemination’ .69 In other words, the imagination can represent our 
fears through the language of fiction and other literary genres, but whether the imagination 
can also invite positive social action concerning the mitigation or cure for forms of 
dementia seems doubtful.
69 David Punter, M etaphor (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), p. 144.
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The dark language which often describes the lives of the elderly can often also fill 
their lives. The language may shade from the bleakly humorous to the tragic and it may 
describe a caring aspect anywhere on a continuum from empathetic and loving to distant 
and cruel. But the public language could not be clearer in its recognition o f how 
contemporary culture handles old age and death. There are almost daily reports in 
broadsheet and tabloid newspapers alike which, in terms o f horror, terror and fear, voice 
the parlous condition o f the elderly and the demented in today’s society. For example, a 
national newspaper with a large circulation reported recently a poll o f some 2000 people 
which found that 31 per cent ‘feared dementia above all else as they grow older, compared 
with 27 per cent who were most scared o f cancer and 18 per cent who feared death itself
•  7 0  .  •more than anything’. The headline and the report were swathed in the concept of fear and 
Terry Pratchett, a contemporary author who has early onset Alzheimer’s, was reported as 
saying that ‘Alzheimer’s is a large number o f  small tragedies usually played out behind 
closed doors, so in spite o f the numbers living with it, the world still doesn’t take much 
notice’. The idea o f a number o f small tragedies growing into a large one has something of 
an image of a Greek tragedy, one that builds up until a chorus announces the dreaded 
arrival of a fated end created by an unseen malign force.
In the same news item, Alzheimer’s Research UK suggested that dementia costs 
the economy some £23 billion a year, giving this newspaper (but it could have been any 
other) a platform to publicise the connectedness o f  private tragedies and public economy 
framed by the concept o f fear. This research also indicated that around 10 million people 
in the United Kingdom carry the apoE4 gene creating a risk o f early onset o f Alzheimer’s. 
That the general public are ignorant o f these large numbers o f personal tragedies seems
70 Martin Beckford, ‘Britain Faces Dementia Catastrophe’, Daily Telegraph, 9 February 2011, p. 1. This 
newspaper article was based on a research report by Alzheimer’s Research UK publicising the growing 
numbers diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease and particularly people at risk o f early onset Alzheimer s.
Terry Pratchett’s comments were reported within this news item.
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unlikely given the amount o f general media and literary interest in the subject in recent 
years, the number o f carers actively involved in families and many others in the caring 
professions and the health care economy. It seems more likely that the horror and the fear 
expressed about the condition are woven into the various texts referred to in this thesis and 
the increasing number o f accounts outside o f it. Thus are the psychological and social 
effects of Alzheimer’s disease comfortably, and paradoxically, hidden out of sight in the 
gothicity o f the language within the genres referred to, underlining the internal menace 
which threatens our fearful natures and our fearful differences. As the texts used here have 
indicated, such fears are well grounded because the tragedy o f Alzheimer’s disease is that 
it truly casts us off, abjects us out o f our bodies and out o f culture, into a posthuman state.
Ghost-writers work within a concept o f  change and how change occurs through the 
emergence o f substitutions, displacements, disguised conquests and various reversals. 
These writers show how changes come about through the appropriation of the defects of 
neurobiology, how the body is a conduit o f  a terrible power shifting us from one set o f 
images to another. Their texts arrive producing sentences o f a life within, announcing a 
fidelity to humanity, but with such dark undertones that the reader is taken into the arenas 
of the Gothic. And these life-sentences illustrate and represent an emotional twilight, 
leaving a body shorn o f the intensity o f self-knowledge and self-possession. In itself the 
disease writes a final chapter o f lived lives in an empty house no longer able to 
accommodate the life except through the empathetic imagination o f ghost-writers seeking 
to recapture those lived lives. The ‘I’ o f  the texts o f Scar Tissue, Out o f  Mind, The 
Wilderness and House Mother Normal is a voice which represents many other voices 
suffering loss of self and o f sovereignty and compromised by gothicity.
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